

6 South Sudan

6.1 Level of human development

In 2010, Sudan was ranked 154th out of a total of 169 countries in terms of HDI. South Sudan achieved independence from Sudan in mid-2011, and therefore was not included as a separate country entry in the HDI rankings. South Sudan has historically been one of the most underdeveloped regions within Sudan, and hence it is conceivable that South Sudan would have a lower HDI ranking than the entire Sudan.

6.2 Economic overview

The South Sudanese economy is entirely dependent on oil, with on average 98.7% of total government revenue having been derived from oil since 2005. In 2008 oil revenue increased three-fold from the previous year due to Southern Sudan's enhanced autonomy, then declined by 38% in 2009 due to the global financial crisis, and then increased by 37% in 2010. Only one-tenth of a percent of revenue is generated from personal income taxation.²⁷⁴ Agriculture is the main economic activity, but mainly takes place in "small, hand-cultivated units often farmed by women-headed households". Sorghum is the main cultivated crop, with maize, cassava, sesame, millet, groundnuts and a number of other crops also being farmed. However, agricultural production is insufficient for domestic consumption, and the FAO estimated that there would be close to a 300,000 ton deficit of cereal crops in 2011.²⁷⁵

Due to the historical economic marginalisation of Southern Sudan by the North, and decades of armed conflict, trade in South Sudan has been highly localised and predominantly sourced from Kenya and Uganda. In addition, the manufacturing sector was

relatively insignificant, very little agricultural produce and livestock being geared for export. In essence, South Sudan was a net importer of goods.²⁷⁶ Between 2005 and 2010 there was a dramatic expansion of most urban economies in South Sudan, particularly Juba. Conversely, the size of the urban poor has also increased. The reason for this is that the

formal economy has grown to meet the demands of the international donor/aid/NGO²⁷⁷ community and national government. Foreign businesses (mainly from Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia) have largely met the demands of this sector, but most of the profits are not invested in South Sudan. It is important to note that no more than 10% of the South Sudanese derive an income from formal sector employment.²⁷⁸

For South Sudan the key demographic, social and economic indicators in 2010 were as follows:²⁷⁹

- The total population was estimated to be 8.26 million people.
- Half of the population was below the age of 18, with 72% under the age of 30.
- Less than a third of the adult population was literate, with the literacy rate for males being 40% and 16% for females.
- 83% of the population resided in rural areas, with the average number of members in a private household being seven.
- 79% of urban household owned their own housing, with 96% ownership amongst rural house-


The South Sudanese economy is entirely dependent on oil.

Table 5: Human Development Indicators Sudan

Indicator	South Sudan
Health	
Expenditure on health, public (% of GDP)	1.3
Under-five mortality (per 1,000 live births)	109
Life expectancy at birth (years)	58.9
Education	
Adult literacy rate (both sexes) (% aged 15 and above)	60.9
Combined gross enrolment ratio in education (both sexes) (%)	39.9
Expenditure on education (% of GDP) (%)	8.5
Internet users (per 100 people)	10.2
Mean years of schooling (of adults) (years)	2.9
Expected Years of schooling (of children) (years)	4.4
Income	
GDP per capita (2008 PPP US\$)	2,300
GNI per capita (2008 PPP US\$) LN	7.6
Household final consumption expenditure per capita PPP (constant 2005 international \$)	1,024
Inequality	
Inequality-adjusted education index	..
Inequality-adjusted income index	..
Inequality-adjusted HDI value	..
Poverty	
Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3)	..
Intensity of deprivation	..
MPI: Headcount (k greater than or equal to 3), population in poverty (% of population)	..
Gender	
Maternal mortality ratio (deaths of women per 100,000 live births)	450
Population with at least secondary education, female/male ratio	0.702
Gender Inequality Index, value	0.708
Gender Inequality Index (updated)	0.73
Composite indices	
Multidimensional poverty index (k greater than or equal to 3)	..
HDI value	0.379
Gender Inequality Index, value	0.708
Inequality-adjusted HDI value	..


Source: UNDP, <http://www.hdr.undp.org>

Figure 6: Human Development Index Trends: Sudan. 1980-2010



Source UNDP, <http://www.hdr.undp.org>

Figure 7: South Sudan 2011 budget



holds, most homesteads being constructed of wood.

- 53% of the working population were unpaid family workers, with 12% being paid employees.
- GDP was 30 billion Sudanese Pounds (equivalent to US\$ 13 billion).
- Average consumption in urban areas was SDG 168 per person per month (of which 69% is on food) compared to SDG 88 per person per month in rural areas (of which 79% was on food).
- 10% of the population had access to electricity (of which 9.6% were in urban areas).

As with other post-conflict econ-

omies, a disproportionate share of the annual government budget has consistently been allocated to the security sector since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The rationale for the prioritisation of security spending was to “develop an efficient and effective armed forces, to safeguard security and implement the CPA”.²⁸⁰ Between 2006 and 2008, more than a third of the total budget was allocated to security, with an average 36% being allotted to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) alone. The lion’s share of the funds was used for salaries. Security spending was also prioritised by donor agencies, receiving the third highest portion of aid after health and infrastructure.²⁸¹

In 2011, just over a quarter of the total budget was earmarked for security, which included the Demining Authority (0.006% of the budget), the DDR Commission (0.04% of the budget) and the SPLA and Veterans Affairs (27.7% of the budget). Despite the drop in the percentage of the security share in the budget, SPLA costs have actually increased by 33.6% compared to 2005. The change in percentage share is due to the increase in oil revenues. Other spending priorities included public administration (the majority of funds going to the Office of the President and the Legislative

Assembly), infrastructure (particularly transport and roads), and the allocation of funds to the States (counties). Close to 80% of the budget was for salary and operating costs, with the remaining 20% assigned to capital expenditure.²⁸² Figure 7 provides a graphical depiction of the manner in which the South Sudanese budget was disbursed for the 2011 financial year.

6.3 Livelihoods support


In South Sudan 79% of rural households were reliant on subsistence crop farming, and 6% on animal husbandry as their main livelihood source. However, most households combined crop cultivation and livestock ownership in order to survive. In urban areas the foremost type of livelihood support for households were wages/salaries (44%), followed by crop farming (22%) and small business enterprises (12%), most of which operated in the informal sector.²⁸³

As figure 8 indicates, the annual cereal crop output from subsistence agriculture has varied between 2004 and 2009, but FAO data reveals that on average crop production increased by 50% for the six years after the CPA (2005-2010) compared to the 2000-2005 period (when there were active armed conflicts). More than 95% of agricultural production is rain-fed,

which makes South Sudan food production vulnerable to drought.²⁸⁴

Cattle are widely regarded as wealth in South Sudan, and are linked to social status, as in many other parts of Africa. As detailed in figure 8, cattle ownership has increased significantly (by a third) since 2004. In 2010 it was estimated that there were 11.8 million cattle in South Sudan. In addition to the cattle, there were 14 million goats and 12.6 million sheep. If the total livestock population were evenly distributed amongst all South Sudanese households there would be 19 animals per household.²⁸⁵ Nonetheless, as with agricultural production,

Figure 8: Livelihood indicators: Cereal crops, cattle and formal businesses



Source: Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, *Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan 2010, Juba, 2011*
 Note: cereal crops (tons) and cattle figures in thousands; actual figures for business presented.

Table 6: Formal sector business type and activity in South Sudan

Businesses by type of activity (urban areas)	Number	%
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Mining, Quarrying, Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air-conditioning Supply	10	0.1
Manufacturing	199	2.7
Water Supply, Sewage, Waste Management and other services	7	0.1
Construction	89	1.2
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of motor vehicles and motorcycle	5116	69.8
Transportation and Storage	45	0.6
Accommodation and Food Service	1037	14.1
Information and Communication	97	1.3
Financial and Insurance Activities	52	0.7
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities	46	0.6
Administrative and support service activities	10	0.1
Education	31	0.4
Human Health and Social Service activities	361	4.9
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation	22	0.3
Other Service Activities	211	2.9
Total	7333	100

Source: Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, Statistical Yearbook for Southern Sudan 2010, Juba, 2011

livestock are vulnerable to drought (as it affects the availability of grazing) as well as to disease.

By the end of 2010 there were a total of 7,333 registered (formal sector) businesses in urban areas. Prior to 2005 there were very few formal businesses in existence, and a business registry was only created in 2006. As depicted in figure 8 over the past five years there was more than 2000% increase in the number of registered businesses being established in South Sudan. In 2010, more than a third (37%) of businesses are located in Juba, with 15%, 12% and 7% being in located in the smaller urban centres of Wau and Malakal and Rumbek respectively.

Table 6 provides more detail on the business types and activities in South Sudan, with majority being in the wholesale, retail and vehicle repair trade (more than two-thirds), followed by accommodation and food service. Accurate data on the number of type of informal sector businesses was unavailable, but anecdotal evidence has suggested that there has also been growth in the size and diversity of the informal sector since the signing of the CPA and an increase in urbanisation.

6.4 Constraints and barriers to the formal economy

Establishing a formal sector business, or converting an informal one into a formal sector business in South Sudan is challenging, especially as the costs and measures for setting up and registering a business are excessive. It takes 11 procedures, and could cost on average SDG 6,801 (US\$ 3,077), which equates to 250.2% of income per capita. This made Juba the second most expensive commercial capital in the world in which to establish a formal sector business. Registering private property was also problematic, as it took on average seven procedures, 18 days and cost 14.7% of the property value.²⁸⁶

Juba is the second most expensive commercial capital in the world in which to establish a formal business.

Most communities have traditional rights to the land on which they reside. In many cases community members are entitled to transfer these rights, however, customary law governs such transfers, and typically accu-

Table 7: Indicators of barriers to formal sector business development Juba		
Procedure	Juba rank	Sub-Saharan average rank
Ease of doing business	159	137
Starting a business	123	126
Registering property	124	121
Getting credit	176	120
Protecting investors	173	113
Paying taxes	84	116
Trading across borders	181	136
Enforcing contracts	74	118
Resolving insolvency	183	128

rate records of such transactions are not maintained. Consequently, community members were not in a position to use land as surety to access credit through financial institutions to either invest in agriculture or business.²⁸⁷

In addition, South Sudan is “heavily under banked”,²⁸⁸ with only 42 banking service outlets in South Sudan and 76 microfinance institutions in 2010. Close to half of both institutions were located in Central Equatoria County, which includes the city of Juba. Only 1%

There are four to seven checkpoints per 100 km on average along major trade routes.

of households in South Sudan had a bank account. Obtaining credit in South Sudan was exceedingly difficult, with only short-term credit on offer (three to six months) and relatively high interest rates being levied. Approximately 10% of loans were provided to small and medium sized businesses. The microfinance sector was small and only provides services to 5% of the clients in Juba.²⁸⁹

The economy is severely constrained by trade restrictions and high associated costs. Most consumer goods are imported into South Sudan, and are transported through the country by road, river or air, with duties being levied on imports. For example, if a businessperson based in Juba uses Mombasa (Kenya) to import a standardised container of goods 11 official documents will be required; it will take 60 days to receive the goods; and it will cost US\$ 9,420. Exports require nine official documents; take 52 days; and will cost US\$ 5,025. In short, the import/export of goods

in South Sudan is slower and more expensive than the sub-Saharan average.²⁹⁰

In terms road transport, there are numerous checkpoints, which in most cases required fees or tolls to be paid. On average there are four checkpoints per 100km along major trade routes, while on northerly trade routes there are between six and seven checkpoints per 100km. Fees paid on internal routes can be as much as 15% of the value of goods transported, with close to 50% of the payments being un-receipted. Across all routes, waiting time was on average in excess of two hours per 100km, or 65% of driving time.²⁹¹ These trade constraints have contributed to the increased costs of imports and exports in South Sudan, which not only has negative implications for livelihoods, but has also stymied post-conflict construction efforts due to the high cost of construction materials.²⁹²

The nature of taxation in South Sudan has also contributed to the slow materialization of the formal sector. The CPA and the Interim Constitution (post-2005) provided the legal basis for three-level government taxation, namely: Government of National Unity; Government of Southern Sudan; and States/Regions. The implementation of this system became “uncoordinated and un-harmonized...rates are levied on an ad hoc basis...unauthorised revenue collection is rampant.”²⁹³ Other constraints included: inadequate protection for investors; the deficient enforcement of contracts and the difficulties involved in closing businesses.

Table 7 provides rankings of how Juba compares to 183 economies in terms of business regulation, based on data from the World Bank/International Finance Corporation’s ‘Doing Business’ project. The table reveals that in most categories, Juba is below the Sub-Saharan average, which is considerable more restrictive than many economies in Asia, Europe and North America. Consequently, most South Sudanese businesses are relatively small and operate in the informal sector.

6.5 Urban informal sector

As indicated above, the majority of people living in South Sudan’s urban areas interacted with the informal sector, including informal businesses, in order to survive. Most economically active people generated an

Table 8: Livelihood activities and average wage rates

Livelihood activity	Wage rate/profit
Firewood collection Small bundle Big bundle	SDG 5–7 (US\$ 2–2.50) SDG 20–25 (US\$ 7–9)
Charcoal-burning	SDG 30-35 (US\$ 11-13) per bag
Stone breaking	SDG 350-450 (US\$ 130-165) per truck load (One truck-load is equivalent to approximately seven tonnes or 1-2 weeks of labour)
Making bricks	SDG 30 (US\$ 11) for 500 bricks
Smearing houses	SDG 20 (US\$ 7) per day (or approximately SDG 200 for 2 rooms)
Washing clothes	SDG 1 per piece (or approximately SDG 50 (US \$18) for 3 days' work)
Washing dishes	SDG 10 (US\$ 3.50) per day
Charcoal retail	SDG 10 to 20 SDG (US\$ 3.50–7) per bag (Bags bought from charcoal-burners and sold at markets)
Food retail, tea-making and baking	SDG 10–30 (US\$ 3.50–\$11) per day
Vegetables	SDG 5–10 (US\$ 2–3.50) per day
Alcohol brewing	SDG 10–15 (US\$ 3.50–\$5.50) per day

income through a variety of strategies. A 2010 study undertaken by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) identified the main means of income generation in the informal sector in Juba as being: laundry services; bread making/selling; selling of soft drinks; market stalls; grass collection; charcoal making/selling; artisanal quarrying and stone crushing; beer making/selling; domestic help; and casual labour in hotels and markets.²⁹⁴ In market places a wide selection of items are on sale, including prepared food, vegetables, beverages, hardware and household items, cooking utensils, electronic goods and cell phone vouchers. It is nonetheless important to note that formal sector unemployment in urban areas remains relatively high.

Operating a ‘boda-boda’ (motorcycle taxi) was a popular means to generate an income for young, able-bodied urban men, some of which served in the SPLA. ‘Boda-bodas’ are an essential component of the post-war informal urban transport system, ferrying workers between their homes, places of work and marketplaces (with an average fare being in the region of US\$ 2). However, the industry was largely unregulated, other than drivers requiring a licence from the government to operate (which was SDG 30

in July 2010).²⁹⁵ On average, ‘boda-boda’ drivers could earn between SDG 30–60 (US\$ 11–US\$ 22) per day, after fuel and motorcycle rental costs have been deducted.²⁹⁶ In recent years ‘boda-boda’ drivers have been frequently accused by the authorities of being responsible for traffic accidents in Juba, which led to increases in regulation, as well as alleged harassment by the traffic police.²⁹⁷

Relationships exist between types of income generation and gender. In very general terms, women typically engaged in marketplace activities, such as preparing and selling food and beverages, collecting grass, collecting/selling firewood and doing laundry. Men were often involved in charcoal making, jobs relating to construction, and driving ‘boda-bodas’. As in many other developing countries, some women have become the ‘bread winners’ for their families, either because the household was female-headed, or their husbands/partners were unemployed, or did not generate a stable, regular income.²⁹⁸

Minimum earnings from market stalls, which involved the selling of food, drinks and other consumables, were between SDG 5 and SDG 30 per day, while the wages for casual labour in the markets were around

SDG 5 per day. See table 8 for further details on wages/profits from informal sector work. In comparison, wages/salaries in the formal sector were on a par with market stallholders (also known as the ‘table trade’), with police and prison personnel monthly remuneration being approximately SDG 350. Drivers and guards earned around SDG 400–500 per month.²⁹⁹

Most households spent their income on food, school fees, and medicine, with the costs of all three reported to be increasing annually, largely due to increases in transportation and tariffs/taxes.³⁰⁰ For example in 2010, a crude assessment of the average food costs for people of living in informal settles were as follows: 1kg of meat=SDG 12; 1l cooking oil=SDG 4; 1kg maize=SDG 4; 4 tomatoes=SDG 2; 200l of Nile water=SDG 5; live chicken=SDG 50; live goat=SDG 180; and a live sheep= SDG200.³⁰¹

6.6 DDR programming

In January 2005, following two decades of civil war in Sudan, the CPA was concluded between, and signed by, the main conflicting parties, namely the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan. The CPA allowed for the establishment of an interim constitution, which was the legal basis on which the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) was established and granted a high degree of autonomy. The Agreement also made provision for a referendum on the independence of Southern Sudan.

In terms of the CPA, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM agreed to proportional reductions in the size of their armed forces, with DDR programming being the key implementation instrument. International donors and agencies were tasked with financing the DDR process, but the specific DDR objectives, orientation and strategies were unspecified.³⁰² Following discussions and negotiations between the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) and international donors, a DDR target figure of 90,000 was determined. However, this figure was based on loose estimates of the personnel size of the SPLA, as no accurate member record existed at the time.

After the finalisation of the CPA a National DDR Co-ordination Council and an Interim DDR Programme were established, under whose auspices a National DDR Strategic Plan (2007) was compiled. The fundamental aim of the plan was “to consolidate the peace

process and to create an enabling environment to undertake the activities related to human security, reconstruction and development”. The specific objectives of the plan were as follows:³⁰³

- Reintegrating the targeted groups psychologically, socially, politically and economically into civil society
- Enhancement of peaceful coexistence among various groups of ex-combatants and their communities through psychological demobilisation
- Empowering ex-combatants to economically compete and to rely on themselves
- Supporting special needs groups (women and children associated with armed groups, disabled and elderly)
- Reducing and controlling small arms to create a peaceful environment and to enforce the rule of law
- Sensitisation of the targeted groups and host communities on issues related to HIV/AIDS, peace building and healing.

A number of target groups were identified in the plan, namely: voluntary demobilised combatants from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA; ex-combatants identified as a result of downsizing as envisioned in the CPA; disabled and elderly combatants from the SAF and the SPLA; child combatants and children associated with armed forces and groups; and women associated with armed forces and groups.³⁰⁴

The National DDR Coordination Council was allocated the responsibility of policy formulation, oversight, review coordination and evaluation. Two DDR commissions, in Northern and Southern Sudan, were also created to facilitate the implementation of the Strategic Plan, through the design and execution of DDR processes and activities within their respective territories. Both of these commissions were comprised of a number of State (provincial) Offices, which were responsible for implementing DDR activities at the State (provincial) level.

The UN, especially the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UNDP, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), as well as international organisations, a range of donor agencies and non-governmental organisations pro-

vided financial and technical support.³⁰⁵ The UN, for its part, taking into consideration the requirements of the UN IDDRS, sought to synchronize and implement its DDR activities via an Integrated DDR Unit.

The main rationale for the Interim DDR Programme, according to the National DDR Strategic Plan, was to “address the vulnerable groups normally left out in the DDR process and to lay the groundwork for subsequent development and implementation of a multi-year DDR program.” This Programme, however, did not progress beyond conceptualising, strategizing and planning, and was dogged by the complexities and challenges of implanting a DDR programme in a large, grossly under-resourced country. This state of affairs was exacerbated by the fragility of the peace agreement and considerable institutional rivalries between the main DDR stakeholders.

The Interim DDR Programme was subsequently replaced by the Multi-Year DDR programme in June 2009, which was predominantly geared to DDR implementation. With the benefit of hindsight, many DDR specialists lamented the lost opportunities of the 2005-2009 period, as the delayed implementation of the DDR programming was arguably to haunt the effectiveness of post-conflict peace building in South Sudan.³⁰⁶

The Multi-Year DDR programme was to be underpinned by a Master List of 90,000 individuals identified to undergo DDR. The SPLA became entirely responsible for compiling the Master List, which was to be ultimately linked to a reduction in the salary component of the SPLA budget. Consequently, the SPLA became the key power broker within the revived DDR process. The UN, which was responsible for sourcing and disbursing funding for DDR activities, as well as providing technical support, initially endorsed this arrangement, as it coincided with a central principle of the UN IDDRS, namely that DDR processes should be ‘nationally-owed’.³⁰⁷

A combination of political and security considerations led to this arrangement: the GOSS, which was concerned about the possibility of renewed military action from the North in the post-CPA period, and the existence of tensions in the border areas, delegated the responsibility of the Master List to the SPLA. This decision was arguably taken to minimise the possibility of institutional insecurity and low morale within

the military organisation. The SPLA subsequently adopted a decentralised approach to the Master List with individuals being nominated at the State level by senior SPLA officials. However, there appeared to have been a lack of suitable checks and balances within the SPLA to verify the reliability of the information on the Master List.³⁰⁸ In addition, systems to independently and effectively authenticate the credibility of the Master List did not materialise. Given these challenges, the Master List was replaced by a less formal ‘names list’.

UN financial (through donor governments) and technical investment in the DDR processes was forthcoming, with the bulk of the reintegration workload either being undertaken by UNMIS or subcontracted to ‘implementing partners’, namely the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), FAO, *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) and the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (BRAC). Further subcontracting to non-governmental organisations and the private sector also took place. UNICEF took the lead in facilitating DDR in relation to children.

The Southern Sudan DDR Commission achieved full autonomy from the National DDR Coordination Council, and with South Sudan’s independence in July 2011. The Southern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Act was finalised in 2011, which renamed the Commission the Republic of South Sudan Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration Commission (RSSDDRC), and stipulated its post-independence mandate as “to provide for the establishment and governance of an independent Commission to expedite the process of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-combatants into other regular forces, and other civilian institutions and society, and certain issues related thereto”.

Conventional DDR programming was pursued in both North and South Sudan. In South Sudan, those identified by the SPLA for DDR were required to report to demobilisation sites, where they would be registered as beneficiaries. They were required to hand-in

Following the independence in July 2011, the South Sudan DDR Commission was tasked with expediting the process of DDR.

firearms and ammunition (if in their possession) and undergo medical and/or disability screenings. These individuals were also required to attend information sessions on reintegration, and thereafter select a reintegration option. For these individuals, demobilisation equated to being discharged from the SPLA, as they were issued discharge certificates.³⁰⁹

DDR in South Sudan was divided into two phases, with 36,641 individuals from the special needs group (SNG) being earmarked to participate in phase I, and 53,400 SPLA personnel in phase II. Close to 1,000 women associated with armed forces were also identified to receive DDR benefits. A key drawback of the DDR process was that, by the time the practical DDR processes were implemented, close to three years had past since the conclusion of the CPA, and a significant number of the targeted DDR beneficiaries had already self-demobilised and returned to their home communities. These individuals were subsequently recalled by the SPLA to report to demobilisation sites / assembly areas in order to undergo DDR. Significant numbers did not report for disarmament and demobilisation registration, and numerous others who applied for DDR benefits were deemed to be ineligible.

Phase I of the reintegration strategy took an individualistic approach to reintegration, and focused on the reintegration of SNG. According to the 2008 GOSS and SSDDRC Strategy Document, by the end of the reintegration process, each ex-combatant was supposed to receive a package worth US\$ 1,750 with USD 1,500 being sourced from international donors and US\$ 250 coming from the GOSS.³¹⁰ The budget for reintegration in both North Sudan and South Sudan was USD 105 million.

After demobilisation, discharged individuals received a reinsertion package, which was comprised of a selection of the following: clothing, food rations (sorghum, beans, oil and salt), soap, cash (SGD 860), mosquito nets and a variety of other items. These packages were a transitional arrangement to provide stopgap livelihood support for beneficiaries and their dependents for the period between the end of demobilisation and the initiation of reintegration support.

Reintegration programming took the form of training, with subsequent material support and technical advice being provided. The implementing partners (mentioned above) initiated a variety of reintegration

training options, with the main categories being: agriculture production and livestock rearing; small business and entrepreneurship; vocational training; and education.³¹¹ Approximately 80% of the reintegration beneficiaries chose the small business and agriculture/livestock options. In addition to the individual reintegration options, projects were established, and support provided, in those communities that would receive demobilised individuals. Examples included women and youth empowerment initiatives.³¹²

By the end of the disarmament and demobilisation components of phase I of the Multi-Year Programme (April 2011), 12,525 of the targeted 90,000 individuals had received disarmament and demobilisation support. In addition, 12,282 had received counseling; 9,575 were registered with DDR implementing partners; 5,033 had completed formal DDR training; and 4,459 received material DDR packages.³¹³ The completion of the reintegration component of phase I was scheduled for December 2011.³¹⁴

6.7 Reintegration dynamics

The under-performance of the DDR process in South Sudan is undeniable and has been widely criticised. In September 2011 the Small Arms Survey Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment released a report claiming: “by any criteria, phase 1 can be judged as having largely failed...[and that] the programme had no discernible impact on human security in South Sudan.”³¹⁵ No detailed assessment or substantial evidence was, however, provided to validate such a bold deduction. Other critiques have been more nuanced, and the STHLM Policy Group, for example, in its evaluation of the DDR process in December 2010, concluded that the DDR process was:

“More of an expensive livelihoods support program for a limited group of people than a relevant contribution to peace and stability in southern Sudan...[and] that the DDR has not been effective in terms of contributing to the reduction of military capability, military expenditure, nor to confidence building measures.”³¹⁶

It is important to note that the outcome of the DDR process in South Sudan was fundamentally shaped and curtailed by dynamics within the SPLA, and the relations between the SPLA, UN agencies responsible

for supporting DDR, implementing partners and the DDR Commission in South Sudan. Security considerations could also not be discounted. The South Sudan government, particularly the SPLA, concerned about armed conflicts in the border regions, and anticipating the strong possibility of military action from Khartoum, did not actively prioritise DDR. In short, the DDR process in South Sudan was undertaken in an acute environment of adversity. The STHLM Policy Group further suggested that:

“The CPA, which is de facto a ceasefire, was an insufficient basis for an actual process of demobilisation of active-duty combatants... [and that] there is quite a strong feeling among many of the older SPLA members that the current design of the DDR does not provide them and the people they fought side-by-side with, sufficient support.”³¹⁷

Given the abovementioned considerations, the SPLA, from a military perspective, earmarked its least valuable members for DDR. This group included certain disabled and wounded members, as well as women and children, and became more widely referred to as the SNG. There were also indications that SNG individuals were chiefly drawn from militia/armed groups who had previously been integrated into the SPLA, whose loyalty to the SPLA was unclear, many of which were not directly benefiting from SPLA salary payouts. SPLA members identified as ‘War Veterans and Wounded Heroes and Heroines’, which were widely respected within the SPLA, were not targeted for DDR.

The effectiveness of UN DDR work was also seemingly undermined by alleged inter-agency rivalries and tensions; not only within Juba; but also between Juba and Khartoum; as well as between UNMIS and UN Headquarters in New York. The UN also kept a tight rein on the financial resources allocated for DDR in South Sudan, which provided UN agencies with considerable leverage in determining the type, content and manner of support provided as well as the organisations and agencies that would be contracted to implement the processes and activities.³¹⁸

The dominant role of the SPLA in the DDR equation, sanctioned by the UN and donor agencies, effectively diluted the ability of the DDR Commission to fulfil its oversight mandate. As the DDR process matured,

the Commission increasingly found itself restricted to coordination, donor liaison and public relations roles. Since 2009, the majority of its activities have involved: the hosting information and sensitization workshops; strategy, stakeholder and donor meetings and conferences; research; presiding over DDR ceremonies; distribution of public education material; and press conferences.³¹⁹

Relations between the Commission and the SPLA, as well as between the UN and the Commission were consequently strained on occasion.³²⁰ For example, an acrimonious disagreement between the Commission and UNDP over the management of the DDR process, and the manner in which financial resources were allocated (and associated transparency) was widely reported in the Sudanese print and electronic media.³²¹ At the time, the Chairperson of the Southern Sudan DDR Commission, William Deng Deng, was reported as saying: “There has been no boss [of the DDR process]. Who is the boss? Is it the UNDP? Is it the donors? Is it the government of South Sudan? It must be the government of South Sudan because this is a government project.”³²² Added to this, the SSDDRC was of the view that a number of donor agencies that provided financial support to the demilitarisation process were at times inconsistent in terms of prioritising DDR support.³²³ For the beneficiaries of DDR support, the Swahili proverb, ‘when elephants fight, the grass gets hurt’ appeared to have had some resonance.

The outcome of the DDR process in South Sudan was fundamentally shaped by dynamics within the SPLA.

6.8 Informal sector and the impact of reintegration support

6.8.1 Overview

A 2010 study commissioned by the World Bank, African Development Bank and Southern Sudan DDR Commission found that 80% of the 3,000 sample participants from the DDR process defined themselves as being unemployed.³²⁴ Taken at face value this finding would suggest that the DDR process should be considered a fiasco (in line with the Small Arms Survey’s conclusion). However, a more nuanced analysis of reintegration in South Sudan indicates that there ap-

pears to be some surprisingly positive developments.

Similar to CAR and the DRC, there was the prevailing view among the majority of former combatants, that employment was synonymous with receiving a monthly salary or wage. This was reinforced in two ways. Firstly, following the CPA, SPLA members were provided with salaries and other benefits, although the regularity of payment varied. Over the past five years the salaries of the lowest ranking SPLA members have ranged between US\$ 300 and US\$ 500 per month.³²⁵ Secondly, certain government officials and senior SPLA officers, when informing the SPLA rank-and-file of the DDR process, allegedly embellished the benefits that would be provided to demobilised SPLA members.³²⁶ Many were left with the impression that lucrative employment (and other remuneration) would await those who were demobilised.

Nonetheless, as indicated in the section on the economy of South Sudan, formal sector employment was extremely limited, even in government ministries and agencies. Such employment generally requires individuals to be literate, numerative, and be conversant in English. These were skills that the vast majority of rank-and-file ex-combatants and SNG individuals did not possess, due to decades of war, and a dysfunctional and largely ineffective education system.

However, despite these expectations, commonly held views on employment, and a lack of education, significant numbers of SNG and ex-combatants were able to pursue civilian livelihoods in post-war South Sudan. The greatest successes were in small informal businesses in urban areas, as well as in the subsistence

The greatest successes are in small informal businesses in urban areas and in subsistence agriculture in rural areas.

agriculture, predominantly in rural areas. An assessment of the reintegration of only 53 former combatants by the Small Arms Survey in 2010/2011, suggested even though many ex-combatants had been able to pursue civilian livelihoods, this had been achieved prior to reintegration support being provided. The report therefore questioned the design and rationale of the South Sudan DDR process.³²⁷ Some DDR implementing partners, such as GIZ and FAO, appeared to have been aware of this dynamic, and sought, where possible to

use reintegration support to enhance the livelihood endeavours of former combatants.

GIZ reported in June 2011 that 64% of the beneficiaries that underwent GIZ-sponsored training were self-employed (majority) or employed. Most of self-employed DDR beneficiaries were involved in informal small businesses, selling fruit, bread, soft drinks, and managing restaurants/cafes. In addition, a highly successful fishing cooperative, which operated throughout the entire value chain, had been established.³²⁸ These successes appeared to due to 'opportunity and partnership mapping' being undertaken in the areas where GIZ support was being offered; appropriately targeted training (small business, vocational activities and agriculture); a comprehensive selection process of beneficiaries; and regular monitoring and evaluation.³²⁹

Interviews in Juba with ex-combatants and SNG individuals who had been beneficiaries of SNG support revealed that the training support had assisted them in either becoming self-employed or finding employment in the informal sector. Some beneficiaries had even been able to establish multiple small businesses.³³⁰ In some cases, ex-combatants had expanded their small businesses to include other ex-combatants/SNG individuals or family members. Many ex-combatants indicated that they were remitting a significant portion of their income to their families, including spouses and children, most of whom were living in rural areas. Some of the beneficiaries of vocational training support were working within the UN system on short-term contracts (six to eight months) as carpenters, plumbers, electricians and welders. These individuals earned between SDG 40 and SDG 60 per day.³³¹

6.8.2 Small businesses

In terms of income generation, those interviewees who operated informal sector businesses in Juba's main markets indicated the following:

- Small restaurants owners could earn a daily profit of between SDG 100 and SDG 500
- Juice bar vendors could generate an approximate income of SDG 100 per day
- Tea/coffee stalls made a profit of about SDG 60 on market days

- Vegetable/fruit sellers often earned in the region of SDG 30 pounds daily
- The tailoring business brought in an average income of SDG 30 per day
- Phone card vendors could earn up SDG 200 daily.

The majority of fresh produce (especially fruit and vegetables) sold in the urban markets of South Sudan was imported from neighbouring countries. The former combatants/SNG individuals interviewed reported that their profits were negatively affected by poor road infrastructure and numerous checkpoints (which delayed the delivery and affected the quality of the produce), as well as transport/import taxes (which increased the cost of the produce). Insufficient cold storage, business/market taxes and poor access to credit were also indicated as constraints to business. DDR beneficiaries who were in vocational trades, and employed by the UN, expressed concern about job insecurity, given that they were only employed on short term contracts.³³²

6.8.3 Rudimentary income-generating activities

Former combatants without skills or entrepreneurial competencies in urban areas have had to pursue more rudimentary income generating options, such as the manufacture and sale of charcoal, artisanal quarrying, stone crushing, grass collection and casual labour.³³³ One demobilised former SPLA soldier described the charcoal trade as “not very profitable and requiring a lot of energy”.³³⁴ Some former combatants earned a living operating ‘boda-bodas’.

6.8.4 Subsistence agriculture and animal husbandry

In rural areas, ex-combatants and SNG individual primarily resorted to subsistence agriculture and livestock rearing. The FAO, as well as other implementing partners, provided considerable reintegration support in this regard. The FAO provided training in these sectors to 1,883 beneficiaries in the following

enterprises: field crop production; vegetable growing; ox plough; poultry; bee keeping; fisheries; small ruminants (goats). Beneficiaries were encouraged to be trained in multiple enterprises in order to have the option of diversified livelihood support. The most popular were: ox plough; field crop production; and small ruminants. The livestock options were particularly popular due to the high cultural value attributed to these animals (particularly cattle).³³⁵

At the time of the interview, the FAO had undertaken follow-up visits with approximately 20% of beneficiaries, and indicated that there had been mixed results in terms of achieving sustainable reintegration. Some beneficiaries had improved their standards of living through using the training and material support provided by FAO and other organisations, whilst others had been less successful. The key determinants of success were previous experience/skills with agriculture and livestock, and natural inclination towards entrepreneurship.³³⁶

6.8.5 Community reintegration

In addition to livelihood reintegration, there were indications of some progress towards community reintegration. For example, an understated finding of the 2010 World Bank, African Development Bank and Southern Sudan DDR Commission socio-economic study of the reintegration ex-combatants into communities of return was that “more community leaders and individuals perceive the engagement of DDR participants in community affairs as normal, rather than low or non-existent.”³³⁷ However, the reintegration process to date, for all intensive purposes, is a prelude to a far more substantial DDR process that will be launched in the latter part of 2011. The objective of the new DDR phase is to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate 80,000 active SPLA/South Sudan Armed Force (SSAF) in addition to 70,000 former SPLA personnel that were absorbed into the South Sudan Police Services, the Wildlife Service and Prison Services and Fire Brigades from 2005. Therefore the total number of individuals that are targeted for DDR totals 150,000.³³⁸

