

SECTION III

Adam Smith International

Consultancy to Implement Capacity Building and Monitoring and Evaluation

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FINAL REPORT

**Capacity Building and Monitoring and
Evaluation Project -
Support to the National Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration
Commission (NDDRC) Pilot Reintegration
Project**

November 2013

IN PARTNERSHIP WITH:



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1. INTRODUCTION

1. Funded by the World Bank, Adam Smith International (ASI) and Integrity Research & Consultancy provided capacity building support to the Republic of South Sudan's National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC). This support included: project management training, mentoring, systems development and managing and undertaking baseline surveys. The pilot project was designed as a learning experience to build and enhance operational and management systems, assist in developing and elaborating procedures, test modalities, and build institutional capacity within the NDDRC. During the project, the NDDRC Headquarters (HQ) and State Office staff, along with other key stakeholders, were provided with experience and lessons that could be applied in future DDR programming.
2. A team of consultants from ASI and Integrity worked with the NDDRC between May and November 2013 to assist in strengthening the operational capacity of HQ in Juba and its offices in the four State capitals of Greater Bahr el Ghazal (Aweil, Kuajok, Rumbek and Wau). This report covers the overall support provided by ASI and Integrity in this period. Key lessons learned and recommendations to the NDDRC are presented in the final section of the report.
3. In addition the team designed, supervised and conducted two baseline surveys in relation to the pilot project. The first survey took place in the Mapel Transition Facility and dealt with ex-combatants undertaking the pilot project. The second survey took place throughout urban and rural communities across the four states and looked at the impact of DDR on those local communities affected by it. Details of these reports have been provided separately to the World Bank and NDDRC.
4. Details on the implementation process have been provided to the NDDRC and the World Bank through weekly and monthly project reports, starting with the weekly report dated 10 June 2013 and ending with the weekly report dated 1 October 2013. Specific formats and working documents that have been developed with, or for, the NDDRC staff in the State Offices have been made available directly to the teams in the states and are also accessible through the following dropbox link: <https://www.dropbox.com/home/ASI%20%26%20Integrity%20Pilot%20DDR%20South%20Sudan>.

2. IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY

5. The ASI/Integrity support commenced with an inception mission conducted by the Team Leader, 21 May - 8 June 2013, and continued through until the completion of the community baseline survey on 11 October 2013. The Inception Report was submitted to the NDDRC and the World Bank on 11 June 2013.
6. As per the Project Implementation Plan (PIP), the ASI/Integrity team would :
 - a. Support the development of Project Implementation Manual (PIM); plus related training;
 - b. Design a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system and subsequently design M&E procedures to fit in the PIM;
 - c. Implement baseline surveys of ex-combatants and communities (including training of enumerators);
 - d. Train Project Management Units (PMUs), at HQ as well as State level;
 - e. Deliver mentoring for project management and M&E; and
 - f. Draw lessons from the Pilot Project.

7. The ASI/Integrity team consisted of:
 - a. Kees Kingma – Principle Capacity Building Mentor / Team Leader
 - b. Andrew Cummings – Project Manager
 - c. Bryon Gillespie – M&E Expert
 - d. Alex Rusita – M&E Capacity Building Mentor
 - e. Martine Zeuthen – M&E Surveys Expert
 - f. Charles Abola – State-level Assistant Mentor (Lakes)
 - g. Jackie Kasiiku – State-level Assistant Mentor (NBG)
 - h. Francis Odiwuor – State-level Assistant Mentor (WBG)
 - i. Peter Olowo – State-level Assistant Mentor (Warrap)
 - j. Victor Bol Dungu – Senior Research Supervisor Ex-combatant (XC) Survey
 - k. Hollyn Hammond – Community Survey Coordinator
 - l. Omari Raraji - Research Supervisor
 - m. Martin Mande - Research Supervisor
 - n. Kilama Peter - Research Supervisor
 - o. Peter Gatouth - Research Supervisor
 - p. Edith Odhiambo – Logistical and Administrative Support
8. Throughout the project the ASI/Integrity team worked primarily with the management and staff of the NDDRC¹, in particular those represented in the Project Management Unit (PMU). At state level, good working contacts were established with numerous representatives of implementing partners, State Officials and other DDR stakeholders.
9. The team also liaised closely with the World Bank task team as well as the BICC technical advisors in Juba. In addition, it exchanged information and collaborated with the UNMISS DDR Unit, at various levels. The team also met regularly with the UNICON livelihoods team to support each other's work and share information.
10. On 30 September a comprehensive briefing of the findings of this report was provided to the senior management of the Commission and the PMU.
11. The following principles (presented in the PIP) applied to the support provided by ASI/Integrity:
 - a. The pilot project was designed and implemented as a learning process;
 - b. The ASI/Integrity team worked closely with the PMU, with the perspective to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the NDDRC as a whole;
 - c. The systems developed with the NDDRC would need to be sound, but also realistic, given the circumstances;
 - d. The assistance was based on a complementarity of training, mentoring and systems development;
 - e. The assistance focused on the NDDRC capacity at HQ level as well as in the four states of greater Bahr el Ghazal;
 - f. The assistance focused on the pilot phase, and worked primarily through the PMU. But all activities were undertaken from the perspective of strengthening the national capacity to implement the larger DDR operation that is foreseen; and
 - g. ASI/Integrity took a purposeful approach to monitoring for this assignment, focusing on building a responsive monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system that provides real-time feedback into the PMU and management team to develop evidence-based implementation and draw lessons for the future.

¹ The ASI/Integrity team is grateful to the management and staff of the NDDRC for the confidence given to them and the very positive engagement during the entire period. It would also like to express its gratitude to all the partners of the Commission with whom the cooperation was very positive and constructive

3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL

12. One of the central outputs of the project was the support provided in the development of a Project Implementation Manual (PIM) for the pilot project. The October 2012 version of the Reintegration Implementation and Operations Manual was used by the PMU as the initial starting point in order to build on previous processes. The ASI/Integrity team specifically focussed on 'shepherding' the development of the manual by the PMU in order to ensure sufficient national ownership. Many discussions were held, on process as well as the content of the PIM. In August, the PMU discussed the purpose and proposed contents of the PIM and agreed which sections were to be incorporated. At state level, the assistant mentors held discussions on relevant procedures with NDDRC staff and stakeholders. But, unfortunately, mostly due to the day-to-day work pressures on the (chairperson of the) PMU, the development of the PIM progressed slower than desired.
13. ASI/Integrity delivered draft sections of the PIM on capacity support (28 August) and M&E (30 August). UNICON delivered a section on livelihood support (26 August). On 7 October the team sent comprehensive comments on the current draft to the PMU. At the time of finalizing this report, in November 2013, no updated version of the PIM has yet been circulated by the PMU.

4. CAPACITY BUILDING AND MENTORING

4.1. TRAINING OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT UNITS

14. During the implementation of the project the members of the PMUs at HQ and in the four states of Greater Bahr el Ghazal were provided with training and on-the-job mentoring. Two four-day training workshops were conducted: one for the HQ PMU in Juba (19-22 August) and one for the staff of the four State Offices of Greater Bahr el Ghazal, in Wau (27-30 August). The training sessions covered the key issues and the systems and processes that were to be put in place, using the draft PIM as a guideline, as well as some more general management skills. The training sessions in Wau were specifically tailored to the needs, challenges and processes in the States.
15. The training sessions were facilitated by the ASI mentors along with the NDDRC staff themselves, who played a central role by providing presentations and leading some of the discussions. Both workshops produced a list of urgent and important action points related to the implementation of the pilot project that are currently being followed up by the PMU. The documents produced for the workshops are stored in drop box under:
<https://www.dropbox.com/home/ASI%20%26%20Integrity%20Pilot%20DDR%20South%20Sudan>.
16. In addition to the HQ and the (combined) state level training sessions, smaller sessions were held at State level in which the existing systems and procedures were discussed with the responsible staff, as well as relevant institutional partners. Particular focus was given to critical approaches to provide reintegration assistance and conduct M&E, as well as on administrative and financial management systems. Discussions included the way in which the Commission would need to involve key stakeholders in the DDR process. More details are provided in the four separate reports by the state-level mentors. Through their engagement in the baseline surveys outlined in above, the ICRS caseworkers received a significant amount of training, including interview skills and analysis.

4.2. PROJECT MANAGEMENT MENTORING AND CAPACITY BUILDING

17. Following the training sessions conducted in Juba and Wau, the four State-level Mentors travelled on 2 September to 'their' states where they were embedded in the NDDRC Offices, whilst the Principle Capacity Building Mentor continued his mentoring and support role at NDDRC HQ. Prior to their

deployment in the States, on the 31 August, three State-level Mentors travelled to the TF in Mapel to familiarise themselves with: the training accorded to ex-combatants; the achievements thus far; challenges and barriers to success; and the key issues involved.

18. As planned, a process of mentoring took place throughout the period during which ASI/Integrity were involved. Each member of the ASI/Integrity team conducted their work in such a manner that it enabled and empowered the members of the HQ and state offices to understand and implement their own tasks. Team members were always accessible for questions and advice. They also actively raised questions and/or made suggestions with regard to the responsibilities of the members of the PMUs. The mentoring was an ongoing and mostly informal process. The main mentoring relationships were:
 - a. The Principle Capacity Building Mentor worked with the Chairperson of the HQ PMU and the Director for Reintegration.
 - b. The State-level Mentors primarily mentored the Directors of the state offices.

However, all of the mentors also extended the mentoring process to others in the relevant PMUs. In the processes of mentoring they also interacted with relevant stakeholders in the broader reintegration process, such as State Governors, State Ministries and implementing partners.

19. As part of the mentoring process, the Team Leader participated in PMU meetings whenever he was in Juba, starting with the first PMU meeting on 7 June. He had regular discussions with the PMU chairperson, supported him in the leadership of the pilot activities and building systems and practices. He also held individual meetings with most other members of the PMU, discussing their work, expectations, systems to be developed, etc. Specific issues for the individual staff were always placed in the context of the broader challenges for the Commission to support the reintegration of XCs. Specifically in the preparation for the training sessions in Juba and Wau, he assisted some key members of the PMU in their preparation.
20. The team leader also held regular sessions with senior management of the Commission to take stock of the progress of the project and to discuss relevant capacity issues within the Commission. Some of the separate meetings with the Deputy Chairperson (and some NDDRC staff) addressed the adjustments in the NDDRC organizational structure that are being considered. The team has provided the comments on the proposed new structure as well as several draft job descriptions for key positions in the Commission.
21. The four State-level Mentors each started their work in the states with an assessment of the activities and capacity of the office. They did so in close cooperation with the staff in the office. General findings of the current capacity of the four State Offices were:
 - a. Staffing in the states offices generally shows gaps and a lack of clarity regarding the staffing structure. Some offices show critical staffing gaps with regards to Administration & Finance and M&E. Some staff do not possess the qualifications required for the job. Most of the offices are therefore not foreseen to be able to respond appropriately to an increased workload once the XCs return to their States. Relevant job descriptions and staff records are often lacking. Junior staff in particular have limited knowledge of their day-to-day roles and responsibilities.
 - b. Some staff possesses significant relevant work experience from their role during the DDR operation as part of the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA DDR).
 - c. The availability of vehicles and equipment varies in the states. In most offices servicing and maintenance is irregular and/or poor. This results in a significant number of computers, vehicles and other equipment not being operational. Some are merely abandoned due to lack of spare parts or other repairs. In Warrap State, for example, three of the four 4x4s are immobile. Computers are running on pirated software and have no anti-virus. The risk of serious loss of data is significant.

- d. Financial and administrative systems are generally weak. The Financial Management and Operational Guidelines Manual for the South Sudan NDDRC is available in the offices, but not used. Administrative planning and filing of documents is not practiced.
 - e. Little programmatic work is going on. Very few activities are initiated at State level. The offices are mostly reacting to what is demanded by NDDRC HQ. There are no work-plans or budgets for office operations. The ASI consultants found little preparation for the reintegration support that is needed by the XCs, as they are returning to the States. Only some mapping of reintegration opportunities was going on. However, there are difficulties in accessing the data entered into the ICRS database.
 - f. No frameworks existed for collaboration or coordination with stakeholders or implementing partners.
 - g. No systematic M&E systems and practices are in place.
22. The general approach taken by the four consultants was to engage in a constructive and participatory fashion with the available state office staff and to try to jointly develop and implement improvements in systems and practices. Unfortunately, events linked to the graduation ceremony at Mapel on 18 September drew away most state-level staff, leaving the mentors to work with the one or two staff who remained. One-on-one coaching and mentoring sessions with available staff were held. In all states relevant stakeholders were consulted, in particular the UNMISS DDR officers and government officials.
23. Some of the critical areas identified by the mentors and which they worked on with the staff of the state offices are:
- a. Development of work-plans for the implementation of the pilot project in each State;
 - b. Requesting more clarity about the resources available for the operations of the State Offices, especially now that the reintegration of the pilot caseload needs to be supported;
 - c. (Re-)defining roles and responsibilities of staff in the office; drafting of job descriptions;
 - d. Orientation on financial management and operational guidelines manual;
 - e. Opportunity mapping and generating information from ICRS to support reintegration of the XCs, especially linking their needs to existing opportunities in return areas;
 - f. Strengthening supervision and coordination of the work of implementing partners;
 - g. Discussing and defining M&E requirements and responsibilities;
 - h. Establishing clear communication and reporting lines with NDDRC HQ;
 - i. Improvement of internal communication as well as flow and storage of information;
 - j. Strengthening public information (PI);
 - k. Active engagement with implementing partners and other stakeholders.

The mentors also initiated processes to identify practical issues to improve work in/of the office and come up with creative thinking about effective reintegration support.

24. The four reports on the state-level mentoring, including short SWOT analyses, are attached to this report. In addition, the mentors produced – often together with the NDDRC staff – several formats and working documents for use in the specific state. These documents have been left with the State Coordinators – and through them with other staff – and are also stored in the dropbox link: <https://www.dropbox.com/home/ASI%20%26%20Integrity%20Pilot%20DDR%20South%20Sudan>.
25. A specific format for work planning has been developed jointly by the mentors and has been shared with the PMU chairperson. It has subsequently been discussed within the PMU and recommended by PMU to be used by NDDRC.

5. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

26. Assisting the Commission in building its Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) capacity was the other key area of ASI/Integrity support. As agreed, the enhanced M&E system was to be based as much as

- possible on the existing systems within the NDDRC and would include effective and efficient linkages with the Commission’s Information, Counselling and Referral System (ICRS).
27. Early on in the process, from 23 June till 19 July, two Integrity consultants worked with the Commission to assess the situation and propose an initial M&E system appropriate for the anticipated tasks ahead. In the PMU meeting on 10 July the Integrity/ASI team presented a draft results framework, an overview of how the M&E system could operate, as well as a draft capacity development plan for M&E. Subsequently, on 25 July the ASI/Integrity team delivered an update on the work done thus far on the M&E system and capacity, including the main components already developed. A draft M&E section for the PIM was submitted on 30 August.
 28. As reported throughout the implementation of the project, the effectiveness of the ASI/Integrity team in assisting the Commission in establishing an appropriate and functioning M&E system was hampered by the absence of M&E staff/Unit within the NDDRC. Encouragingly the first two members of the NDDRC M&E Unit were appointed in late September. However the late appointment of these posts meant that they took place after the provision of the advisory support and as such the ASI/Integrity team had no significant opportunity to train or mentor either individual.
 29. Significant briefing and training will still need to take place in addition to some organizational clarifications to enable the Unit to start systematic M&E of the pilot project. The Commission should further clarify (in the PIM) the precise intended role of the M&E Unit and its interaction with the ICRS, which currently manages most of the Management Information System (MIS). As observed in the PIP, “To be successful in its ongoing data collection, analysis and reporting, the M&E Unit will require ongoing coordination between the Unit, the HQ PMU, the SPMUs and implementing partners.”
 30. The ASI/Integrity team did conduct broader training on M&E for staff of the NDDRC, particularly through multiple sessions devoted to M&E during training workshops in Juba and Wau in August, and as part of the ongoing mentoring at State level.
 31. As part of an extension of project funding the team was also tasked with completing a draft M&E manual for the NDDRC. The document provides details of the M&E system for the pilot project, as well as establishes guidance on how M&E could be run beyond the pilot. The manual includes the proposed roles and responsibilities as well as a detailed draft logical framework and reporting schedule for the Commission. Its purpose is to provide detailed guidance and practical tools for the M&E staff and other staff involved in M&E, so that they will be able to effectively track the project’s progress and inform decision making for effective and efficient management of the Commission’s operations. The manual will allow all staff (not only staff involved in M&E) to see how data and information about the programme is intended to feed back into management to continuously adapt and adjust implementation in order to improve. Buy in at all levels will help the process of data collection and sharing of lessons from the analysis.
 32. It had been foreseen that the M&E experts in the team would work closely with the M&E teams of the livelihood and community support components (components 3 & 4) of the pilot project in order to ensure cross-programmatic coordination and minimize data collection duplication. However, due to timing and operational constraints, much of this harmonization could not take place.

6. BASELINE SURVEYS

33. A significant part of the M&E component was the support to two baseline surveys, one covering ex-combatants (XCs) and one focussed on communities of return. The objectives of the surveys were to:
 - a. understand the demographic characteristics, livelihood aspirations and social capital profiles of XCs;

- b. document the impacts of livelihood activities on XCs and their communities, income and savings; and
- c. provide broader level information to the NDDRC for use in:
 - i. documenting programme impacts in a post-pilot phase and methods for improving programme management, and
 - ii. developing new and improved livelihood and capacity building products and services.

6.1. EX-COMBATANT SURVEY

34. The baseline survey of XCs was designed with assistance of World Bank consultants. It was developed by drawing on experience of similar surveys in Uganda, Rwanda and elsewhere. The survey was tested at the Transition Facility (TF) in Mapel 27-28 May. Some minor adjustments were made and the survey was subsequently handed over to the ASI/Integrity team, which trained the enumerators and conducted the actual survey. The sample encompassed (almost) the entire population of XCs accepted into the TF in Mapel by 1 June 2013.
35. The training of the enumerators (12 NDDRC ICRS caseworkers) took place in Wau 2-4 July, led by the M&E Capacity Building Expert. The training focused on familiarizing the enumerators with administering the tool itself, as well as on good interview practice, and research ethics required for conducting surveys. The participants also identified several questions that they felt risked being culturally insensitive and could thus damage rapport and jeopardize data quality, or generate erroneous or irrelevant data. Discussions allowed the group to frame the questions during the interview in order to get the intended information. Enumerators flagged problematic questions, or issues that participants raised and were not included, in the questionnaire as background information for the statistical analysis.
36. A Senior Research Supervisor oversaw the work of the enumerators during the survey, mostly through spot checks. He provided quality control by reviewing data as it was entered into the ICRS database, and held debriefings each evening in order to receive feedback from enumerators about issues they encountered, whilst consolidating these issues into notes for the analyst who conducted the statistical analysis. Both the enumerators and the Senior Research Supervisor produced reports informing the process of running the surveys that were used in the methodology section of the report.
37. Reporting on the XC baseline survey was led by the M&E Surveys Expert. The draft report on the survey was submitted to the NDDRC/PMU and the World Bank on 19 August, for comments. Comments have been received from NDDRC and the World Bank and have been incorporated in the survey report.
38. The XC survey produced information about the XCs with regards to livelihoods, and the XCs' perceptions of safety and the way they expect to be received in communities of return. Findings show that a large majority of respondents (86%) expected to be 'totally' accepted upon their return. Most XCs (81%) also claimed to feel safe upon their return to their areas of residence. It is of note that 74% asserted that violence would never occur between XCs and other civilians due to differences between these groups. The survey included details around the daily life of the XCs, and when asking if the household ever goes hungry 8% claimed that their household 'always' goes hungry, with a further 48% asserting that members of their household 'always' are reliant upon food donations, with an additional 20% stating that their household are 'often' reliant upon donations. 2% claimed that their household is 'always' forced to search for food in the streets with a further 3% asserting that this 'often' occurs. One third of the respondents mentioned that they were considering moving to other parts of the country or abroad to find better employment.
39. The survey also produced a number of direct recommendations for the programme, as well as on how to manage these surveys in the future. These recommendations highlight the importance of the instrument design and in particular the necessity of including national experts in the development of

the questions, to ensure they are culturally sensitive to the specific location. The recommendations also stressed the importance of getting the survey instrument and programming (if IT solutions used) correct from the start and sufficiently piloted with the enumeration teams, in order to minimize the risks of human mistakes and individual interpretation in the field.

40. Tracer studies have been planned for 2014 separate to this project that will compare the situation before and after the XCs' return home and the (initial) reintegration support has been received. This tracer study will provide further guidance to the work of the NDDRC. The follow-up survey will be provide important analysis around outcome of the pilot and enable more programmatic recommendations.

6.2. COMMUNITY SURVEY

41. The instrument for the baseline survey of communities built on lessons learned in the earlier XCs survey. It was reviewed and fine-tuned together with the NDDRC and the World Bank. The baseline provides a snapshot of community attitudes towards returnees and XCs. This provides an important input for the Steering Committee in its development of the strategy for community support throughout the pilot project. Perceptions, expectations, fears, attitudes and socio-economic circumstances of the communities that the XCs are reintegrating into are captured. The baseline provides a point of comparison for the tracer study that will be conducted in the later stages of the reintegration process, which will capture changes that may have come about during project implementation, and beyond.
42. The training of the twelve enumerators took place in Wau at the UNMISS DDR training facility on 19-21 September. Training was led by the Community Survey Coordinator and focused on content and translation of the survey as well as an introduction to the 'tablet' tool used for data collection. As most of the enumerators had also been involved in the XC survey, significant capacity already existed within the group. Emphasis was placed on teaching techniques to approach and interact with community members. Enumerators were trained in household selection techniques using a Kish grid to ensure that each adult member of a chosen household had the same chance of being interviewed, without bias being placed on the male heads of family. The three-day training concluded with a small pilot with members of the UN community, after which again a few minor changes were made to the sequencing and wording of some questions.
43. Considerably more women were sampled in this survey due to a number of factors including a higher population of females in the four states. During the harvest season, many men had travelled back to their home villages in other locations to work in the fields for one to two months; and recent tribal conflicts in Western Bahr Ghazal meant a number of men had lost their lives, whilst others had picked up arms and were hiding or fighting in the bush (as was reported by the enumerators). Overall, communities were very open to participating in the survey, as they saw their opinions as important to the process that they have heard about through DDR campaigns nationwide. In addition many participants were encouraged by their community leaders who had been briefed on the purpose of the survey.
44. Each state team consisted of a supervisor and three enumerators. They travelled by road to the state capitals, overcoming the significant logistical challenges that this entailed. Mapping and surveying of the communities started in the four States – Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap and Lakes – on 23 September following intense sensitization processes with the tribal leaders and government officials. The teams were able to locate the enumeration area (with help from NDDRC staff and photographs of the maps of the National Bureau of Statistics – NBS) and begin the mapping exercise. Despite heavy rain, interviewing by the enumerators progressed largely as planned. After each team surveyed 115 households in the urban site, the teams travelled to one rural site each day to map and survey a further 115 households (with the exception of Northern Bahr el Ghazal where only the urban site was surveyed). Enumerator teams were supervised by a Research Supervisor, who ensured that community sampling protocols were observed using a

randomized participant selection process (Kish Grid) and representative data was collected according to the sample plan. Overall 805 households across the four states were surveyed.

45. The community survey produced information about the XCs and how community members perceived their return. The survey also included data livelihoods, economics, cooperatives, social capital, empowerment and security in the communities. Some of the most interesting findings centred on security and conflict in relation to the XCs. For example 76 per cent claimed to feel 'very safe' in the areas in which they lived. Many thought that the presence of XCs made no difference to local safety (45 per cent) or made the community safer (37 per cent). These findings, aided by high levels of trust in government employees in the SPLA (49 per cent maintained 'lots of trust') and government employees in the police service (45 per cent), may speak to positive sentiments expressed around XCs more broadly. Community members on the whole seemed to have been accepting of returning XCs and a common perception observed in the field was that the XCs were often treated with respect and appreciation. In terms of local conflicts, 96 per cent maintained that if they had a serious argument with someone else living in their area they would be able to resolve the problem without resorting to physical violence. Considering livelihoods, a key component of the DDR programme, levels of hunger were high (despite high rates of livestock and landownership) with 51 per cent asserting that their household 'often' goes hungry and a further 7 per cent claiming that this is 'always' the case.
46. Besides the findings derived from the data, the process of undertaking the survey also produced some recommendations for managing these surveys in the future. These recommendations highlight the importance of translating the concepts in the instrument to ensure they are culturally sensitive to the specific location. The ASI/Integrity team also recommended that importance be attached to planning the household survey during the dry season to avoid transport, mapping and enumeration delays caused by heavy rains. Additionally, enumerators may need to be more explicitly trained to manage expectations of community leaders or participants who might anticipate a follow-on project to the survey exercise.

7. LESSONS LEARNED

47. The pilot project has thus far produced several lessons with regard to organization and management of the NDDRC, project preparation and implementation, M&E, and communications. These lessons have been drawn mostly from discussion with the NDDRC staff and management. They are formulated here so that they can be considered in future DDR programming in South Sudan.
48. It is important to note that many of the earlier lessons identified as part of previous projects had not been fully or appropriately utilized. As part of the training sessions in Juba and Wau the team engaged members of the PMUs in a discussion based around a list of lessons drawn from reviews and evaluations of the DDR operation conducted as part of the implementation of the CPA (CPA DDR). These discussions showed that many of those earlier lessons still required attention.

7.1. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

a) As indicated in the project's Inception Report, it is the view of the ASI/Integrity team that 'capacity building' is more than the establishment/improvement of systems and training of staff. Institutional capacity depends to a large extent on: a) the organizational structure; b) planning and management; c) communication and learning capacity and practices; d) available resources; and e) staffing, including organizational culture, motivation and qualifications. Indeed, during their engagement the mentors observed that the capacity of the Commission is at least as much constrained by the way the Commission is organized and managed as by the qualifications of its staff. In its activities and discussions aimed at increasing the preparedness of the NDDRC to initiate and

implement a substantial reintegration support program, the ASI/Integrity team has therefore taken a broad approach.

b) The capacity of the NDDRC is still affected by the lack of clarity about the organizational structure of the Commission, as well as the specific roles and responsibilities of units and officials. Discussions were held and expert advice requested and provided to senior management. But to date no breakthrough has been reached. Among others the relationship between the ICRS and the other reintegration support provided by the Commission, as well as the use of the MIS in the ICRS for broader M&E, still needs to be formally established. In short, the lesson is that external support can only reach its potential if the national authorities ensure that its own organisations are fit for purpose.

c) The establishment of the PMU has helped to expedite some operational processes in the Commission. However, it has not facilitated the streamlining of the work of the Commission as a whole. In the light of the GoSS' intention to expand and accelerate demobilization and reintegration support and the foreseen increasing number of implementing partners (and possible funding streams), an explicit phasing out strategy for the PMU appears to be required. Time and effort needs to be invested in (improving) the regular structure and functions of the organization.

d) At the State level the introduction of SPMUs has not added significant value to the existing structure of the NDDRC offices. It would be more beneficial to invest in existing systems and coherent staffing of these offices than in a new structure specifically for the implementation of one project.

e) Given the importance of both the proper management of the State Offices as well as the TFs, it is recommended that dedicated managers be recruited for the positions of TF Manager (at Mapel and the two new TFs). The current arrangement, where one of the State Coordinators acts as TF Manager, affects the preparation for the reintegration support in at least one State.

f) Most of the units in the Commission are currently acting too much in isolation. The DDR programme should be implemented by the entire Commission together, and all activities should be seen in their support to the overall reintegration process of the XCs. Therefore, linkages and collaboration procedures needs to be developed to deliver more effectively and efficiently. In addition, staff should be focused on the actual impact of their work on reintegration, with individual's objectives being aligned with the overarching objectives of the NDDRC. As a practical example, visits by NDDRC staff to the TF or communities should be well coordinated and serve the purpose of the programme as a whole.

g) The involvement of ICRS caseworkers in the conduct of surveys has benefitted their general understanding of the challenges and opportunities in the reintegration processes. It has however also affected the time they could spend on their operational tasks in reintegration support.

h) Mentoring has shown to be an effective approach to assist staff to take on their actual responsibilities and engage more proactively and responsibly with their immediate colleagues as well as other units in the Commission. More coherence in the activities of the Commission was achieved through the mentoring process, as well as the general work of the PMU.

i) As a result of mentoring in the state offices the staff are more aware of the importance of systems and procedures. Some of these systems have been revived in discussions at the state level. The team found that some of the systems/formats of the CPA DDR should not be discarded offhand, but reviewed and assessed for further relevance. For example, the Financial Management and Operational Guidelines Manual is useful, but needs to be reviewed. Also SOPs need to be reviewed. However, it should be clear that the use of these systems and procedures would need to be guided

more clearly and forcefully from the center (HQ). As an important first step, the ASI/Integrity team developed a work planning and budgeting format, which should be discussed and adopted by the NDDRC and then utilized (and supervised) at all levels across the country.

7.2. COMMUNICATIONS

j) Many of the problems faced in the work of the Commission are related to the lack of timely and accurate communication. The current structure and practices of the Commission do not encourage and facilitate an appropriate flow of relevant information within the Commission, nor towards the Commission's partners and other stakeholders. Measures need to be taken towards more transparency throughout the programme. Operational processes need to be developed among others to share information with XCs and their communities through radio, mobile phone, follow-up visits, etc. The existing communication strategy needs to include both an internal and external strategy and be updated and systematically implemented.

7.3. PREPARATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

k) Linkages between the NDDRC programme and the SPLA's preparation of the combatants while they are still within the military must be strengthened. More efforts are required to understand the SPLA process (including for Wounded Heroes) and to bring both processes together.

l) The ICRS has made progress with regard to the collection of information on the individual XCs (mainly through the intake registration process and baseline surveys) as well as on services and economic opportunities in the areas where XCs are foreseen to return. However, it has thus far not yet provided services in the reintegration process. The actual approach to counsel and advise the XCs is not yet clearly spelled out. How precisely will the XCs be informed in a timely fashion on the opportunities existing or foreseen? For example, it was a significant missed opportunity that the first group of XCs going through the Mapel TF was not provided with ICRS services while at the TF.

m) The outcomes of the baseline surveys will provide useful information for the design and planning of reintegration support. It should be clearly noted, however, that the XC survey was not based on a random sample of the overall caseload. It remains a serious question what the anticipated profile will be of larger groups of XCs that will be assisted by the Commission through the overall programme. For example, planning might have to take into account that their average age would be older than the pilot group. This could result in increased numbers of XCs who will not be interested in training for manual activities.

n) There remains a need for greater clarity on what type of assistance will be provided to the XCs. In addition, more information needs to be shared with XCs on the assistance they can expect to receive through the ICRS. Moreover, will there be more services to the XCs? Will there be anything such as work brigades? Knowing what they can and cannot expect from the NDDRC strengthens the position of the XCs to take full charge of their own reintegration, which is likely to result in more lasting results.

o) It is critical for the confidence of the XCs in the process as well as their own planning that toolkits and other business inputs be available when announced, and that the delivery process and timing is well communicated to the XC.

p) Little attention has been devoted thus far to informing and sensitizing the communities prior to the return of XCs. Particular attention would need to be devoted to the potential for conflict associated to the return of XCs and the general risks associated with alcohol abuse.

- q) Gender issues have thus far not been sufficiently integrated in the preparation and implementation of the reintegration support. Structural approaches need to be developed to deal with issues observed in the communities.
- r) The PIM would need to contain a section on access to land and the possibilities and procedures for XCs (or cooperatives) to acquire land.
- s) Too little explicit effort is made to utilize XCs in the support to the reintegration processes of others. More involvement of XCs themselves in project implementation appears to be possible and useful.
- t) The capacity (and willingness to assist) of the UNMISS DDR Unit is insufficiently acknowledged and utilized by the Commission.

7.4. MONITORING & EVALUATION

- u) With regard to M&E the main lesson is that the Commission has invested too little attention and resources in establishing an M&E Unit. Throughout the project there was no staffed M&E unit in the Commission. This meant that the ASI/Integrity support project has not had sufficient traction in strengthening the M&E systems and capacity of the NDDRC. The now newly established unit appears to be starting from scratch, with no handover of the work done by the previous M&E officer arranged. The new M&E officer has attended only the general training by the ASI/Integrity team.
- v) The Commission should further clarify (in the PIM) the precise role of the M&E Unit and how it will work with the ICRS. For purposes of M&E, an MIS needs to be formalized, drawing on the experience with the 'DREAM database' and ensuring linkages with the database managed within the ICRS.
- w) The timing of the two surveys has in several ways affected the effectiveness and efficiency of the programme. For future programmes, sufficient time should be given to the implementing team to carefully review the survey questionnaire before the actual training and implementation of the survey. The surveys should be scheduled at a time that does not interfere with important events and processes in the programme, for example graduation of XCs. Moreover, the survey results should be available in order to support the design of the reintegration assistance.
- x) The XC baseline survey training made it clear that ICRS caseworkers and other Commission staff need to be more closely involved in the development of the tool than they have been in the past for the following reasons: 1) building capacity of staff to carry out research; 2) validating the tool and ensuring questions are culturally appropriate; and 3) maintaining 'ownership' of the program by the NDDRC staff. Therefore the implementation of the survey should include a thorough validation and pilot phase to adjust the instrument, if required.
- y) The interest in participating in the survey at Mapel was high because it was connected to the distribution of the official DDR ID Cards. The XCs were keen to report for the interview early on. The team notes, however, that in the light of the status of the payroll system in the SPLA the general process of verification of eligibility for participating in the process – and thus entitlement to the ID card – still needs to be strengthened.
- z) An issue still to be clarified by the NDDRC is to what extent the M&E process would also continue to track the reintegration of those XCs supported under the CPA DDR. Their reintegration processes could provide major lessons for the ongoing operation. To monitor their reintegration would require that the M&E system that was put in place for this purpose be revived and operationalized. Access to the 'DREAM database' used for the CPA DDR still needs to be resolved as this has been a stumbling block.

8. CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

49. The lessons listed above should be addressed by the Commission and its partners in order to make the Commission sufficiently effective in dealing with the challenge of supporting the planned demobilization and reintegration of over 100,000 combatants over the coming years. Below are some of the key recommendations in the area of organization and management, partnerships, the ICRS and communications that arise from these lessons.

8.1. NDDRC STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT.

50. In order to continue to be the central organization leading the (planning and preparation for) demobilization and reintegration support, as outlined in the Government's policy, the Commission should further strengthen its capacity. The strengthening of this national ownership of the DDR operation could be achieved through:
- a. enhancing a realistic and efficient organizational structure of the NDDRC; so that the Commission can effectively plan for the DDR process and guide and supervise its implementing partners;
 - b. improving human resource management throughout the NDDRC; and
 - c. developing a positive organizational culture in the Commission.
51. Specific activities recommended are:
- a. create uniformity and consistency in the staffing structure;
 - b. specify how the PMU will be fully absorbed in the regular NDDRC structure;
 - c. clarify responsibilities of units and staff;
 - d. introduce clear timelines for the various tasks and activities;
 - e. strengthen HR function at the state level;
 - f. introduce a job evaluation process;
 - g. continue streamlining the administrative procedures; and
 - h. ensure systems and operations remain simple and focussed.

8.2. IMPROVED PARTNERSHIPS.

52. For an effective nationally owned demobilization and reintegration process the NDDRC would need to clarify and strengthen its relationships with its partners. Specific groups of (potential) partners are:
- a. **The SPLA and other organized services.** The timing of the demobilization of the combatants will be decided by the SPLA and the other four organized services. These organisations must ensure that demobilization is irreversible. These services are also in a position to provide the NDDRC with the specific profiles of the combatants to be released and to play a leading role in the strategic communications to potential ex combatants and to the wider security sector.
 - b. **Line ministries.** In the medium term reintegration support will be provided through the government's line ministries. However, thus far, the engagement of these ministries in Juba and in the states is very limited.
 - c. **UNMISS.** It is the impression of the team that if the NDDRC would provide more proactive clarity about the Commission's intended work plan, the DDR Unit of UNMISS would be able to

provide much more effective support to the DDR process, including the strengthening of the capacity of the Commission itself.

- d. **Implementing partners.** Guidelines could be developed by the Commission outlining the role that implementing partners would play in the implementation of the national DDR programme (to be included in PIM). This would also require more clarity about the programme that the Commission is preparing for.
 - e. **NGOs and private sector partners.** As part of the operation of the ICRS, the Commission could be much more proactive in engaging NGOs and private firms in the reintegration support to XCs. Improved contact with local governments and community/opinion leaders is also essential for successful implementation of the reintegration support.
53. The NDDRC should therefore create a comprehensive stakeholder engagement plan and assign personnel to oversee relations at a strategic and operational level with each of the above partners. This plan should be overseen by the Commission and would help to bind in these key organisations to ensure that all relevant parties affected by DDR feel sufficient ownership and can be held accountable for delivery. In order to do this training could be conducted with key staff on how to build effective and sustainable partnerships at various levels

8.3. ICRS

54. The ICRS is designed to be one of the main mechanisms of the NDDRC to support the reintegration of the XCs. To date the emphasis has been on designing the system, training staff, and collecting and storing information. The ICRS does not yet function to actually support the reintegration of the recently returned XCs by generating opportunities. Specific activities recommended are:
- a. discuss and finalize the ICRS manual (including sections on how to interact with the XCs);
 - b. commence the counselling process as early as possible and preferably whilst the XCs are still at the TF;
 - c. expedite operationalization of the ICRS to benefit the XCs immediately following their return to their home areas (especially through referrals);
 - d. develop procedures of cooperation with the NDDRC's Reintegration Department and the M&E Unit; and
 - e. harmonize the ICRS and reintegration staffing at the state level.

8.4. COMMUNICATIONS

55. Accurate and timely communication, both internally and externally, are essential for effective and efficient demobilization and reintegration support. Internal and external communications strategies should be developed and operationalized. The entire NDDRC should understand and regularly communicate the key messages of this plan.

9. CONCLUSION

56. The ASI/Integrity support to the Commission was short term in nature and covered the process for fewer than 300 individual XCs moving through the Maple TF. In order to ensure that the NDDRC is sufficiently capable of delivering a DDR programme both in the three pilot TFs but also more broadly when numbers increase into the tens of thousands, significant and ongoing capacity building support, and in particular on the job mentoring would be required. The challenge facing the NDDRC remains significant and it is important to ensure that the organisation is equipped, responsive and results driven at all levels. Further support, particularly in bringing greater ownership at state level is a key priority, whilst ongoing support within the HQ is also recommended.