UNITED EX-COMBATANTS DEVELOPMENT
ASSOCIATION
HEAD OFFICE
P O BOX 619
ARUA
TEL: 077553338
078 410711
Email Untd-2005
@ Yahoo.COM
Peace And Security For Development

3. MIGRATION AND CONFLICT: FINDINGS FROM EXISTING LITERATURE

The research literature on migration is extensive, encompassing societies around the globe. However, within the study area of migration and conflict, especially with regard to former rebel combatants, significant research gaps persist. As a result, the following collection of literature is both a discussion of the previous work related to this study as well as a reflection on the absence of documented work regarding migration of former rebels. While stark contrasts exist, those migrating within and outside the context of war often move for similar reasons. Consequently, general migration literature can be helpful to constructing an understanding of post-conflict migration. However, this review gives special attention to conflict-related migration, as this is arguably the context in which most ex-combatants returning from rebellions find themselves. Within this context, the literature is useful to understand common types of migration destinations and components of the decision making process (e.g. values and priorities, facilitators and obstacles, push and pull factors), as well as the post-migration experience.

3.1 Common post-conflict migration destinations

While similar causes for migration may exist both in conflict and in non-conflict settings, migration becomes an even more attractive option during conflict. Migration destinations in this situation often differ depending on the phase of the conflict. During active conflict, most individuals who migrate flee either to camps for the internally displaced, across the border into refugee camps, straight to urban areas or to alternate host communities unaffected by the violence. At the same time, many either join or are abducted by armed groups. When conflict has ceased, these former Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees and soldiers begin the process of reintegration back into their communities. In many settings the entire community has been displaced and everyone must then begin anew upon return. This was primarily concerned with migration after the cessation of fighting. Individuals may return to their communities of origin, to alternate host communities including larger cities, or may stay for an extended period of time in an IDP or refugee camp. The reintegration of returning IDPs, refugees and particularly ex-combatants has social, economic and political dimensions (Taylor et al. 2006). Social reintegration in this context is to be understood as the self-reported relations with family and members of the community, economic reintegration as the ability to find productive livelihoods in the post-war context, and political reintegration the commitment to peaceful and democratic political expression (Taylor et al. 2006). Another increasing dynamic in conflict settings is the "issue of young people's migration due to war, economic hardship and lack of social opportunities for personal development (education, training, employment). This includes both rural to urban migration and migration from the war-affected country to a neighboring country or even a different continent" (Honwana, 2006).

A thorough analysis of migration destinations and other migration-related themes was conducted by the World Bank for the scoping study, forming the foundation of this follow-on migration study. Therefore, this section makes frequent reference to that research (conducted by Viola Erdmannsdoerfer in 2011), linking it with further secondary source research.

3.1a IDP and refugee camps

As a result of intense conflict, large populations are often displaced. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2010), 27.5 million people were internally displaced by conflict or violence as of December 2010. Furthermore, IDPs constituted two-thirds of all forcibly displaced people, with only the remaining one-third becoming refugees. The Africa region topped the number of

IDPs worldwide, with 11.1 million, or 40 per cent of the world's IDPs by the end of 2010 (ibid.). The instability and destruction, which fueled the original forced migration, had a significant impact on migration decisions for those individuals and communities going forward. While "the majority of IDPs in the world lived outside gathered settings" (IDMC, 2010), many go to IDP or refugee camps for provisions and protection. Many of the refugee and IDP camps have existed for over a decade, serving as default homes for thousands of individuals. A large number of these individuals have been raised in camps and know little else.

IDP camps can also have serious drawbacks and many people eventually migrate to the city or elsewhere, even before the camps are officially closed. Living conditions in IDP camps are often characterized by overcrowding and inadequate health services, education and nutrition, all serving as incentives to move on. However, it has been found that while "some [refugees] may [freely volunteer to return home] because the conditions of refuge become intolerable and because no viable alternatives exist," in reality, this is rare (MacNamara & Goodwin-Gill, 1999). It has also been found that "in other situations, refugees may not want to return home even when it is safe to do so for fear of ongoing discrimination on return, or for economic or other reasons" (Ibid.).

Refugees-turned-combatants in IDP and refugee camps have received attention for their role in the camps and their impact on subsequent conflict. These individuals are often referred to as 'refugee warriors'. Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo were among the first to argue that refugee communities frequently become prime recruitment areas for combatant groups. While refugees flee conflict, they can also exacerbate conflict behavior. Several cases of refugee warrior communities illustrate this phenomenon: Afghans in Pakistan, Rwandan Hutus in the Congo, Cambodians in Thailand, and Sudanese in Chad, are just a few examples of significant refugee involvement in rebel activities (Salehyan, 2007). IDMC reports that in 2010:

> *"IDP camps and informal settlements continued to be prime recruiting grounds, as children there were relatively densely gathered, often without access to education (particularly those of secondary-level age) and unable to engage in other livelihood activities" (IDMC 2011).*

3.1b New migration destinations

After the end of hostilities, IDPs and former combatants will often attempt to resettle in their community of origin. Another possible destination of migration is a host community other than the community of origin. This is often the choice if migrants have a network that connects them to the destination city or if they are unable or uninterested in returning to their community of origin. Often in war-affected situations, individuals will no longer have anything to return to, as frequently villages were destroyed, land taken, society divided, and family and social networks decimated. In addition, stigma or banishment and other factors may make it impossible for them to return home.

While each situation is unique and the number of migrants joining a host community will have an impact on the reception, host communities have often been found to exhibit open hostility towards migrants of all sorts.

> *"Displaced persons can pose an economic burden on receiving areas as they consume goods and services, and compete with locals for scarce resources and employment" (Saleyan, 2007).*

Adrian Martin found evidence from Ethiopia that local communities are often concerned about the economic effects that hosting refugee communities entails. In addition, a World Bank report[1] notes a link between refugees and infectious diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS. Refugees fleeing war may also place a burden on health infrastructure and hospitals, which are often not prepared to deal with large population inflows, especially those with the special needs of forced migrants.

> *"While many authors have underscored the importance of human rights discourses in the protection of vulnerable persons including refugees, others have noted that accepting refugees and asylum-seekers is more than a humanitarian action. Unexpected mass migration can place significant economic and social burdens on host areas" (Salehyan, 2007).*

Moreover, in the case of ex-combatants, communities often are jealous of the special attention (and funds/ resources) from the United Nations (UN) agencies or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), feeling that they are undeserved (Stavrou et al. 2005). This jealousy is accompanied by a fear that ex-combatants would re-engage in conflict. There is also usually a perception that the migrants are more prone to engaging in crime and violent behavior. Hence, urban communities feel threatened by groups of street children and fear child soldiers and ex-combatants in general. In the case of Bujumbura, there were complaints regarding the increase in both petty and violent crime, as well as a new breed of older and more demanding street children (Stavrou et al. 2005).

As a result of all the above factors, life for migrants in host communities can vary greatly. As such, little is known about the experience beyond the fact that many migrants experience issues of stigmatization and a need for social integration. Variation can also exist based on the size of the receiving community, with larger cities more accustomed to absorbing transplants and providing more opportunity for anonymity, which often hides issues of stigma.

3.1c The urban destination

Irrespective of conflict, urbanization has become a major trend throughout Africa. Cities offer the promise of economic opportunities and upward mobility even for people with limited education, skills, and assets. Additionally, in the context of power imbalances and exclusion that characterize war, informal economic opportunities may be particularly beneficial to historically disadvantaged groups affected by armed conflict (Stavrou et al. 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011). Hence, there is evidence that an increasing number of migrants of rural origin, be it refugees, IDPs or regular migrants, become urbanized (Sommers, 2003). Based on each individual decision process, this migration to urban areas may occur within an individual's own country, or result in a move abroad. In fact, a high percentage of those who have been forced to flee to camps eventually migrate to cities and other urban areas. This does not appear to be premeditated on the part of the IDP or refugee, but rather a result of camp conditions and the economic and social opportunities offered by urban areas (Stavrou et al. 2005). Two particular subsets of ex-combatants, children and females, appear to be more likely than their male counterparts to migrate to urban areas. The Rwanda tracer study found that seven in ten of the child ex-combatants reside in an urban area, with 16.1% in Kigali alone, and that 70.6% of the female ex-combatants currently reside in urban areas with 53.4% in Kigali City. In addition to rural-urban migration, others move from one urban destination to another if they determine that it may provide additional opportunities (Stavrou, Jorgensen, & O'Riordan, 2007).

Economic implications

[1] Lule, Seifman & David. "The Changing HIV/AIDS Landscape." World Bank. 2009.

Despite the hopeful expectations of migrants, urban livelihoods rarely match expectations, regardless of whether the individuals are migrating due to conflict or not, and outcomes become even less favorable in conflict-affected areas. Once in the cities, most of these migrants become urban poor, become reliant on the informal economy, and live in overcrowded spaces with poor sanitation and a lack of security, social and health services (Zulu, et al. 2006, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011). In sub-Saharan Africa, 72% of the urban population lives in slums, a situation expected to expand as the number of slum inhabitants is expected to double by 2030 (Coming of age in the 21st century, UN Habitat). In the case of Nairobi, most migrants live in the cheap squatter settlements, either out of necessity or to accumulate savings for various investments in their original communities (Zulu, et al. 2006, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011). Such is the case in Darfur as well, where remittances enable local investment, trade and development (Young, et al. 2009).

With limited employment opportunities and resources, the economic hardships encountered often lead to inadequate, insecure and unsustainable livelihoods for migrants (Young, et al. 2009). In Darfur, IDPs sought livelihoods in the sale of firewood and water, brick making and other ways of exploiting limited natural resources (Ibid.).

In the case of Somalia, newcomers were often denied access to clean water, health facilities, proper shelter, protection and security of tenure (UN Habitat). The lack of integration into the city was characterized by different forms of social exclusion and exploitation (e.g., higher rents, poor job prospects, low wages and sexual harassment). This forced most people to live in public compounds and abandoned buildings upon arrival (UN Habitat), or else be charged high rents and constantly live with the threat of eviction. In that respect, social segregation and physical separation went hand in hand (Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011).

Social implications

In addition to economic hardship, IDPs also face various forms of political and social exclusion as in the case of IDPs from southern Sudan. The IDPs had been viewed as aligned with the government's opposition during the civil war and have faced ongoing and extensive persecution by the government (Sommers, 2003).

Another notable aspect of urban migration is the cultural change and adaptation of migrants to urban life. There appears to be a trend of cultural and social acclimatization, which reveals itself in the urbanization of lifestyles and values, especially in the case of youth and women that often makes migration irreversible. In the case of Darfur, most people indicated that a return to their previous livelihoods seemed unlikely and that they would probably stay in the urban areas to which they had adapted (Young, et al. 2009, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011). Similarly in Sri Lanka, nearly all IDPs interviewed, while expressing a desire to return to their villages under the right circumstances, were not clear how their urbanized skills and expectations would allow them to re-adapt to a rural lifestyle. Surveys further demonstrated that the IDPs had become more urban in their livelihoods (Korf, et al. 2002). Similarly, for Southern Sudanese IDPs in Khartoum, years of displacement have caused a fundamental shift in identity, especially among young people. Considering themselves to be urbanized, they have no desire to return to their rural origins (Sommers, 2003, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011). This is not only reflected in values but also in skill sets and livelihood strategies (Young, et al. 2009). Similarly in Sierra Leone, ex-combatants had no interest in learning about agriculture and stated that they had become accustomed to a very different lifestyle during the war and now found the idea of involving themselves in agriculture and rural life unattractive (Peters 2007). Despite these findings,

many have also found a desire to eventually return to one's home. In Kampala, 10 out of 11 youth interviewed said that they were hoping to earn enough money to get a good education and then return home (Stavrou et al. 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011).

Ex-combatants

Reintegration of ex-combatants in urban areas is more complex than in rural areas due to several factors. For one, labor competition is stiff in war-torn economies. While ex-combatants in urban areas may be able to secure a job in the informal sector, due to the large number of more highly qualified applicants and very limited number of jobs available it is often far more difficult to secure employment in the urban formal sector. For women, the outlook is often bleaker since a return to prevailing labor patterns prior to a conflict usually signals a return to an economy in which women were associated with informal work. (Bouta, 2005). Additionally, when ex-combatants lack economic opportunities or self-determination it contributes to their likelihood to reengage in some form of violence (Nilsson, 2005).

Urban youth (including children formerly associated with armed groups)

One of the primary challenges facing urban youth tends to be unemployment. Frequently, a lack of opportunities in the formal sector results in urban youth seeking to earn a living in the informal sector through manual labor jobs such as water vending, petty trading, selling plastic bags, making mud bricks, washing cars and shining shoes (Sommers, 2003). Such participation in the informal sector necessitates already having some contacts in the city, and most youth migrants arrive knowing at least one individual. Furthermore, most of those who succeed in escaping a life on the streets achieve this through the help and assistance of friends and family (Stavrou et al. 2005).

Livelihoods of urban youth and particularly migrant youth are even more challenging, as most African cities are not prepared for the influx of migrants (Sommers, 2003, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011). Young people migrate to cities looking for economic opportunities; however, they typically encounter insufficient public infrastructure, schools and health care, which leads to the current increase in youth crime and deviance in sub-Saharan Africa (Coming of age in the 21st century, UN Habitat).

In the case of former child soldiers, due to their exposure to extreme violence, they are prone to suffering from physical, psychosocial and sexual harm as well as separation from their families, and loss of education and socialization (UN Habitat). Many of these factors also hold true for adults who have been involved in fighting, though, war-affected youth require greater psychosocial assistance due to trauma, victimization, and forced substance abuse (Stavrou et al. 2005). Youth also suffer from different forms of exclusion, e.g. isolation from the social development process, marginalization/discrimination/ exclusion from political and cultural processes and vulnerability/exclusion from security networks (UN Habitat). They may also be stigmatized due to their ethnicity, political identity or association with the conflict. Moreover, the lack of responsive services to these challenges compounds the issue.

Protracted interruptions in education, limited vocational expertise, and absence of critical life skills among youth and former youth combatants further exacerbates an already grim situation for these individuals. In the case of Uganda, however, there seems to be an extremely low interest in returning to school among child and youth ex-combatants, as few expect that a secondary school diploma would increase their competitiveness in the job market. For these reasons, they are commonly relegated to the margins of urban society (Stavrou et al., 2005).

In Sierra Leone, due to a lack of educational and economic opportunities in rural areas and the exploitation of youth by customary law, young people migrated to cities and diamond fields where their struggles for daily survival made them easily susceptible to recruitment by warlords (Peters 2007). On the other hand, despite these expectations, surveys of ex-combatant youth in Bujumbura revealed that most were not willing to join an armed group for money nor interested in dying for someone else, expressing a feeling that it was necessary to have peace in the country (Stavrou et al. 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011). Overall, there seems to be a consensus that recruitment into these groups is a significant danger both to the children and youth themselves and to society as a whole, underscoring the importance of successful reintegration to prevent either a relapse into war or an expansion of inner-city violence and crime (Erdmannsdoerfer 2011).

In post-conflict settings, many youth migrants have been separated from their families because of conflict, flight or recruitment into armed groups. Consequently, they are more likely to be orphaned and end up living on the streets (Stavrou et al. 2005). While indeed sometimes engaging in criminal behavior, the groups formed by street children seem to mainly serve as substitutes for the family they have lost or escaped from, offering protection from harassment, sharing the burden of survival and finding some sense of belonging and identity (Stavrou et al. 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011), hence providing alternative legitimacy and support, offering status, identity and social and recreational opportunities, and finally potential economic gain (UN Habitat).

3.1d Summary

Conflict causes social and economic upheaval that can impact the whole community. This turmoil often results in the need for migration due to a combination of factors. The variety of reasons precipitating each individual's migration and their specific circumstances then factors into their eventual destination. The majority of people return to their community of origin after conflict. However, some are either unable or uninterested in what was once their home. Many are in situations where their home is still unsafe and are instead reunified with their families in IDP or refugee camps either temporarily or for extended periods of time. Many first return home and discover they are either unable to stay or are drawn elsewhere. Those who could not go home and those who determine they must leave their home communities face a similar dilemma as they must find other host communities, be they rural destinations, mid-sized communities, or large urban destinations.

3.2 Influential factors in the decision to migrate

For individuals directly affected by conflict, the decision making process involved in choosing to stay or leave is not widely understood but key determinants in the process are the individual's values and priorities, facilitators and obstacles, and push and pull factors of migration. According to Susan Martin, three factors must be present for migration to occur: demand/pull from receiving communities or countries; supply/push from source communities or countries; and networks to link the supply with the demand. The networks explain why certain migrants move to certain locations, as well as why the same set of push or pull factors in different countries lead to very different migration experiences. In the case of absent or non-functioning networks, the supply and demand never find each other. As Lindley puts it, "thinking about the causation of migration in conflict-affected countries requires models that do not either try to reduce it all to economics or apply macro-level political explanations, but acknowledge the complex causation of migration in these contexts – including underlying structural factors, proximate

causes, precipitating factors and intervening factors" (Richmond 1994; Van Hear 1998; cited in Lindley, 2008).

It is also clear that there is no single "refugee experience" or "ex-combatant experience". In reference to forced migration and repatriation, Ghanem states:

> *"The returnee's experience cannot and should not be generalised. Each forced migrant will experience his/her flight, his/her exile and his/her return differently, and as such, the evolution of one's perception of 'home' and one's relationship to one's country of origin will vary from one individual to the other. This is not only due to the fact that forced migrants are subject to different events and navigate in different social settings, but also because the dynamic between an individual's dispositions and his/her environmental determinants is unique to each person. In order to understand the experience of returning home, one must not only look at the return stage, but all the stages of the refugee's migration trajectory" (Ghanem, 2003).*

In keeping with the variation in experiences, there is much literature on the importance of tailoring the DDR process to meet the unique needs of reporters, which continues to prove an immense challenge. An understanding of the motivations and driving factors involved in the decision to migrate as well as increased knowledge of their experiences in their new communities can help address this challenge. Additionally, incorporating these considerations into DDR programming will facilitate reaching more migrant ex-combatants and providing such individuals with services better-tailored to their needs.

Notably, there is also some debate on whether migration in post-conflict settings should be termed a 'decision'. Some literature asserts that the decision to stay or to migrate in conflict settings is not always a real choice given social, cultural, economic and political restrictions on an individual's free will. Other sources contend that even in 'forced migration' situations, a strong element of free will permeates the decision-making process. It has often been assumed that forced migrants, especially refugees, lack agency regarding the choice to flee their homeland. However Salehyan argues that it is important to acknowledge that choices are made even under exceptionally difficult circumstances. As one author points out, it is important to conceptualize people as making a choice to leave – as most members of a given community may flee due to violence and persecution, while others still choose to stay (Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003 cited in Salehyan 2007). In other words, while conflict may severely limit options for individuals, the decisions regarding when, how and where to go ultimately lie with the individual. As such, while many ex-combatants may have been conscripted against their will, post-demobilization journeys may manifest very differently from individual to individual.

3.2a Values and priorities

Understanding migrant's values and priorities is the first step to understanding the decision process. People value their life, liberty, property, and friends and family, and will choose to flee their homes only if conditions elsewhere are preferred to their current situation (Salehyan, 2007). Moore and Shellman argue that "people live in cultural communities that are critically important to them." Consequently, if one chooses to migrate, they may do so more willingly if they know family, friends or a diaspora representative of their culture awaits them at the destination (Moore & Shellman, 2004).

Reflective of the values mentioned above is the desire to sustain oneself and care for one's family. One of the most important factors for migration in general is the search for economic opportunity, livelihood options, and particularly access to land in rural areas. Those involved in conflict-related migration may even be more likely to move due to these factors (Stavrou et al. 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011).

In tandem with economic factors, individuals affected by ongoing conflict and violence place a high value on finding safety and security and will make seeking a safe and secure destination a top priority, even if it means leaving their homeland, friends and family members behind for an extended period of time. In the case of refugees and IDPs in Nairobi, it has been found that conflict, insecurity and the desire for safe havens are significant push factors in their decision to flee (Zulu, Konseiga, Darteh & Mberu, 2006, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011).

3.2b Facilitators and obstacles

Taking into account outside considerations and weighing risk factors is another major component of a conflict-affected migrant's decision-making process. Schmeidl divides this part of the process into two groups, "facilitators," which increase the likelihood of flight, and "obstacles," which decrease the likelihood of migration. Facilitators can be reception at destination, migration networks, transportation linkages, etc. while examples of obstacles might be challenging geography, fighting, or lack of resources. Facilitators and obstacles are distinguished from push and pull factors in that they are typically factors related to the journey and not the origin or destination.

Facilitators and obstacles are also relative and the value placed on each is ever-changing. For example, as migration pressures, such as political violence, increase, the importance of obstacles tends to decrease (Schmeidl, 1997). Facilitators can also mitigate the effects of some obstacles. Migration networks are one such example, as "migrant communities form networks that provide information and the cultural space to make migration an option for others who stayed behind" (Massey et al. 1993, Faist 2000 cited in Moore and Shellman 2004). Migrants tend to go to places in which their relatives, friends and community members are already located. Those already settled in the new community or country provide many needed services, not least of which is finding jobs or helping the newcomer obtain other sources of support (UN-DAW, 2004). This information and cultural space may serve to mitigate obstacles such as language, fear, or the locations of intense fighting. Moore and Shellman also note that it is important to acknowledge that the information environment can have a considerable impact on one's decision to migrate (2004).

3.2c Rationale for return to community of origin

According to a study conducted on the reintegration of ex-combatants in Burundi, most ex-combatants returned to their communities of origin; the study did not record a massive movement of demobilized soldiers to the city (Uvin 2007). The Rwanda tracer survey produces a similar result, concluding that although there also is a rural-urban migration pattern, the majority of ex-combatants have remained in rural areas (Stavrou, et al., 2007).

Some of those who return home experience very successful reintegration and stay. However, while there are not exact statistics on the populations as a whole, anecdotal evidence and World Bank research (Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011) suggest that a significant percentage of both IDPs and ex-combatants who first returned to their community of origin later decide to leave that community for either the city or an alternative host community.

It is also apparent that many individuals do not return home. A Sierra Leone tracer study found that a large number of ex-combatants in that country do not return to their families or the places in which they lived before the war for a combination of the reasons including fear of retribution, feeling ashamed and no longer being used to the rural way of life. Similarly in Rwanda, out of 232 demobilized child ex-

combatants, one third no longer lived with their families whilst the number of those living in rural areas dropped from 51% before the war to 7.5% now (Stavrou et al. 2005).

According to the Operational Guide to the IDDRS:

> *"Most ex-combatants, like refugees and IDPs, wish to return to the places they have left or were forced to flee. Returning home, where this is possible for individuals, is often a key step in reintegration programmes. However, they may find their land or homes occupied by others, either spontaneously or as part of a planned strategy. Within the context of conflict, often societal shifts occur in which land is redistributed, roles of women and other members of the community have shifted, traditional employment and means for livelihood creation have been disrupted, and community cohesion has adjusted to fit the needs of the conflict" (UNDDRRC, 2010).*

These and other challenges experienced by migrants in their home communities will be further discussed in the push factors below.

3.2d Push and pull factors

Migration pressures causing people to leave, also termed "push factors," must be considered in tandem with "pull factors." Push factors are typically unfavorable aspects about the area one lives in, and pull factors are aspects that attract one to another area (Lee, 1966). The literature points to the understanding of push and pull factors as being a critical component for understanding migration. The following is an examination of key push and pull factors present in the decision making process for migrants affected by conflict.

PUSH FACTORS in the war context

In post-conflict settings there are often extreme push factors impacting an individual's daily existence. "In many cases migration is a survival strategy," and many factors in that strategy, such as the ability to collect fuel for cooking or having access to land for cultivation purposes also play critical roles in determining whether to stay or to leave (Teodosijevic 2003, Lecoutere, Vlassenroot et al. 2008).

<u>Violence/insecurity</u>

Violence and insecurity in communities of origin is one of the most powerful push factors among individuals who have made the decision to leave their homeland for the unknown. Kilroy finds that the push from insecurity in rural areas is one of the "non-economic factors driving urban migration in conflict contexts" that has a heightened influence. He further finds:

> *"Economic activity and investment tends to concentrate in cities, for the usual reasons of urbanisation economies, but also because physical security may be too uncertain in the countryside. Furthermore, urban areas have tended not to be afflicted by landmines, which might prevent access to rural land" (Kilroy, 2007).*

One example from northern Uganda illustrates how even the fear of violence and insecurity can impact decisions of whole communities to flee their homeland. In August 2003, the wife of a Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) commander escaped from the custody of the LRA, returning to her home community. In

retaliation, the LRA commander threatened to kill every last member of his wife's community until she was returned to him. Fearing the LRA commander's attack, 12,000 people quickly fled their rural villages and constructed a makeshift IDP camp in the Kitgum town center (Stites, Mazurana, & Carlson, 2006).

Another example, also from Uganda, illustrates the impact of ongoing insecurity on children in communities affected by conflict. In northern Uganda there were an estimated 50,000 "night commuters" in 2004 - children, adolescents and women who fled their homes or IDP camps each night to seek safety from rebel forces in town centers (Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2004). While night commuters represent only a small fraction of the migrant population, their situation is a dramatic illustration of how push factors can continue to effect daily migration for extended periods of time.

Food insecurity

Food insecurity, meaning the lack of ongoing availability of and access to nutritional sustenance, is another key push factor for conflict-affected migrants. Combined with other factors, the inability to provide food security for civilians during the civil-conflict in Ethiopia caused 800,000 infant deaths, which exceeded the deaths directly attributed to the conflict itself (Steward and Fitzgerald 2001 cited in Teodosijevic, 2003). Seddon and Adhikari stated, "a conflict resulting from a political insurgency whose stated objective is to bring about a social and political revolution in the name of the popular masses…is likely to have distinctive effects on local lives, livelihoods and food security" (Seddon & Adhikari, 2003). In eastern DRC, conflict-induced institutional changes leading to loss of access to land forced rural households to employ a variety of coping mechanisms to deal with the food deficiency, and many families found no other options but to migrate (Lecoutere, Vlassenroot, & Raeymaekers, 2008).

Economic challenges/lack of employment

Initially, unemployment and poverty are often major contributing factors to conflict itself, suggesting that the original economic baseline in these communities was likely quite low or highly unequal. Post-conflict environments are usually also characterized by economic challenges and high unemployment. Economic activity, training and education systems are significantly disrupted during conflict. Additionally, the high unemployment found in many war-affected communities makes it even more challenging for those with less skills or any negative stigma to gain employment. One report found that for ex-combatants, "Economic vulnerability is particularly prevalent in the first two years after demobilization" (Body, 2005). It further found that often they "lack marketable skills, material assets and social networks" (Ibid.). Uvin's Burundi study found that in the city, ex-combatants are facing both higher costs of a non-productive nature and fewer ways of earning money, while at the same time having lost or lacking the social networks necessary to progressing in the city (Uvin, 2007). Another problem facing ex-combatants relates to their having been removed from the labor market and educational system, especially for child ex-combatants who have been fighting during many formative years. In combination with the occurrence of post-traumatic stress disorder, these are significant obstacles to successful economic reintegration (Taylor et al., 2006). "A key challenge that faces former combatants is that it may be impossible for them to reintegrate in their area of origin. Their limited skills may have more relevance and marketable value in urban settings, which are also likely to be unable to absorb them" (IDDRS, 2010).

The economic challenges for former child-soldiers and children associated with armed groups can be particularly acute as over the course of the conflict they may have reached the age of responsibility in

their communities. While they may have been abducted or joined the rebel groups as children, they frequently return to significantly augmented responsibilities. Sarah Michael found "These older adolescents face an onslaught of responsibilities almost immediately after they return to their families: they are expected to take on household duties and to generate income. In Rwanda, about 10 percent of child soldiers had spouses and/or children; in Burundi, about 25 percent of child soldiers were heads of households, being the primary income generator for either their siblings or their spouse and children. For these older adolescents, former education is rarely a realistic reintegration option to consider since a family's primary income generator cannot spend all day in school" (USIP, 2007).

Land tenure

Housing is one of the major challenges and one of the paramount considerations in an IDP trajectory (Korf and Singarayer 2002, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011). For many similar reasons housing and land tenure is a major challenge for ex-combatants. Access to arable land, which is critically linked to food security and livelihood, plays a crucial role in the decision of whether to stay or to leave. In post-conflict settings, land usually is scarce or not equally accessible to all (Stavrou et al. 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011), either for settlement or cultivation purposes. This is a particular concern for individuals forcibly removed from their land due to conflict, or who leave land behind to join unpopular rebel movements. Another obstacle to successful economic reintegration in the case of Rwanda is that ex-combatants are considerably worse off with regards to land ownership than the majority of the population and hence are facing multiple challenges in rural areas (Stavrou, et al., 2007). Whether ex-combatants own land and/or if their claims are recognized is also significantly impacted by the level of social reintegration achieved (Sierra Leone tracer survey, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011).

In some countries such as Uganda, the question of who owns the rights to land abandoned by an IDP or rebel combatant further complicates matters, dramatically hindering repatriation and reconciliation, both of which, in turn, have significant effects on migration. "Recognition of land rights for IDPs…has been complicated by the question of who is a landowner. Ugandan law recognizes what is called 'customary ownership' of land, i.e. claims to ownership which are recognized locally, whether or not the claimant has any formal papers to 'prove' ownership (e.g. title deeds)" (Levine & Adoko, 2006). Ugandan law creates a number of challenges for individuals returning from IDP camps or combat. For these people, a claim to ownership may ultimately rest in the favor they have garnered with those who stayed behind. They in turn may harbor feelings of abandonment or bitter resentment toward returnees, particularly in the case of ex-combatants and others associated with armed groups.

Further complications arise when IDPs return to a community en masse, which may have the added effect of displacing landowners who never left. "Many have tried to argue that land ownership is traditionally communal in northern Uganda. If land were owned communally 'by the clan', then individual families would not have land rights as owners. This would also mean that displacing them from one place to another within their clan territory would not violate their legal 'ownership' rights, as long as they could be found some land – any land – in the place to which they had been moved" (ibid.). While research conducted in 2004 disproved this argument by conclusively showing that land is held as private property in the parts of Uganda where displacement has occurred, the line of reasoning cited above regarding "clan ownership" has made it much easier to ignore or downplay IDP land rights violations. According to Levine and Adoko, violations have included hundreds of thousands of people being forcibly displaced by the state without compensation, and army camps and public facilities being set up on private land (Ibid.).

In many conflict-affected areas, the issue of women's exclusion from land ownership due to inheritance traditions is also a significant challenge (IDDRS, 2010). While women in Sudan comprise 80% of the agricultural labor force and deliver all household food requirements for the household, widows do not inherit land but rather lose their land to in-laws and older sons (Ayoo, 2000). Conflict-affected areas have a disproportionately high number of widows, thus exacerbating the inheritance issue, which can significantly impact a widow's decision to migrate. Similar challenges exist for children and adolescents, particularly those in child-headed households.

Social exclusion, stigma and discrimination

Social exclusion and discrimination play a significant role in migrants' decisions to leave a given community, especially among ex-combatants who have returned to communities to find they are not welcome. The tracer survey conducted in Rwanda found that, while ex-combatants cited lack of land ownership and lack of off-farm income generating opportunities as key factors in their decision to migrate, they also mentioned factors such as stigmatization from rural host communities and a lack of socialization with peers (Stavrou, et al., 2007, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011). The majority of those interviewed stated that they felt alienated from the rest of society, and encountered suspicion, anxiety and jealousy among family and friends, resulting in a breakdown in social networks (Stavrou et al. 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011). Experience from the reintegration of refugees and IDPs in southern Sudan found that the different lifestyles, values and experiences of returnees from urban areas caused tensions with the receiving communities (Pantuliano, Buchanan-Smith & Murphy 2008, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011).

Frequently ex-combatants are diverted from ever returning home for fear of retaliation or stigma. "Demobilized members of rebel militia are particularly reluctant to return to the areas where their groups remain strong. Others fear rejection by their communities because of the role they have played during the war. It is known that many young former combatants were forced to kill their own relatives and raid their villages" (Honwana, 2006). In Sierra Leone, many of the country's ex-combatant youth, and those who worked in support of combatants, did not return to their villages either because they preferred life in urban centers or because they feared retribution on return to their home villages in rural areas, even if many have not yet found sustainable sources of income (ARC et al., in Sommers, 2006).

"Social reintegration can have a major impact for ex-combatants both in whether they decide to return to a community in the first place, as well as for migration decisions post-return. First of all, there is the notion that ex-combatants pose a security threat, especially if their command structures are not broken (ibid.). However, it has been found that this assumption does not necessarily hold true and there can also be a positive impact of ex-combatants staying together, such as close bonds of friendships (ibid.). In the case of Burundi, communities fear that ex-combatants might be agents of intelligence services (Uvin, 2007). Generally, a difference has been noted regarding those who return to families that stayed at home and those whose families themselves are returnees, e.g. from a refugee or IDP camp (ibid.). According to one study in Burundi, child ex-combatants in particular have a reputation as drunks, petty criminals, drug users and generally dangerous, leading to much distrust and anger, especially regarding the demobilization funding, from the side of the communities (ibid.). However, a study of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone argues that there is little evidence that female or child ex-combatants are having more difficulties gaining acceptance into civilian life after conflict. It is stated that instead, the crucial determinant of whether an individual is accepted by family and community lies in the abusiveness of the military unit in which they fought (Weinstein & Humphreys 2005). They also found that "the level of

violence experienced by the community also impacts the ease of social reintegration (Weinstein & Humphreys 2005)" (Erdmannsdoerfer 2011).

"Regarding the impact of DDR on their social reintegration, the Sierra Leone study found only very limited evidence that participation in a DDR program increased the probability of a successful social reintegration, acceptance by families and communities, as non-participants have done as well as participants (Weinstein & Humphreys 2005). However, the Rwanda tracer found that the majority of ex-combatants live with their families and most of them seem to be happy with the current living arrangements. The ex-combatants reported having established friendships and networks, and the trust level between ex-combatants and the community has been rising since 2004. The study also found that the original reunification with their families was stressful and caused anxiety and suggested that the families were in need of counseling services and sensitization prior to the reintegration" (Stavrou, et al., 2007, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011).

Female-specific challenges

In terms of gender, it is widely recognized that the reintegration of girls and women poses additional challenges due to the stigma they face upon their return, hence making it more attractive to migrate to urban areas (Stavrou et al. 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer 2011). In Liberia it was found that, "Societal attitudes towards women and girls associated with the fighting forces pose a threat as well. A key determining factor in a girl or woman's successful reintegration is whether she was accepted back into her community. Initially, in communities, there were many hostilities towards female combatants and women associated with fighting forces (WAFF). They were considered aggressive, and looked down upon by the community − including their own families − particularly if they came back from the war with children. Their return was sometimes seen as an additional burden for their families, and was not always welcomed" (Amnesty International, 2008 cited in Sherif, 2008).

In many communities rebel fighters were supported in their efforts and are either welcomed back with neutrality or appreciated upon their return for their contributions. However, for women this is very rare and most women even in supportive communities work to conceal their past. "When a war is over, women's contributions during the conflict rarely receive recognition, one reason being that the needs and priorities of a post-conflict society are very different from those of a society at war: whereas men and women are encouraged to act out similar roles as fellow soldiers in an army or guerrilla movement, post-conflict society encourages difference between the genders. This has important consequences for former soldier women. Female ex-combatants, who have broken rules of traditional behavior and gender roles, risk being marginalized during the rebuilding process. In many cases, female ex-soldiers prefer to conceal their military past rather than face social disapproval" (Barth, 2002, cited in Barth, 2003).

Additionally, women and girls face stigma as, according to Betty Bigombe, "returned child soldiers who become mothers while in armed groups confront major social stigma for having sex at a young age and outside of traditional marriage. The effects can be devastating. These mothers face the choice of whether or not to live with the father of their child–their "bush husband." Bigombe said that situations like this can play out in a number of ways; sometimes the girl will feel that she has no other choice but to remain with her bush husband; other times she cannot bear to look at him. Sometimes the girl's parents or other community members are asked to take care of the child if the girl is very young" (USIP, 2007).

"In addition to the difficulties that are common to men and women, young women's sexual reputations and marital prospects can be seriously compromised by their captivity and, in some cases, maternity. Women's experience of sexual violation can be more difficult for them to overcome, in part because it is often an "open secret"—recognized by everyone but seldom discussed or dealt with" (Honwana, 2006).

Psychological impacts and triggers

Migration can also be an effective method of coping with psychological trauma, especially among former soldiers, as the desire to avoid memory-triggering physical locations becomes a push factor in itself. "Psychosocial problems are common among ex-combatants, as many of them have been victims or perpetrators of horrendous violence, which may have left deep scars resulting in depression, apathy or rage. Post-war trauma, especially in combination with substance abuse, is likely to affect reintegration processes, overstraining the capacity of receiving communities, limiting human rights-based social behavior, and undermining possibilities for peaceful resolutions of conflicts. Psychosocial problems are particularly bad among disabled ex-combatants" (UN IDDRS, 2010).

Research has found that avoidance is one common way for former child soldiers to deal with memories of violent acts they may have experienced at an impressionable age. "Avoidance, as described by the former child soldiers, included actively identifying social situations, physical locations, or activities that had triggered an emergence of post-traumatic stress symptoms in the past, and making efforts to avoid them in the future. One of the strongest traumatic re-experience triggers was physical location: some former child soldiers are now avoiding places where they witnessed or participated in violent and inhumane events (Boothby, Crawford, & Halperin, 2006). Research conducted in Sri Lanka confirms the use of this coping mechanism among those fleeing from war and conflict, identifying the act of leaving the arena of struggle as being a key strategy of coping with violence and fighting (Sri Lanka Korf & Singarayer, 2002, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011).

In war-affected areas the psychological wounds are often very deep and healing is usually a long-term process. As with migration experiences overall, psychological impacts and triggers can be very individual. As stated by Majodina, "The extent to which returning exiles experience difficulties depends not only on the extent of these difficulties but on the social support they receive and the strategies they use to cope" (Majodina, 1995, cited in Ghanem, 2003).

As with social acceptance, women's experience frequently differs from that of men. "The norm for girl soldiers, Jimmie Briggs said, is to fight alongside the boys during the day, and to be subjected to sexual violence at night. This is the "double-trauma" that girl soldiers experience. Girls who survive their experience as child soldiers may have a child or children, usually born when the mothers were extremely young; they may be incapable of ever having children as a result of the abuses they suffered; and they may have one or several sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) including AIDS. Briggs discussed the need for a greater response to the special needs of girl soldiers, especially counseling. Briggs said that he saw many reintegration programs in Africa where there was no space for girls to talk about the experiences they had: they may be counseled the same as boys regarding their experience as child soldiers, but they are not counseled as rape victims, they are not counseled as child mothers, nor are they routinely tested for AIDS and other STDs" (USIP, 2007).

Inability to relate to home community

One of the lesser-discussed psychological factors for forcibly removed migrants is the destruction of their personal conceptualization of what "home" once was, or reconceptualization of the idea of home.

Pilkington and Flynn (cited in Purdeková) state that, "Since repatriations are, by definition, journeys 'home,' it has been largely assumed that such movements are familiar and unproblematic" (Pilkington and Flynn, 1999). Purdeková further states that, "Repatriation implies a certain finality, a return to stability and normalcy (Warner 1992), a restoration of order-as-was, an equilibrium of yestertimes (Malkki 1992). Such a vision, however, denies 'the temporary reality of our lives and the changes that take place over time' (Warner 1994). It neglects the fact that repatriation might not mean a return to the economic, social, and cultural 'status quo ante' (Kibreab, 2002), that what results is 'integration' rather than 're-integration' (Ibid.), and that return in fact might not be a 're-anything but the beginning of a new cycle' (Black and Gent 2006). The most worrisome outcome of this stylized notion of return as a good thing, a re-emplacement of people to 'where they belong,' to a 'place known in shorthand as home' (Hammond, 1999) is that 'attention to refugees might be abruptly and artificially ended at the point of repatriation. As a result, too little assistance is given to those who return and we know too little about the diverse experiences of returnees" (Black and Gent, 2006 cited in Purdeková, 2008).

Purdeková further adds that, "Even when return leads to one's encounter with the same location, this location for different reasons might cease to be the same 'place,' 'home' or 'patria.' For one, it might carry different, often negative, associations as a result of conflict and forced flight (Rogge, 1994). The passing of time might change objective circumstances in the country or location of origin and make it 'unfamiliar,' a 'strange and threatening place' especially for returnees born in exile (Kibreab, 2002; Rogge, 1994; Malkki, 1995; Hammond, 2004). But exile and return are more than kinetic moments, political phenomena and geographic spaces. They are also spaces of experience and transformation of identity (Clifford, 1994; Gilroy, 1993; Matsuoka and Sorenson 2001). Exile can lead both to dissociation from homeland, and to longing and re-imagining of home and nation. All of these factors determine the experience of return and integration, and also might signal a most complex transformation of conflict" (cited in Purdeková, 2008).

This personal conceptualization of what "home" once was, or reconceptualization of the idea of home can start even before an IDP or refugee has fled their community of origin, as was the case with Zarzosa, a Chilean refugee. After the coup d'Etat in 1973, everything Zarzosa and her family and friends believed in had been shattered. Her sense of alienation was so significant that she felt estranged from the physical environment around her: "Almost all that I identified with was destroyed. Even space ceased to have meaning for me as it became [Pinochet's forces'] domain for their repressive practices. I was scared of the 'soil' (streets, beautiful countryside, rivers and sea) as there were always people being arrested, tortured or even killed there" (Zarzosa 1998, cited in Ghanem, 2003).

However, returnees perhaps feel the strongest sense of estrangement and isolation when coming home, as they struggle to reconcile their former conceptualization of home with the reality they confront upon returning. "The experience of an altered home is accepted with resistance by the returnee as he/she assumed that once back home, life would go back to normal again. Nothing can be further from the truth" (Ibid.). Refugees and IDPs often return to homelands that have undergone profound changes following conflict or socio-political upheaval. "[T]he changes perceived in one's immediate context, such as in the status of one's former house, in people's behavior, or in more trivial things such as the emergence of new streets and buildings, even changes in colloquial expressions, may cause strong emotional reactions in the returnee as it tarnishes the image he/she had constructed during exile. For instance, Somalian returnees found their houses turned into hotels, drinking houses and brothels after the passage of the Ethiopian army (Kibreab, 2002, cited in Ghanem, 2003). As noted by Maletta et al., "[m]igrating is in a sense the 'end of innocence', the end of an immediacy with one's country that will never be attainable again by the returning migrant" (Maletta et al. 1989, cited in Ghanem, 2003). For

returnees that were rural farmers before their flight, even their attachment to the land as a source of identity might have changed (Kibreab, 2002; Hammond, 1999, as cited in(Ghanem, 2003).

For ex-combatants in particular, through demobilization, "forces are finally cut loose from structures and processes that are familiar to them, re-entering societies that are equally unfamiliar and that have often been significantly transformed by conflict. In some post-conflict countries, former combatants will have no experience, or memory of pre-war peaceful patterns of life" (IDDRS, 2010).

For female ex-combatants this distance can be particularly great. There is a "relatively large number of female ex-combatants who feel that reintegrating at home is impossible. The changes that they have undergone are too great for them to readjust to conventional life again. So they opt to go elsewhere, often placing themselves outside family and community support networks, as well as possibly limiting their chances of receiving assistance from intervening agencies" (Barth 2002, cited in Bouta, 2005).

For some the transition from military to civilian life, including different behavioral expectations, is a challenge. "Some show tremendous difficulty in controlling their aggressive and anger impulses and sometimes long for the high adrenaline life they experienced in war times. Although this might represent a smaller proportion of ex-combatants it is nonetheless worth noting and paying attention to" (Honwana, 2006).

It is also worth noting that economic declines are often felt more intensely when individuals are returning from a relatively developed environment to one that is devastated by war or is in transition. War is often lucrative for some and returning to peacetime economies may be a stark contrast. This could prove to be the case with ex-combatants returning from holding jobs in which they enjoyed a higher standard of living than that of their community of origin. "War is often described as the collapse or breakdown of normal politics, resulting in anarchy, destruction and a halt in economic development. Even though war has severe negative consequences for most sections of society, there are those who gain from it. This is true, for example, concerning the creation of illegal wartime economies based on unlawful taxation, pillaging, and smuggling involving government officials, guerrilla groups, combatants and local and international traders. For these groups of individuals war is not so much a breakdown of a political system as the creation of an alternative and highly beneficial system (Berdal & Malone, 2000; Keen, 2000a: Keen 2000b; Lyons, 2004, cited in Nilsson, 2005). In many countries there are few possibilities for social advancement due to widespread corruption, lack of jobs and education opportunities. In such societies war can be an alternative route to empowerment, especially for marginalized groups such as male youths" (Nilsson, 2005).

Nothing to return to

Another important push factor is the recognition that one has nothing to return to. This is particularly common in conflict settings where individuals have not been in contact with their family or where there was forced initial migration. When destruction is widespread many are aware of this reality before returning home. However for those that have been out of contact with family or others in their community, the death of family members and the destruction of all property may only unfold upon their return. Research on IDP camps has shown the lack of anything to return to due to looting or destruction as a powerful force impacting individual's decisions not to return home but rather to remain in the camps (Global IDP Project, 2003). In the West Nile region of Uganda one case study found, "Many of the ex-fighters had been gone for ten years or more, having left behind families and land. Most would find on their return that their wives had remarried and their land had been taken over by brothers or

cousins, so they returned to nothing. So the ex-fighters, who went to fight expecting a bright future, were bitter because they felt they had sacrificed and lost everything for fighting their cause, and the local communities were bitter because of the pain that had been inflicted upon them" (TPO Uganda, 2008).

PULL FACTORS in the war context

Frequently, particularly in post-conflict settings, push factors are sufficiently intense to require an individual to migrate. In these cases the pull factors offered by the destination city need only to present a viable alternative to be chosen. In other situations, another community offers an opportunity or combination of factors so appealing that the individual decides it is in their best interest to move. Most commonly there are a combination of push and pull factors that work in concert to cause migration. Overall there is less available information on the pull factors specific to ex-combatant migration and many factors are assumed to be similar to the generally established pulls of urbanization.

Economic opportunities

Migration from rural to urban areas in search of increased economic opportunity and livelihood options is a common pull factor among migrants, whether or not their lives have been affected by conflict. "Cities offer many economic opportunities and upward mobility, even for rural people with limited skills and assets, as work is more regularly available than in subsistence agriculture" (Stavrou et al., 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011). This type of migration has been found to be an especially attractive option for those who have been deeply impacted by war. "[I]n the context of war, power imbalances and exclusion, informal economy opportunities may be particularly beneficial to historically disadvantaged groups affected by armed conflicts" (Ibid.). Even in the face of rising unemployment and poverty in urban areas, the expanding urban informal sector and the promise of upward mobility represents a significant pull for these groups of individuals (Ibid.).

Support network/existing diasporas

The existence of a support network or diaspora representing the culture of the migrating individual is another strong pull factor for IDPs, refugees and ex-combatants. As mentioned previously, culture including familial ties, language, religious practices, and traditions is critically important to people, especially for forced migrants who have, to some extent, involuntarily forfeited much of their culture. Migrant communities tend to form networks that provide information and the cultural space that eliminates obstacles and paves the way for others who stayed back home. In this respect, an initial migration flow will tend to attract further migration (Massey et al., 1993, Faist, 2000, cited in Moore and Shellman, 2004).

Because of the difficult housing situation, kin support is crucial to many migrants and new arrivals often have no other means of getting accommodation. In the case of Sri Lanka, relatives helped out in many different ways, from accommodating, lending or renting on favorable terms to providing land on which to build (Korf and Singarayer, 2002, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011). However, this kin support usually is only a short-term solution, as cramped conditions, disputes over money and housework as well as the generally subordinate position constitute strong push factors for a return (Ibid.) or stretch coping systems to the limit, pushing host families into extreme poverty (Stavrou et al., 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011).

Anonymity

In addition to the economic and social reasons already discussed, migration to urban areas can also be attractive for ex-combatants and others affected by conflict who are seeking refuge from stigmatization, persecution and alienation. Ex-combatants were often forced to commit atrocities in their home communities, the act of which was specifically intended to sever ties. For many of these ex-combatants, returning to communities of origin is difficult to impossible, while the anonymity of urban centers offers a fresh start. Anonymity allows an individual the chance to lose his/her past and the freedom from constant confrontation (Stavrou, Toner, Ravestijn, Jorgensen, & Veale, 2005). In Somalia, for example, the relative anonymity afforded by the urban environment of Mogadishu has been an effective survival strategy in the face of clan-based threats in the countryside (Machel, 2006). IDPs or refugees may seek anonymity to avoid the stigma often found in smaller host communities.

Marriage

A major pull in all migration, but also with a particular role in post-conflict settings, is marriage. As discussed above, many female ex-combatants experience significant stigma in their local communities and are considered difficult or no longer marriageable. These women have limited marriage options making it likely that they will need to move either for a tangible marriage offer or to reopen the prospect of marriage.

"Family formation and family reunification are significant reasons for moving internationally as it is internally. Upon marriage, one or both spouses generally move from the family home to a new residence. Usually, this move occurs within the same country, but it can involve relocation to a new country. Women appear to be more likely than men to migrate to join or accompany other family members or because of marriage, but this type of associational migration is not unique to women as was pointed out in early work on women migrants (United Nations, 1993); some men move for associational reasons also" (UN-DAW, 2004).

Presence of infrastructure, services and institutions

The draw of existing or better services has also received mention in literature on migration. Such services may include better health, psychological and disability services, training programs or other NGO or government assistance, and better schools. "Infrastructure has tended to be rebuilt more quickly in urban areas than rural areas, even where the state itself has not been able to resurrect public utilities and foreign investment is not forthcoming. (In addition) urban areas have tended to maintain a greater continuity of institutions during conflict. City-level institutions (both formal and informal) have tended to be more robust, and indeed the autonomy of urban administrative institutions has often been strengthened during intra-state conflict (CSRC, 2006). The most striking manifestation is the emergence of 'city states' (often the capital cities) during and after warfare, or amidst surrounding state fragility, which seem able to survive, cope and even prosper even when the rest of the country is stagnant or regressing" (Kilroy, 2007). Moreover, as many DDR programs are located in or near urban centers, there is a probability of some ex-combatants staying on in that area (Stavrou et al., 2005, cited in Erdmannsdoerfer, 2011).

3.2e Summary

A unique combination of factors will face each individual and determine whether that individual migrates. In post conflict settings there are clear trends seen in terms of push and pull factors impacting

the decision, or for many the forced need, to move. Values and priorities also inform this decision as do facilitators and obstacles. Through researching the topic of migration in post-conflict settings, it became clear that this is an area that has lacked sufficient attention. There is limited information currently available specific to ex-combatant mobility (rationales and experiences). In addition there was little found on migration for persons with disabilities, insufficient data on the impacts of land tenure on mobility, on the decision process between staying, fighting or fleeing (Salehyan, 2007) and on the possibility of migration to follow aid money.

Kampala supermarket