

## 4. Reintegration of former combatants in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri

This section provides an assessment of the socio-economic reintegration of former combatants in South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri. An analysis of the DRC economy is provided as a backdrop to understanding ex-combatant behaviour. As this section reveals, the vast majority of ex-combatants, similar to most of the DRC's economically active population, have interacted with the informal sector of the economy in order to sustain themselves. The most financially viable activities have been in the small business, fisheries, transport and extraction (mining) sectors.

### 4.1 DRC economic overview

The main GDP source in the DRC is agriculture, which contributes more than 40% (including the forestry sector). Mining adds more than a quarter to GDP, with other significant contributors being industry (16.1%) and services (31.8%). Between 2006 and 2010 there was an average real GDP growth of 6.5%. Mining has been identified as a major growth area for the country, given the substantial reserves of cobalt ore copper, coltan, tantalum, tin and diamonds.<sup>42</sup> The World Bank has suggested that mining could contribute as much as 25% to GDP.<sup>43</sup> Estimated mineral exports were in the region of US\$6.6 billion in 2008. Cobalt accounted for more than a third (38%) of the total value of mineral exports; copper, 35%; crude petroleum, 12%; and diamonds, 11%.<sup>44</sup> Nonetheless, agriculture will continue to be the bedrock of economic and livelihood security of the DRC in the foreseeable future.

The mineral (extractive) sector in the DRC has typically been dominated by state-owned industrial mining enterprises, but sustained war, poor governance and neglect effectively rendered them “moribund and

producing a fraction of the production of previous years”.<sup>45</sup> Consequently, government revenues from mining are substantially lower than they should be. Processes to restructure state mining companies are underway, with a number of foreign mining companies investing in the DRC, such as Australia, Canada, China, South Africa and the US. The involvement of the military and armed groups in the mining sector in the east, however, has constrained the contribution of mining revenues to improving human security. The artisanal mining sector critically produces the highest volume of mineral commodities in the DRC. For example, this sector was responsible for approximately 70% of the total DRC diamond extraction.<sup>46</sup>

DRC forested areas are estimated to be 145 million hectares in size, of which 20 million hectares were granted as timber concessions to about 60 formal sector companies, but “only about a dozen companies are in operation”.<sup>47</sup> The formal sector production is primarily for export purposes, and exports are typically

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42 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country report: Democratic Republic of Congo, London, September, 2011.

43 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 4.

44 U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 2009 Minerals yearbook, Congo (Kinshasa), May 2011, 11.1.

45 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 6.

46 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 6-7; Business Monitor International, Democratic Republic of Congo mining report Q1 2010, January 6, 2010.

47 Forests Monitor, The timber sector in the DRC: a brief overview, Cambridge, 2007.

in the form of logs.<sup>48</sup> Between 1995 and 2010, timber production increased by 27.7%.

## 4.2 Ex-combatant socio-economic reintegration

Ex-combatants have pursued a wide variety of livelihood strategies in the three areas, with most engaging in small businesses, artisanal mining, transport, and fishing. A significant number of ex-combatants undertake a variety of economic activities in an effort to improve their income-generating potential. Former combatants with families/dependents generally opted for more stable livelihood options. Ex-combatants without the skills, networks and start-up capital for small businesses typically opted for livelihood options such as artisanal mining, subsistence agriculture and casual labour. It appeared that younger former armed group members were more vulnerable to being recruited into armed groups and/or engaging in criminal activities. Such endeavours included: smuggling of gold; armed robbery; drug trafficking; and gun-running. In some cases, ex-combatants used income derived from licit activities to invest in illicit activities, and vice versa.

Some ex-combatants used their reinsertion/reintegration kits to enhance their income generating potential, while others sold the disposable components of the kits to invest in business ventures or for short-term consumption. Those kits that were sold did not go to waste, but arguably contributed to the recapitalisation of the urban economy in the eastern DRC. Money, livestock, seeds, foods and equipment (from the kits) were injected into the local economy in a widely dispersed manner. These kits that were then bought by others presumably better placed to make use of them.

A common theme among interviewees was that DDR kits were best utilised when recipients re-entered professions they had pursued before they took up arms, and initiated viable businesses, capable of generating incomes over not just the short but also the medium term. According to Dziju Malozi Jacqueline of the *Fédération des Mamans de l'Ituri*, a Bunia-based NGO founded in 2001, this has worked with large numbers of ex-combatants, and particularly women:

“Fewer women ex-combatants than men sold their kits. In my view, this is because the main

responsibility for keeping households going falls on women, so they have had more motivation to keep the materials that were given them, and to make good use of them.”<sup>49</sup>

However, Malozi complained that ex-combatant women had been unfairly discriminated against in the DDR process, and had consequently received fewer demobilisation kits than they should have:

“The circumstances of women ex-combatants were not taken into account properly during the process. To get the demobilisation package you needed to surrender a weapon. But women ex-combatants often did not have weapons. Where they had weapons, often their commanders took them off them, so they were unable to present a weapon at the demobilisation camps. And others did not have weapons to start with, since they were performing other tasks, such as carrying messages, providing sex, and cooking. Another issue was that with some women who did receive kits, their husbands or their families stole them.”<sup>50</sup>

The most common complaint about the kits, voiced by numerous interviewees, was that they were insufficient, in terms of funds and equipment. NGO representatives also voiced frustrations that the kits they had distributed were inadequate, though some acknowledged that had the kits been more generous, the resentment of non-ex-combatants, many of which had suffered greatly during the war at the hands of the very fighters apparently being rewarded for their violence, would have been far greater. A sense of gratitude for the reinsertion/reintegration support was notably absent.

### 4.2.1 Small businesses and cross-border trading

As with most economies in the Great Lakes region, there is a significant small business component in the DRC. Many households, particularly in urban areas

48 L. Debroux et al (Eds.), *Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda*, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007.

49 Interview with Dziju Malozi Jacqueline, *Fédération des Mamans de l'Ituri*, Bunia, April 1st, 2011.

50 Interview with Dziju Malozi Jacqueline, op cit.

derive an income for running market stalls, however, most consumer goods that are sold in marketplaces, including agricultural produce, are imported from other countries. As there are considerable costs associated with importing goods in the formal sector economy, there is consequently a vibrant informal trade between the DRC and its neighbours.<sup>51</sup> Small businesses have been a popular means of income generation for the more entrepreneurial ex-combatants, particularly in North and South Kivu. Individual examples of ex-combatant experiences are outlined below.

However, the small business sector has been constrained by excessive bureaucracy and taxation. For example, female business owners have reported that they are required to pay as many as 24 different taxes/fees to a variety of government officials and military personnel, from those responsible for overseeing local markets to the *Administrateur du Territoire*.<sup>52</sup> The owners of businesses are taxed on their business income as well as their net profit. Small informal businesses are required to pay a site tax. Other taxes are levied at a variety of levels of government. There have also been numerous allegations of corruption associated with the system of taxation.<sup>53</sup>

In Luvungi (South Kivu), Paul Mukeba, a former combatant, established a small kiosk after demobilisation (2005) with a US\$ 60 loan from his sister (who was employed as a tailor in Bukavu at the time), and sold cigarettes and beans. In 2007, he set-up a second-hand clothing business with Issa Kagera, a non-combatant neighbour, in which they would buy clothing in Bujumbura and then resell it in Luvungi at a profit.<sup>54</sup> The rationale for the joint venture was that Mukeba did not have the necessary identity document to cross the border into Burundi (due to his previous combatant status). Kagera on the other hand was able to travel to Bujumbura legally. In 2008 two newly demobilised ex-combatants joined them in their business venture with contributions of US\$ 310 (which was part of the reintegration support), and kit provided by Caritas.

Thereafter, a Caritas agricultural extension officer encouraged the four businessmen to create a self-help group that would open up their business to investments from more ex-combatants and others. The motivation was that this would in turn enable them to diversify into other areas such as cattle rearing. The entrepreneurs consequently established a self-help

group called *L'Initiative Locale pour le Développement de Luvungi* (ILDELU). With a collective saving of US\$ 1,500, the four bought three cows, and the remaining US\$ 620 was reinvested in the trading business. The agreement under ILDELU was that heifers produced by the cows would be shared between the members of ILDELU, while the breeding cows remained the property of the association. At the time of this interview, ILDELU had a total of eleven members, with seven having received their share of heifers. The association also had a stock of second hand clothes, beans, corn and cassava estimated at US\$ 3,400.<sup>55</sup>

In Kiliba location (South Kivu), 22 ex-combatants teamed up with 17 other individuals in 2009 to form a self-help group called *L'Action Communautaire pour le Développement Agro-pastoral de Kiliba* (ACDAKI). ACDAKI approached Caritas for support in the form of training and start-up capital. Caritas subsequently provided agricultural training, including livestock keeping, after which it leased three acres of land to ACDAKI for a once-off single harvest period as a start-up package. The group grew maize, cabbages and beans, and generated US\$ 3,280 in income from the first harvest.<sup>56</sup>

Lualua Josue was demobilised in Kitona in 2006 and used his reintegration package for short-term consumption. In 2007 he borrowed US\$ 80 from his brother (who made a living baking bricks near Bukavu) to start a sugarcane business. He then used the proceeds from his sugarcane enterprise to purchase a kiosk in Panzi location. He reportedly made a profit of between US\$ 120 – 150 a month.<sup>57</sup>

Kambamba Makenga, an ex-FRFP (*Forces républicaines*

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51 See Bank of Uganda, Informal Cross Border Trade Survey Report 2009-10, Kampala, 2011: For example, the DRC was the second largest destination for Ugandan informal sector imports in 2009 and 2010

52 Jennifer Smith with Edward Bell, Governance in mining zones in North and South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo, London, Initiative for Peacebuilding, March 2010, 9.

53 Thaddée Hyawe-Hinyi, DRC: the slow march towards a tax agreement, Afronline, 8 August 2010, <http://www.afronline.org/?p=9255>

54 Focus group discussion with ILDELU members. Luvungi, 30 May 2011.

55 Focus group discussion with ILDELU members, *ibid*.

56 Interview with Munyereza, the chairperson of ACDAKI. Kiliba, 30 May 2011; Focus group discussion with ACDAKI members. Kiliba, 30 May 2011.

57 Interview with Lualua in Panzi, Bukavu, 1 June 2011.

*fédéralistes*) combatant used the approximately two kilograms of gold he had amassed from the mines in Shabunda whilst a member of the armed group to finance a second-hand clothing business. At the start he bought bags of used clothing from wholesalers and hawked them around Goma (North Kivu) until he secured a trading space on a street corner. According to Makenga:

“Since I got to this location in February 2010, I have built confidence in my customers because they know they can always find me here as opposed to when I used to roam around. In a week I get to sell between three to five bags, which earns me a profit of about US\$ 50 week...I have two friends who handle the [three] *chukudus*... and they go out to look for businesses around those hardware stores and nearby market places...These *chukudus* are a lifesaver; unlike motorcycles and bicycles, they cost almost nothing to maintain, and don't require petrol to run. If I make more money I will buy more of them.”

Jacques Kaembe, a graduate of the Tumaini centre<sup>58</sup> (North Kivu) established his own masonry business (employing five other masons) as he was unable to secure employment with construction companies. At the time of the research he was employing five other masons and in July 2011 they got contracts to construct two maisonettes. To Kaembe, it takes an individual ex-combatant's own initiative to break the legacy of the war and embark on economic progress.

The village of Kibumba in North Kivu is close to the border with Rwanda and is located on the slopes of the volcanic Mt Nyiragongo. However, Kibumba has perennial water scarcity due to the difficulty in drilling boreholes through the multiple layers of lava that have formed as a result of frequent eruptions. Some



Makenga's small business and *chukudus*

ex-combatants in the area established businesses to address the demand for water. For example, Tumaini Hamisi, an ex-combatant<sup>59</sup> entered into business partnership with a friend to transport water from the Rwandan side of the border to Kibumba on his *chukudu*<sup>60</sup>. According to Tumaini, the pair would generate a daily income of between US\$ 10 to US\$ 15, of which Tumaini would be paid an average of US\$ 5 a day. Through saving, Tumaini was able to invest in other trading endeavours and purchase additional equipment, steadily expanding his business. At the time of the research he owned five *chukudus* of which he leased out four (at US\$ 20 each per month) and operated the fifth himself. His monthly income reportedly ranged between US\$ 100 and US\$ 120.

58 Tumaini Centre is located in the Commune de Karisimbi, in Goma. It offers training to child-ex-combatants. The centre is the only one of its kind in North Kivu Province. However, due to overwhelming demand, the centre also offers training even to adult ex-combatants in search of skills.

59 Tumaini Hamisi fought on the side of RCD-Goma during the 1998 war and later for the CNDP in the 2008 and did not receive any DRRR support.

60 A *chukudu* is a wooden, non-mechanised means of cargo transportation. It resembles a large wooden scooter, and is arguably the backbone of the urban informal economy in North Kivu. The symbolic importance of *chukudu* is immortalized in a golden statue located on Boulevard Kanyamuhanga in the centre of Goma.

#### 4.2.2 Mining

Artisanal and small-scale mining are arguably the most important components of the informal economy in the DRC. The reason for this is that low-level mining is estimated to provide direct and indirect livelihood support to 10 million people in the DRC, with women and children reported to constitute 20% and 40% respectively of the artisanal mining community. This sector is often considered to be the “backbone of the trading economy in the DRC”.<sup>61</sup> As with the informal timber sector, output from the informal mining sector is substantially higher than the output from the formal (large-scale, commercial) sector, especially in the eastern provinces, where large-scale mining operations are yet to gain momentum. It is estimated that artisanal mining accounts for 90% of mineral production in the DRC.<sup>62</sup>

Artisanal (subsistence) miners are typically individuals who are not legally employed by mining companies, and who use low technology (often merely hand tools) to mine for valuable minerals. Small-scale mining, usually takes the form of a collection of artisanal miners who either collaborate in a joint mining venture, or are employed by an entrepreneur. More advanced technology, compared to artisanal mining, is often utilised.<sup>63</sup>

Artisanal miners are involved in extracting a wide spectrum of valuable minerals, such as gold, diamonds, copper, cobalt, cassiterite and coltan (with diamonds being the most popular). These miners generally settle in camps with their dependents on or near the mining site, and living in conditions characterised by abject poverty and insecurity. Many artisanal miners operate on concessionary land that has been allocated to large-scale mining companies. This effectively means that such mining activities are illegal, and that the livelihood of these subsistence miners are tenuous. In mining camps women who do not engage in digging often generate an income through the transportation, washing, sorting, and grading of minerals, as well as trading in consumable goods, tools and materials. Some have established restaurants, while others have entered the sex trade.<sup>64</sup>

According to the DRC Mine Law (2002): small-scale mining permits and “diggers” cards should be made available; and artisanal mining zones should be established. Nonetheless, the implementation of this legis-

lation has been feeble, and there is consensus that the legal protection afforded to informal sector miners is woefully inadequate. Only a minority of miners secured “diggers” card, as the annual cost of US\$25 and time required to respond to the bureaucratic requirements are perceived to be excessive. In addition, the DRC government has not been able consistently protect the concession rights provided for in the permits and cards. However the DRC government has had some success in providing technical support through the Small-Scale and Artisanal Mining Extension Service (SAESSCAM).<sup>65</sup>

Due to poor infrastructure in most mining areas, there have been numerous reports of miners being exploited and fleeced by government officials, intermediaries (*négociants*), militias/armed groups, soldiers and criminal organisations that have preferential access to transport networks. In many cases, miners have only been paid a fraction of the market value of the minerals they mined. The relationship with the *négociants* is however complex, as these incendiaries often provide the capital to artisanal miners.<sup>66</sup>

Ituri is rich in gold, and gold mines have been in operation in the area since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Ituri’s gold mines were nationalised during the presidency of Mobutu Sese Seko, and the *Office des mines d’or de Kilo Moto* (OKIMO) was established. Like other nationalised mines during the Mobutu era, poor management, and excessive theft, resulting in chronic

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61 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 56-58; Karen Hayes, Women in artisanal mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo Pact Congo, Lubumbashi, Pact DRC, 2007.

62 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 56; U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 2009 Minerals yearbook, Congo (Kinshasa), May 2011, 11.1.

63 Karen Hayes, Artisanal & small-scale mining and livelihoods in Africa, Amsterdam, Common Fund for Commodities, 2008, 7.

64 Ruben de Koning Artisanal mining and post-conflict reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, SIRPI background paper, Solna, October 2009, 6-8.; Karen Hayes, Artisanal & small-scale mining and livelihoods in Africa, Amsterdam, Common Fund for Commodities, 2008, 11.

65 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 60-61.

66 World Bank, Oil/Gas, Mining and Chemicals Department, AFCC2, Africa Region Democratic Republic of Congo, Growth with governance in the mining sector, May 2008, 60-61.

under-investment, beleaguered OKIMO. As gold output fell, and OKIMO's ability to generate employment declined, artisanal gold mining increased, with output typically sold by diggers to *négociants*, who then consolidated the material and sold it on. Most of the gold was then smuggled across the DRC's eastern borders, usually to Uganda and Kenya, and then onto to Dubai.

Mobutu's government authorised artisanal gold mining in Ituri in 1982.<sup>67</sup> By the turn of the century, industrial gold production had ceased entirely in Ituri, while artisanal gold mining had become entrenched, employing tens of thousands of people as diggers and crushers, and a smaller number as *négociants* and traders. International mining companies entered into joint ventures with OKIMO to revive the Kilo Moto gold mines in the early 2000s, and have since carried out extensive exploration, but none have yet started large-scale production.

The strong presence of ex-combatants among the artisanal miners of Ituri was extensively documented in a useful 2009 study, conducted by Channel Research. The study found that while some ex-combatant artisanal miners had been miners before the Ituri conflict, the majority turned to mining after the fighting, attracted by its 'high risk and high return' profile, which mirrored their military experience. The study further found that ex-combatant miners from different militia and different ethnic groups worked together on mining sites side-by-side, without conflict. Importantly, the study also concluded that roughly half of all demobilised ex-combatants in Ituri were artisanal miners.<sup>68</sup>

Interviews for this report confirmed the main findings of the Channel Research report. According to one NGO worker who works with ex-combatants in Mongbwalu: "Most of the demobilised in Mongbwalu are artisanal miners."<sup>69</sup> According to the Mongbwalu representatives of the *Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de la Paix en Ituri* (AODERPI): "There are so many of us demobilised fighters in the mines. There is no other work for us to do."<sup>70</sup> AODERPI, and NGO representatives working with artisanal miners, agreed that members of different militia mined side by side without conflict. According to AODERPI:

"We have members of all the militias in our

association. UPC, FNI, PUSIC... but that is over. We have reconciled. Our hate was manipulated. I don't think we will fight again. Some people have tried to stir us up, but they failed."<sup>71</sup>

There was concurrence among AODERPI representatives and NGO workers that it was unfortunate that there had been no demobilisation kits aimed at artisanal mining. According to one NGO worker:

"Because most of the demobilised round here are diggers, I proposed that the demobilisation kit system be adapted to this truth. It would have been a very good idea if there had been a kit for diggers. That would be adapted to the reality here. Instead, everyone round here just sells their kits. None of these miners want bicycles..."<sup>72</sup>

AODERPI and NGO representatives also concurred that most ex-combatants that had taken up artisanal mining had not disarmed, even though many had surrendered weapons in order to receive demobilisation kits. This consequently posed a risk to industrial mining companies, who were planning to evict artisanal miners from their concessions, in preparation for industrial development.<sup>73</sup>

In late 2010, OKIMO gave permission for its gold tailings at Galayi, about 50 kilometres from Mongbwalu, to be exploited by artisanal diggers. Despite poor transport connections between Mongbwalu and Galayi, and no mobile phone reception at the site, within

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67 Interview with Jacques Kalumi, secretary of the mining *comité de pilotage*, Mongbwalu, 30 March 2011.

68 *Étude sur les vecteurs, contraintes et relations des ex-combattants dans les mines artisanales en Ituri. Concessions 39 et 40, Rapport Final.* Channel Research, Brussels, 2009.

69 Interview with Pascal Kahindo, CARITAS, Mongbwalu, 30 March 2011.

70 Interview with Isidore Tamile, administrative secretary, and Ucima Sylva, vice-president of *Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de la Paix en Ituri* (AODERPI), Mongbwalu 30 March 2011.

71 Interview with Isidore Tamile, administrative secretary, and Ucima Sylva, vice-president of *Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de la Paix en Ituri* (AODERPI), op cit.

72 Interview with Pascal Kahindo, op cit.

73 Interview with Isidore Tamile, administrative secretary, and Ucima Sylva, vice-president of *Association des Orpailleurs pour le Développement et la Reconstruction de la Paix en Ituri* (AODERPI), op cit.

only a few months hundreds of artisanal diggers had settled in Galayi. A small town emerged in the forest clearing, complete with bars, shops and brothels. By March 2011, there were, however, no schools or clinics. The site was controlled by CECOKI, which presented itself as a cultural association, though its detractors have claimed it is a front for the business interests of powerful politicians and military commanders.<sup>74</sup> According to a CECOKI representative, more than half of the residents are ex-combatants.<sup>75</sup>

There were eleven *négociants* in Galayi, who buy the gold the diggers produce, which was then subjected to a 30% tax by CECOKI. According to Mapa Majo, the president of the Galayi *négociants*:

“I buy about 30 grams of gold a day. So far, I have had no security problems. There is no banditry. The military are invested in the pits here. That is why they do not bother us... None of the *négociants* here in Galayi are ex-combatants. I don't know why, but that is how it is.”<sup>76</sup>

There are reported to be between 60 and 70 gold *négociants* in Mongbwalu. Very few of them, it seems, are ex-combatants:

“I have been a *négociant* here in Mongbwalu for 17 years. I am not an ex-combatant, and neither are most of the *négociants* here. There are some though... I buy from the small *négociants*, since I am a big *négociant*. I then sell to the OKIMO *comptoir* here, or in Butembo. Sometimes I sell in Bunia. I also have a pit at Pili Pili<sup>77</sup> where I have 346 ex-combatants working for me. I don't care which militia they used to be in.”<sup>78</sup>

As in Monbwalu, there are a few ex-combatants among the gold *negociants* of Bunia, though the majority are not, according to the *Association des Négociants d'Or – Ituri* (ANORI):

“There are 45 *négociants*, big and small, in our association. ANORI was created two years ago, after the wars here, to regroup *négociants* in a peaceful way, so that diggers can sell gold peacefully, regardless of their tribe. We have also disseminated the mining code, to persuade *négociants* to sell legally. It is thanks to ANORI that there are now two gold buying

*comptoirs* in Bunia, though it is true that not all our members sell all their material to them. The problem is that the *comptoirs*' prices are too low, and taxes are too high. This encourages smuggling.”<sup>79</sup>

The mineral sector is also a key component of both the North and South Kivu economy, with coltan, cassiterite and gold being actively mined by artisanal miners. In addition, some of the main *comptoirs*, the trading houses that buy, sell and export minerals mined in the eastern Congo, are based in Bukavu. A significant number of former combatants have pursued a livelihood from mining in these provinces, and their role in this sector has been diverse. The FDLR and armed groups in the mining areas have exploited some former combatants, while others have been fortunate to avoid the predatory activities of these groups. However, some ex-combatants have been implicated in human rights abuses and illegally taxing other miners.<sup>80</sup>

#### 4.2.3 Transport

Operating a motorcycle taxi is a popular means to generate an income for young, able-bodied urban men. This sector is an essential component of the post-war informal urban transport system, ferrying workers between their homes, places of work and marketplaces. This industry has attracted ex-combatants in all three areas, most notably Ituri.

There is one motorcycle taxi association in Ituri, called the *Association des Chauffeurs du Congo/Moto-Ituri*. There are however several hundred other motorcycle taxi drivers in Bunia that were not members of the association. The association began as an independent organisation, but became affiliated to the national association in 2005. The association claimed 2,475 members in Bunia town, which has an estimated pop-

74 Interview with NGO workers, Mongbwalu, 29 March 2011.

75 Interview with Pascal Baseyembise, CECOKI representative, Galayi, 29 March 2011.

76 Interview with Mapa Majo, Galayi, 29 March 2011.

77 An artisanal gold mining site on Anglo Gold's concession, a few kilometres from Mongbwalu.

78 Interview with Fai Avon, Monbwalu, 29 March 2011.

79 Interview with Lomema Batsi Mukwa Christophe, ANORI, Bunia, 1 April 2011.

80 Global Witness, *Faced with a gun, what can you do? War and the militarisation of mining in the eastern Congo*, London, 2009, 50.

ulation of 330,000. Members pay a US\$ 20 joining fee, and then US\$ 5 per year thereafter. Ninety percent of the members are under 30, and in excess of 90% are ex-combatants. The association includes ex-combatants from all the Ituri militias, as well as a number of deserters from the FARDC. According to the president and vice-president of the association:

“In our association, everyone’s objective is to earn a living. So we are not fighting each other. You see how that helps us mentally? Some of our members were colonels, or majors in the armed groups. But they are leaving behind their dreams of that, and are working to make a living...”<sup>81</sup>

According to ex-combatants, part of the appeal of motorcycle taxi driving was that it requires no academic qualifications, nor any workplace skills except driving, and ‘courage’. Few ex-combatants in Ituri attained academic qualifications, and consequently struggled to secure government or formal sector employment, where these qualifications are required. Another aspect of the appeal was: “It is *à la mode*. Young women think you have good money if you drive a taxi, so we always have girlfriends.”<sup>82</sup>

There were three types of taxi drivers: those who work for themselves; those who work for others; and those who work temporarily (by contract). The association reckons that among its members, half own their own motorcycles, 30% work for the motorcycle owners, and the balance work by contract. Owning a motorcycle is the most profitable of the three options, and those who do not own their own bikes are reported to aspire to do so. Those driving for others must remit all their earnings to the motorcycle owners for the Monday to Friday trade, and are only permitted to retain Saturday’s takings.

Virtually all the drivers drive Chinese motorcycles, which at the time of research retailed for US\$ 600. This was considerably cheaper than the Japanese motorcycles available for purchase, but drivers readily conceded that the Chinese motorcycles, when subjected to Bunia’s poor roads of those of the surrounding areas, and persistent over-loading, generally only lasted up to eight months. Drivers preferred the Chinese bikes nonetheless because of their allegedly superior carrying capacity, which meant they were more profitable to drivers despite their short lifespan. Although

inexpensive compared to Japanese bikes, the cost of Chinese bikes far exceeded the amount given to ex-combatants for their demobilisation packages, and it appears that very few, if any, ex-combatants used the packages to purchase motorcycles.

There appeared to be a strong association between motorcycle taxi drivers and artisanal miners in Ituri. The main reason, according to miners and taxi drivers was that ex-combatants dominated both economic activities. Additionally, artisanal miners used motorcycle taxis to travel between Mongbwalu and other digging sites to Bunia and back, and often invest their profits in motorcycles.

Like most Congolese entrepreneurs, Bunia’s motorcycle taxi drivers consider themselves to be excessively taxed, though it seems they actually pay a lower proportion of their income than most economically active resident of the town. According to representatives of the motorcycle taxi association, operators must pay a US\$ 6 tax to the mairie and a US\$ 20 fee to the province annually. In addition, they are required to pay US\$ 74 for insurance and US\$ 85 for a vehicle licence each year.<sup>83</sup>

Despite the popularity of motorcycle taxis among ex-combatants in Bunia, the involvement of international agencies distributing DDRRR kits in this and related activities has been minimal. UNDP provided motorcycles to a small number of ex-combatants, as did a local NGO, the *Fédération des Mamans de l’Ituri*. These interventions were ineffective, as the bikes were not donated to individuals, but to groups of ex-combatants, resulting in ownership disputes between the members. As a result, the groups disbanded and the bikes passed to individual owners.<sup>84</sup> Due to the popularity of motorcycles among ex-combatants in Bunia, there has been considerable demand for motorcycle mechanics. A number of ex-combatants indicated that they would have chosen to train in mechanics had it been available as one of the DDRRR support options.

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81 Interview with Willy Musingo, president of the Association des Chauffeurs du Congo – Section Moto-Ituri, and John Paul Lodda Lossa, vice-president of the same association, Bunia, 26 March 26, 2011.

82 Interview with Willy Musingo, 26 March 2011.

83 Interview with Willy Musingo and John Paul Lodda Lossa, op cit.

84 Interview with Willy Musingo and John Paul Lodda Lossa, op cit, and interview with director of local NGO, Bunia, 26 March 2011.

As with other towns in the eastern DRC, the motorcycle taxi sector in the urban centres of South Kivu and North Kivu are relatively vibrant. A number of ex-combatants, particularly young men, have derived an income from this trade. For example, Byamungu Kambaza benefitted from a US\$ 600 loan from the cooperative credit society in Kalundu, the *Coopérative d'Épargne et de Crédit* (COOPEC), and purchased a second-hand motorcycle, which he subsequently used as a taxi to ferry people between Uvira and Baraka. In the dry season Kambaza undertakes a return trip from Uvira to Baraka every day, a total distance of approximately 180km, in which he transports both passengers and cargo. He charges between US\$ 10 and US\$ 20 per trip depending on the size of cargo and the number of passengers. Passengers sharing the motorbike pay less compared to single passengers. In a week Kambaza makes a profit of between US\$ 60 and US\$ 80. According to Kambaza,

“The biggest threat to my business is the ambushes that armed groups such as the Mai Mai Yokutumba stage along the Baraka-Uvira road. Two weeks ago armed men attacked Lupofu, a motorcyclist friend of mine and took away his bike and the passenger’s goods. The mama and Lupofu were left to trek from Vitobola where the attack took place, to Lweba...I always fear for myself, but I cannot abandon the job, as it is my only means of survival. Twice, armed rebels have intercepted me. The first time by two people whom I thought were FNL elements from Rokoko swamp and another time by a group of Yokutumba rebels.”<sup>85</sup>

To discourage ambushes, Kambaza and three other motorcycle taxi drivers made their trips in convoy. Unlike Kambaza who owns his bike, his three colleagues were renting theirs from a local businessman. The agreement was that the drivers could retain all proceeds over-and-above the US\$ 40 rental cost per day and fuel costs.<sup>86</sup>

Ex-combatants have also been involved in water transportation. For example, in Mboko town, which is located in Tanganyika District (South Kivu), on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, ex-combatants have been operating boats to transport timber, minerals and other goods to Rumonge (Burundi) on the other side of the lake. One such ex-combatant business was

comprised of eight former Mai Mai ex-combatants who voluntarily demobilised when their group joined FARDC. The group owned two canoes (one of which was motorised).<sup>87</sup>

#### 4.2.4 Fishing

Inland fisheries contribute between 25% and 50% of the population’s protein intake. In addition, it is estimated that more than 600,000 people derive a livelihood (both directly and indirectly) from the fishing sector (capture, possessing, marketing, fishing supply, transportation, boat construction and equipment repairs) with most fish being caught in lakes and rivers (inland fisheries).<sup>88</sup> However communities that are located in close proximity to the inland fishery areas are amongst the poorest in the DRC.<sup>89</sup> Ex-combatants located in close proximity to lakes have had some success in the fishing business. Some individual examples are provided below.

In Ituri there is the *Encadrement des Jeunes pour le Développement de la Pêche* (EJDP), an association of 25 fishermen in Kasenyi, on the western shore of Lake Albert. The EJDP’s membership included ex-combatants from several Ituri militia groups, but there have, reportedly, been no tensions or conflict between the ex-combatants. Besica-Duku Tchekedis, EJDP president, reported that the EJDP had received a boat with an outboard motor, a fridge and a generator from the UNDP, and its members had used their own kits to purchase a net and a motorcycle. The EJDP was said to be a successful business because:

“We were all fishermen before and know what we are doing. Fishing is not an easy business, and many of the ex-combatants who chose it had no experience in it before. They have all failed, while we have succeeded.”<sup>90</sup>

However, obstacles affecting the fate of donor-assist-

85 Interview with Kambaza, Uvira, 27 May 2011.

86 Interview with Kambaza’s colleague. Uvira, 27 May 2011.

87 Interview with former Mai Mai ex-combatant, Mboko, 29 May 2011.

88 FAO, Vue générale du secteur des pêches national, République du Congo, Août, 2009.

89 FAO, Vue générale du secteur des pêches national, République du Congo, Août, 2009.

90 Interview with Besica-Duku Tchekedis, president of EJDP, Kasenyi, 31 March 2011.

ed fishing projects for ex-combatants on Lake Albert include: poor road infrastructure between the lake and Bunia; no electricity in the lakeside settlements (caused by destruction of power lines during the period of armed conflict; and looting of replacement power lines after it); and increasingly problematic over-fishing in the lake, including in the fish breeding grounds.<sup>91</sup>

Very few of those interviewed for this study made any use of banking services, though there appears to be considerable latent demand for them. In addition, there were numerous references to the lack of availability of affordable credit. Related to this, a common complaint among DDR kit recipients was that excessive taxation was damaging their business prospects. According to Tchekedis:

“We pay so many taxes. You would be amazed. The FARDC takes two kilograms of fish from each of our boats, every day. That is illegal, but what can we do? Then we pay a \$25 per year tax on our motor, another US\$ 25 on our boat, and then there is the tax we pay to the *collectivité*. We pay another tax on our fish. And another one for our fishing permit. Then there is the provincial tax, and a hygiene tax... This is why we are not progressing. We pay so much tax.”<sup>92</sup>

In North Kivu, Bahati Kahimbi and two ex-combatant colleagues sustained themselves by fishing on Lake Kivu after leaving the CNDP rebel group in 2009. They established a commercial fishing venture called the Kawaida Group, which was comprised of eight fishermen. They fished at night and then sold their catch to restaurants and hotels, and generated a daily average income of between US\$ 120 and US\$ 160. According to Kahimbi:

“This is a skill that we acquired during the



*Kawaida Fishing Group on Lake Kivu, North Kivu*

war. We used to go fishing to supplement our food in the bush... We used to hijack civilian canoes including their catch...”

In South Kivu, former combatants established the *Action Communautaire pour le Développement de Kalundu* (ACDK) in Uvira in 2008. They subsequently approached several potential donors for assistance and eventually received support from national DDR programme through Caritas, an international NGO. This financial support enabled ACDK to buy fishing nets and a *pirogue* (canoe), which they used to fish on Lake Tanganyika. They would fish overnight and sell the bulk of their catch at the port of Kalimabenge (Uvira) the following morning. A small portion of the catch was reserved for family consumption, and was shared equally among the families.<sup>93</sup>

With the savings made from fish sales, the ACDK

91 Interview with Muzungu Tabaro Janvier, administrative secretary of Kasenyi, and Samuel Singh N’ku, fishing officer, ministry of the environment, Kasenyi, 31 March 2011.

92 Interview with Besica-Duku Tchekedis, op cit.

93 Focus group discussion with ACDK self-help group, of which Mazembe is member. Kalundu, 29 May 2011; Interview with Bushobzi, the Chairman of ACDK, Uvira, 30 May 2011.

purchased an additional pirogue, lamps (used for attracting fish at night), and nets. ACDK also diversified its activities, and from January 2011 the members divided themselves into three categories: eight focusing on fishing; 15 on crop farming; and five on livestock rearing. However, the cost of renting agricultural land was prohibitive to ACDK, and they subsequently only undertook small-scale 'kitchen' (subsistence) farming. At the time of this research, ACDK had 34 members (eight of which were not former combatants), of whom four were women and 30 men. ACDK's daily fish sales were on average between US\$30 and US\$ 40.<sup>94</sup>

The ACDK also opened a bank account with COOPEC, into which they deposited their savings. The advantage was that COOPEC administered a micro credit facility that ACDK members could access on relatively favourable terms. The savings account also came handy during the *Saison Ndenga*, when the moon is too bright to effectively fish at night. Consequently, fish catches are substantially reduced, with ACDK barely being able to acquire sufficient fish for their own subsistence during this period.<sup>95</sup>

Most ACDK members, for example, established their own small businesses through the loans accessed from COOPEC. The businesses included the selling of petrol on the roadside (commonly referred to as 'le quadaffi'), welding, motorcycle transportation and kiosks. Others generated an income as dockworkers and porters. Two specific individual examples include:

- Mokili wa Bongo travels to Bujumbura every Saturday to buy fuel so that he can resell it in Uvira for a profit. Mokili hires a motorbike for US\$ 20 and then transports two 20-litre containers of petrol from the Burundian capital. He makes a profit of between US\$ 35 and US\$ 50 per 20-litre container.<sup>96</sup>
- Mafikiri ya Nzoni, accessed a loan from COOPEC, and set up a kiosk in Uvira. He used the bicycle he received as part of the reinsertion kit for transporting merchandise to his kiosk. He currently makes a profit of between US\$ 30 and US\$ 40 USD per month.<sup>97</sup>

#### 4.2.5 Agriculture and hunting (bush meat)

Agriculture provides the greatest contribution to GDP in the DRC in terms of productive sectors, and it has

been estimated that close to 60% of the economically active population derive a livelihood from the agricultural sector,<sup>98</sup> with both subsistence and commercial (predominantly for export) agricultural production.<sup>99</sup> Nonetheless, only 10% of land in the DRC is used for agricultural purposes, and agriculture only receives 0.64% of the total national budget.<sup>100</sup> The principal subsistence crops include: cassava, plantains, maize, groundnuts, and rice.<sup>101</sup>

As indicated above, some ex-combatants pursued agricultural ventures, but were typically not highly profitable. According to representatives of the FAO in Bunia, those who were farmers before the conflict proved more likely to succeed and make use of their agricultural kits than those who were not. Access to land for farmers, however, was a constraining factor.<sup>102</sup> Many ex-combatants have engaged in subsistence agriculture as a part-time activity, in order to produce food for themselves and their dependents.

Meat, particularly bush meat, is a noteworthy commodity in DRC, as the prevalence of disease restricts animal husbandry in the forest areas (which make up 68% of the territory of the DRC). A significant number of households, including ex-combatant households, survive and/or derive a livelihood from hunting wild animals, such as duikers, monkeys, rodents, wild pigs, buffaloes, reptiles and birds.<sup>103</sup> In some of the more isolated areas, bush meat is one of only products "that

94 Interview with Ndegeya Ndakurundi, advisor to ACDK. Uvira, 27 May 2011

95 Interview with Ndegeya Ndakurundi, advisor to ACDK. Uvira, 27 May 2011.

96 Interview with Mokili, Kalimabenge bridge. Uvira, 28 May 2011; Group interview with self-employed ex-combatants (among them Mokili). Uvira, 1 June 2011.

97 Interview with Mafikiri at his kiosk in Kalundu, 29 May 2011.

98 FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on June 23, 2011, <http://faostat.fao.org/site/550/default.aspx#ancor>

99 FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on June 23, 2011, <http://faostat.fao.org/site/377/default.aspx#ancor>

100 African Economic Outlook, Congo, Dem. Rep. 2011, OECD Development Centre, Issy les Moulineaux, 2011, 12

101 FAOSTAT, FAO of the UN, Accessed on October 7, 2011, <http://faostat.fao.org/site/342/default.aspx>

102 Interview with Benjamin Ambura and Faustin Mitumba, FAO, Bunia, 28 March 2011.

103 Emmanuel de Merode, Katherine Homewood and Guy Cowlishaw, Wild resources and livelihoods of poor households in Democratic Republic of Congo, ODI wildlife policy brief, No. 1 November 2003.

can provide income that outweighs transportation costs”.<sup>104</sup>

Typically hunters catch and slaughter wild animals in the deep forest areas, then transport it to urban marketplaces. In some cases the meat is smoked (to preserve it) prior to transportation. However, the trade is allegedly subject to numerous informal fees, which results in the relatively high cost of the meat in the urban marketplace. For example, bush meat sold in Kinshasa has reportedly been as much as five times than the sum the hunters received.<sup>105</sup>

#### 4.2.6 Forestry

The Congolese Association of Small Scale Loggers has estimated that on average there are 8,000 active logging companies (rough estimate) operating in the informal sector in the DRC, commonly referred to as *scieurs de long*. These logging companies primarily engage in pit sawing for both the domestic (for furniture and construction) and export markets. Included in this number are part-time and full-time enterprises, with personnel numbers varying between businesses. The common feature, however, is that these entities generally operate without licenses from the national government. However, they pay taxes and royalties to local authorities and traditional leaders.<sup>106</sup>

In 2007, annual timber production from this sector was estimated to be between 1.5 and 2.4 million square metres, which equated to about half a million square metres of sawn wood. In addition, it has been suggested that the output of informal sector exceeds the formal sector close to 1000%. The reason for this was that the informal sector was more adaptive to conditions of armed conflict, due to low levels of technology, small business entities and its ability to cope with adverse infrastructural conditions. Included in the informal timber sector are artisanal businesses (such as carpentry and furniture making) and fuel wood consumption (charcoal production and use and trade). Charcoal, as in many other underdeveloped African countries, is the primary energy source for households in DRC, and is estimated to constitute 72 million cubic metres of timber per year.<sup>107</sup> There have been reports of ex-combatants pursuing livelihood in the forestry/timber sector and related industries, especially carpentry.

#### 4.2.7 Criminal/smuggling activities

Some ex-combatants have generated income from trafficking of minerals, drugs and armed criminality. This was the case with Claude Bulukwa and two friends who opted for demobilisation when the CNDP rebel group integrated into the FARDC. According to Bulukwa:

“Life of a demobilised soldier is the most difficult thing here. We can hardly get employment and therefore we have to fend for ourselves in any way possible. The easiest way out has been to revive our contacts with our friends who were reintegrated into FARDC, and who are deployed in mining locations [Shabunda, Mwenga and Walungu territories]. This way, they channel the minerals through us to the markets in Bukavu, Uvira and Bujumbura... However, the danger is that often we get intercepted by armed groups such as FDLR and Mai Mai and have to part with the entire ‘tola’ (pack of minerals, notably gold).”<sup>108</sup>

Katamba Bisheko, an ex-combatant, had previously served as a major in the FDLR and then surrendered to MONUC. He was then transferred to *Centre d'appuis aux jeunes démobilisés* (Centre for Demobilised Youth), where he was provided with clothing. At the Centre he was promised reintegration training, but this did not materialise, and Bisheko subsequently returned to his home village. Bisheko claimed there were little in the way of economic opportunities in the village, so he and two other ex-combatants formed an armed gang. The gang targeted gold smugglers and then sold the loot onto senior FARDC commanders. Bisheko and his colleagues also trafficked in cannabis for soldiers and armed groups. According to Bisheko:

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104 Center for International Forestry Research, *Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo: analysis of a priority agenda*, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, 2007, 7-9.

105 L. Hart Debroux et al (Eds.), *Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda*, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007, 8-9.

106 L. Hart Debroux et al (Eds.), *Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda*, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007, 7.

107 L. Hart Debroux et al (Eds.), *Forests in post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo - analysis of a priority agenda*, Center for International Forestry Research, Jakarta, February 2007, 7.

108 Interview with Claude, a former CNDP rebel, now demobilised. Lemera Plateau, 01 June 2011.

“Soldiers exchange cannabis for ammunition and minerals with rebels, who occupy mines and possess plantations of cannabis in the high plateaux, deep in the forest. Everyone in the trade abides by the same rules, and betrayal is often met with death”.

Bisheko reportedly spent eight months with the armed gang until one of the gang members killed a childhood friend of his. According to Bisheko:

“If some form of economic support had been availed to me when I quit the rebel life, I would never have joined that murderous gang. Besides, people in my village know about my former affiliation with the armed groups and therefore treat me with a lot of fear...I had to struggle within my own means to get this *chukudu* in order to quit that criminal life. Although what I earn is pittance compared to life with a gun, I am much more at ease, and able to support my wife and child”.

At the time of the research Katamba was operating a small trading business (with a *chukudu*) in Masisi territory (North Kivu).

The research revealed that some former combatants have weaved in-and-out of the illicit economy in order to generate quick profits, which are then invested in more legitimate business ventures. For example, Maisha Bora, an ex-combatant from FDLR received six months of carpentry training at Tumaini centre (North Kivu) as part of a DDR package. After graduating Maisha worked for nine months as a carpenter in Mabanga suburb of Goma (North Kivu), where he earned between US\$ 30 and US\$ 50 a month. However, according to Bora:

“When I got married I was compelled to look



*Katamba Bisheko at work with his chukudu*

for alternatives, as the earnings from carpentry could not make my ends meet. I almost went back to the bush; although dangerous, life was easier there with a gun. One day an old friend with whom I served in the war, informed me of his flourishing gold business. He bought gold from old friends in Walikale and sold it in Rutshuru”.

Bora subsequently used the US\$ 150 he had saved from carpentry, and accompanied colleague on two occasions to buy gold in Walikale. From the two trips (made mostly at night), he generated US\$ 2,500. He discontinued his involvement in the gold trade after his colleague was shot and killed. Thereafter Bora bought a motorcycle in January 2011 at a cost of US\$ 1,550 to use as a taxi. He then provided a taxi service along Rutshuru-Ishasa road (despite the activities of the FDLR rebels in the Virunga National Park), carrying two or three passengers a trip, for which he charged US\$ 5 per passenger. According to Bora:

“In January [2011] when I bought the *moteur* [motorcycle] I used to make between US\$ 20 and US\$ 30 per day after subtracting fuel costs, but now there are too many *moteurs*, making the competition too stiff. Also, accidents are too many, which makes me fear all the time. I

now make between US\$ 15 and US\$ 25 a day, which I still find better than carpentry and less risky than gold smuggling...”

From the profits generated out of the motorcycle transport, he opened a *quaddaffi* (petrol) selling point outside his house in Rutshuru town in March 2011, which his wife was managing, as well as selling cell phone vouchers. The *quaddaffi* business generated a weekly profit of approximately US\$ 25. He indicated that these earnings provided him with the resources to pay school fees for his two children and meet the daily living expenses.

#### 4.2.8 Recruitment into armed groups

There have been reports of demobilised ex-combatants (who benefited from DDR initiatives) becoming associated with, or rejoining armed groups, mainly in some mining areas. The ‘recycling’ of demobilised combatants has been particularly problematic in relation to the FARDC integration process. As discussed in the section of this report on the security environment in the eastern DRC, dissatisfied former armed group members who had been incorporated into the government armed forces, deserted and returned to their previous armed group or joined/created a new one.

Some of contributing factors to the desertion and re-recruitment phenomenon are as follows:

##### *i) Perceived discrimination within FARDC*

There has been a perception amongst some factions within FARDC that soldiers from certain former armed groups (that are ethnically-aligned) had received preferential treatment in the allocation of benefits, particularly military grades and ranks. This had prompted some of the aggrieved soldiers to desert FARDC. For example, the Mai Mai Yokutumba, whose membership is predominantly drawn from the autochthon ethnic groups of South Kivu, such as the Babembe and Bashi, attracted FARDC deserters from similar ethnicities. These renegades have alleged that a disproportionate number of members of groups with close affiliations with Rwanda, such as the CNDP, FRF and PARECO Lafontaine, had received senior officer ranks in FARDC. According to ‘Major Mali Kidogo,’<sup>109</sup> a FARDC soldier and a Mai Mai Yokutumba sympathiser (and a former a Mai Mai fighter):

“If you observe any operational units of FARDC in south Kivu, the first thing you notice is that those carrying walkie-talkies are of Rwandan origin. They are usually the commanders, while the rest of us...the owners of the land, are mere soldiers; some with no ranks at all. How would you take that, if you were a Bembe like me? If I did not have a rank I would not hesitate to quit FARDC.”<sup>110</sup>

In addition, interviews with civil society organisations in Baraka, Fizi Territory, which was one of the areas worst affected by the actions of the Mai Mai Yokutumba, indicated that the access of armed groups to mining areas, was an additional motivating factor for many FARDC soldiers to abscond from the Congolese military and participate in mining activities.<sup>111</sup>

##### *ii) Loss of access to lucrative mining sites by FARDC factions*

Many FARDC battalions were deployed to mining areas, where some FARDC officers had established economic relations with local artisanal miners, providing the miners with security assurances in exchange for ‘taxes’. Over time many of the FARDC officers and/or battalions involved began to feel a sense of entitlement to the mining zones in which they were deployed. Therefore, when the FARDC senior command ordered these FARDC battalions to redeploy to other non-mining areas, the order was often viewed as a “punishment”, and many of the soldiers in these situations either disobeyed the order or absconded.

In South Kivu, for example, Col. Makenga, a FARDC commander, has maintained his troops in gold mining areas, as well as in a section of Lake Kivu port, in order to facilitate their profiteering out of illegal mineral trade in the area. Col. Makenga has resisted several efforts by the FARDC senior command to have him and his troops transferred to other operational zones.<sup>112</sup>

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109 His real name is concealed for security reasons, as the individual is a serving FARDC officer.

110 Interview with Major “Akili Mali” in Fizi Centre, South Kivu, 23 May 2011.

111 Interview with a staff member of Arche d’Alliance, Baraka town, South Kivu, 23 May 2011.

112 Interview with a logistics commander at FARDC Camp Saio, Bukavu, 28 May 2011.

### *iii) Legal transformation of mining areas*

As indicated above, the government placed a ban on all mining activities in Maniema, North and South Kivu from September 2010 to March 2011, both as a means of combating illegal mining, and reforming the army through the diluting its access to mining sites. Consequently, FARDC soldiers were ordered not to deploy in mining areas. However, numerous individuals defied the mining ban and instructed their proxies in mining sites to continue mining, but mainly at night in order to avoid detection.

For example, in response to the mining ban, a number of FARDC officers in Shabunda (South Kivu) and Walikale (North Kivu) gold mining areas openly declared to their colleagues that "...we have no business remaining in FARDC when we earn pittance compared to what we earn from the mines."<sup>113</sup> The feeling among many FARDC soldiers was that had the mining ban been maintained, there would have been numerous cases of defiance within the FARDC.

### *iv) Flawed security sector reform process*

When armed groups negotiated integration into FARDC, one of the contentious issues was the distribution of military grades and ranks. The number of armed combatants that were under a "commander's" authority largely determined the bargaining power of an armed group. The larger the number of combatants, the greater the bargaining power an armed group had in securing higher military grades and ranks. In an effort to bolster their numbers,

"...some armed groups attracted their former fighters such as those who had been demobilised and those who had already been integrated into FARDC to join their earlier

armed groups in order to inflate the group's numbers and therefore raising the bargaining stakes. Armed groups such as FRF, PARECO Lafontaine and FPLC rerecruited even child soldiers with the aim of inflating their battalion figures."<sup>114</sup>

Therefore, after the reintegration of these armed groups, some of those who had been artificially included in the FARDC integration process deserted, and either reverted to the armed group or a non-combatant lifestyle.

### *v) Allure of the armed group*

Some demobilised ex-combatants, particularly young men who had struggled to adapt to civilian life and/or establish a satisfactory (self-defined) livelihood, joined, or were recruited into armed groups. The security, status, sense of belonging and income-generating opportunities associated with armed groups were key motivating factors in this regard. For example, according to ACDC officials:

"... Many former fighters who underwent DDR processes sometimes never got to the reintegration stage. They get demotivated by the pitiful lifestyle that their predecessors [fellow former combatants] lead, in comparison to those still in the bush wielding arms. To a former fighter, unemployment is one of the most common catalysts to re-recruitment."<sup>115</sup>

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113 Author interview with an FARDC commandant, Uvira, South Kivu, 20 May 2011.

114 Interview with the administrators of the Bureau pour le Volontariat au Service de l'Enfance et de la Santé (BVES). Bukavu, 2 June 2011.

115 Interview with an official of ACDC, Uvira, 28 May 2011.