



# MDRP Final Report

Overview of Program Achievements

July 2010

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**The Multi-Country  
Demobilization and  
Reintegration Program**

**Final Report**

Overview of Program Achievements

**July 2010**

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# List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>ADRP</b>	Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>AFDL</b>	<i>Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre</i> (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire)
<b>AFTCS</b>	Fragile States, Conflict and Social Development Unit
<b>AC</b>	Advisory Committee (for MDRP)
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>AUC</b>	African Union Commission
<b>BINUB</b>	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
<b>BRC</b>	Belgian Red Cross
<b>CAFF</b>	Children associated with fighting forces
<b>CAR</b>	Central African Republic
<b>CEPGL</b>	<i>Communauté économique des Pays des Grands Lacs</i> (Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries)
<b>COFS</b>	Combatants on Foreign Soil
<b>COMREC</b>	<i>Reconstruction Communautaire, Réinsertion des Ex Combattants et Réduction des Armes Légères</i> (Community recovery, ex-combatants reinsertion, and small arms reduction)
<b>D&amp;R</b>	Demobilization and Reintegration
<b>DDR</b>	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
<b>DPA</b>	Department of Political Affairs (UN)
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>ESSD</b>	Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Department
<b>EDRP</b>	Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program
<b>FAR</b>	<i>Forces Armées Rwandaises</i> (Rwandan Armed Forces)

<b>FAA</b>	<i>Forças Armadas Angolanas</i> (Angolan Armed Forces)
<b>FAAG</b>	Females Associated with Armed Groups
<b>FDLR</b>	<i>Forces démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i> (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
<b>GLR</b>	Great Lakes Region (of central Africa)
<b>GTZ</b>	<i>Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i> (German Technical Cooperation Organization)
<b>IBTF</b>	Initiating Brief for a Trust Fund
<b>ICGLR</b>	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
<b>ICM</b>	Implementation Completion Memorandum
<b>ICR</b>	Implementation Completion and Results Report
<b>IDA</b>	International Development Association
<b>IDDRS</b>	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
<b>IFESH</b>	International Foundation for Education and Self Help
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization (UN)
<b>IRC</b>	International Rescue Committee
<b>JICA</b>	Japan International Cooperation Agency
<b>KFW</b>	German Development Bank
<b>LEAP</b>	Learning for Equality, Access and Peace
<b>LRA</b>	Lord's Resistance Army
<b>MDRP</b>	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
<b>MDTF</b>	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
<b>MLC</b>	<i>Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo</i> (Movement for the Liberation of Congo)
<b>MONUC</b>	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo</i> (Mission of the United Nations Organization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
<b>MPLA</b>	<i>Movimento Para a Libertação de Angola</i> (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
<b>MTR</b>	Mid-term Review
<b>OCHA</b>	Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)

<b>ONUB</b>	<i>Organisation des Nations Unies au Burundi</i> (United Nations Operations in Burundi)
<b>PNDRR</b>	<i>Projet National de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration</i> (National program for demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration)
<b>PRAC</b>	<i>Projet de Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants et d'Appui aux Communautés</i> (Project for reinsertion of ex-combatants and support to communities)
<b>RCD</b>	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i> (Rally for Congolese Democracy)
<b>RDRC</b>	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
<b>RDRP</b>	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program
<b>RoC</b>	Republic of Congo
<b>RRM</b>	Rapid Results Mechanism
<b>RRRRU</b>	Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration of 'Reporters' in Uganda
<b>SCF</b>	Save the Children Fund
<b>SIPRI</b>	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
<b>TCG</b>	Technical Coordination Group (for MDRP)
<b>TDRP</b>	Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program
<b>TFC</b>	Trust Fund Committee (for MDRP)
<b>UA</b>	Units of Account
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNIFEM</b>	United Nations Development Fund for Women
<b>UNITA</b>	<i>União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola</i> (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme



# Executive Summary

**T**he Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) was a regional framework to support the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of an estimated 350,000 ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa. Seven countries in the GLR that had been embroiled in a regional conflict played out in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the 1990s and early 2000s participated in the program: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Republic of Congo (RoC), the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda.

The MDRP was an enormously complex financial and technical program involving over 40 national and international partners. Operating from 2002 to 2009, the MDRP succeeded in mobilizing US\$ 500 million in donor and IDA financing for demobilization and reintegration (D&R), in the process establishing a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) to which 13 donors contributed. Key pillars of the program were national ownership, partnership, and regionality.

This document represents the final report on the MDRP. Given that the MDRP financed a portfolio of national programs and special projects for which completion reports were prepared, this report focuses on the MDRP as a regional framework for DDR. The report looks at the MDRP's performance vis-à-vis the original program indicators established in the Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration, which formed the basis for the creation of the MDRP.

The report has five sections. Section I provides

the background and context for the MDRP; Section II outlines the objectives and design features of the program; Section III provides an overview of the results achieved from DDR projects/programs and regional activities financed by the MDRP; Section IV looks at the performance of the program as a whole and that of the World Bank and the recipients of MDRP funds; and finally, Section V draws lessons from the implementation of the program and discusses implications for future programming.

## Highlights

### REGIONAL TRENDS

While most MDRP countries remain fragile, the region has experienced a positive trend in stability and economic growth. The number of internally displaced persons and refugees dropped during the period of the MDRP's operation (2002 to 2009) from 10 million to 3.6 million. The region's GDP increased overall (from US\$ 12.4 billion in 2002 to US\$ 53.3 billion in 2007), and this has led to improved trade and is linked to the restoration of the free movement of goods and persons within and between countries. The region has also seen some reduction in spending on the security sector and shows indications of increased expenditures in social sectors.

### KEY RESULTS

The MDRP funded five national programs (with financing of US\$ 355.7 million) and ten special projects (with financing of US\$ 54.9 million); the bulk of the special projects were implemented

in the DRC by UN agencies and NGOs and supported special interventions such as those targeting child soldiers. A further US\$ 28.9 million was spent on regional activities and program management. Over the life of the MDRP, 279,263 adult combatants were demobilized through MDRP-supported national programs and special projects; 244,597 ex-combatants received reinsertion assistance and 232,107 received support for economic reintegration. Furthermore, 53,880 children associated with fighting forces were assisted in being reunified with their families and reintegrated into their communities. As for the outcomes of MDRP support, data are unfortunately incomplete and inconsistent across countries, but available information suggests reasonable results overall, especially if one considers the objective of reintegration, which is to put ex-combatants on par with other community members. In many places, this implied being reintegrated back into poverty.

Reaching female and war-wounded ex-combatants proved difficult for many MDRP countries. According to statistics, only 9,846 female combatants were demobilized, compared with 269,417 males. Even in countries that had greater implementation capacity and stronger institutions, ensuring that female ex-combatants were on par with their male counterparts after they had received their reintegration support was a challenge. The MDRP took a number of measures to address gender in its programming, ultimately putting in place the Learning for Equality, Access and Peace (LEAP) Program, which aimed to strengthen gender-responsive DDR programming across MDRP countries. Although LEAP was only launched in mid-2007, toward the end of the program, it did make important strides in identifying ways to strengthen gender approaches in DDR.

## PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM

The MDRP's national ownership model meant

that national governments were generally responsible for managing and implementing DDR programs. For countries emerging from years of conflict with destroyed or decayed infrastructure and institutions, this would be no easy feat, particularly where peace settlements were incomplete. Difficult country conditions and fast-changing security and political environments added another layer of logistical and operational difficulty. Implementation problems thus emerged from the start and persisted over the life of the program, a fact reflected in the individual project ratings from project completion reports. Most national programs received a moderately satisfactory rating, the only exception being the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program, which was rated satisfactory. As for the special projects, most received either a satisfactory or moderately satisfactory rating.

## LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The MDRP was an ambitious and complex undertaking for the Bank and its partners. While it was a high-risk endeavor, in the end the risk paid off: despite shortcomings and frustrations, the MDRP as a regional framework met its overall objectives. Even before the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda signified the mainstream push toward harmonization, the MDRP was already championing ownership, donor harmonization, and partnership. Moreover, at the start of the MDRP, the Bank and the rest of the international community were just figuring out how fragile states fit into a development framework. The MDRP thus had to learn by doing. Some of the key lessons generated from the program follow.

### *Regional Comprehensive Approach to DDR*

The experience of the MDRP affirms that a regional multi-partner coordinated response to DDR was the most appropriate, if not the only possible approach to the regional conflict that

had scarred the GLR. The counterfactual – an uncoordinated, piecemeal and fragmented response – would likely have led to duplication, inefficiencies, and gaps in programming, and could have affected the goals of bringing stability to the region. The MDRP’s regional partnership approach ensured coherence and coordination of DDR in the region. It also offered an efficient and effective mechanism for mobilizing and coordinating financial resources for DDR and ensured large-scale and flexible programmable funding, transparent funding allocations, consistent financial management, and harmonized reporting.

### ***Accepting the Risks and Payoffs of a Program Like the MDRP***

Undertaking a large multi-country, multi-stakeholder initiative like the MDRP was inherently high-risk and high-stakes, but it was the only kind of program that had a real chance of generating the DDR outcomes needed when the MDRP was conceived. There was little time for in-depth planning in implementing the MDRP; details had to be worked out along the way in real time. Donors, the Bank, and the development community generally must be prepared to accept the risks, difficulties, and uncertainties inherent in implementing these types of large, complex multi-country programs in a post-conflict setting when peace processes and elections dictate the speed of operations.

### ***Political Dimensions of Demobilization***

From the outset of the MDRP, greater consideration should have been given to the political dimensions of DDR, which hampered key programs such as in the DRC from moving ahead. The Regional Strategy highlighted the importance of MDRP Partners in addressing political obstacles and supporting security sector reforms, and noted the centrality of bilateral donors in this regard, but it did not give sufficient attention to how the politics would actually be

dealt with nor did it establish mechanisms for this purpose. The inability of donors to collectively deal with the political dimensions of the program became a nagging problem over the course of implementation, although it is unclear that any amount of political leveraging would have overcome some of the most intractable political hurdles the program faced.

### ***Accepting the Risks and Tradeoffs of National Ownership***

The intent of national ownership in the MDRP was appropriate. The program acknowledged governments as the primary and legitimate representatives of their own national interests in post-conflict settings and institutionalized their central role in program delivery. But given the key role of government in implementation, the legitimacy and strength of the respective political system and the capacity of the government in a given country were pivotal to achieving the objectives of ownership. Ownership was inherently stronger in countries with victory settlements or elected governments, and it was weaker in transitional caretaker regimes that came to power under negotiated peace deals or *coup d’etats*. Each country’s political environment and the nature of its peace process largely shaped the willingness and capability of its government officials to act on DDR. Donors and other partners who buy into a national ownership model must be cognizant of the risks and tradeoffs associated with this approach. For example, governments may not be fully in control over DDR processes, or they might make decisions and take actions that donors disagree with.

### ***Working in Partnership***

The MDRP partnership, which formally comprised 43 entities, represented an intricate set of inter- and intra-organizational relationships operating at both international and national levels. Not surprisingly, the experience of the

MDRP demonstrated that complex partnerships with a large collection of dissimilar organizations are inherently difficult to manage. Roles and responsibilities within the partnership were not well defined at the outset, and problems of accountability to the partnership and unresolved tensions both persisted over the life of the program. For the MDRP, a key lesson is that managing a partnership of this complexity is time consuming and requires dedicated specialized staff and resources.

### ***Separating DDR into Two Distinct Phases***

The experience of the MDRP suggests that in some cases, separating DDR into two concurrent and complementary implementation approaches may work better than relying on a single approach. The first axis would focus on disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion, while the second would deal with broad-based reintegration. This two-pronged approach is justified for a number of reasons. First, there is broad-based consensus among practitioners and policymakers that DDR must represent a transition from politically driven security-based to developmentally driven agendas for human development. DDR also represents a transition from accommodating the outcomes and commitments agreed to in peace agreements to establishing recovery and social protection schemes. Second, from an implementation perspective, while disarmament and demobilization is fundamentally a security and logistics operation often managed by the military, broad-based reintegration is a developmental activity that lends itself to implementation by mainstream institutions dealing with development programming.

### ***Addressing the Needs of Special Groups***

The MDRP took two distinct approaches to addressing the needs of special groups. Child soldiers were for the most part dealt with through special projects implemented by UNI-

CEF and NGOs. By contrast, in dealing with female, disabled, and chronically ill adult ex-combatants (as well as child soldiers in a few countries), MDRP applied a mainstreaming approach. Earmarking resources for child soldiers proved reasonably effective. However, generating outputs and outcomes on gender, the disabled, and the ill was much more problematic outside of countries with greater capacity. This was not a surprise. DDR as it relates to gender and disability is inherently difficult and represents a challenge in the best of circumstances. Future programs would do well to consider a window that provides dedicated support for the needs of all special groups, not just children, or to encourage bilateral partners to assist with these groups. They should also consider a parallel regional program, such as the LEAP initiative, which identified innovative ways to reach female ex-combatants and deal with gender-specific issues.

### ***Improving the Quality of Monitoring and Evaluation***

The MDRP faced numerous challenges related to monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Effective M&E starts at the design stage of any project; however, the nature of the emergency response embedded in all MDRP-supported D&R programs and the characteristics of the Bank's instruments used at the time (Emergency Recovery Lending) diverted attention from early M&E design and results-based programming. At the national level, given the inherent weaknesses of post-conflict states and institutions and the emergency nature of post-conflict DDR operations, implementing the kind of robust results-based frameworks that donors expect was not possible, especially because national governments had overall responsibility for M&E at the project level. Moreover, the original goal of implementing standardized M&E systems, registration procedures, and common databases across all MDRP-participating countries also proved impractical and unfeasible. Given the



issues, programs like the MDRP thus need to compensate to the extent possible and provide their own technical and financial resources to augment the M&E work done by national governments and implementing agencies. The MDRP did increase its attention to M&E as the program evolved, but the capacity constraints of country counterparts should have been recognized from the outset and greater levels of technical support put in place.

### ***World Bank Policies and Procedures on DDR***

The experiences of the MDRP revealed the need for the Bank to analyze its capacity to carry out massive post-conflict programs at the scale of the MDRP. Such an exercise would include a review of the Bank's policies and procedures related to DDR, its staffing and organizational structure, and its corporate support structures for DDR and post-conflict programming. The Bank is poised to address the key organizational and institutional issues uncovered during the implementation of the MDRP with the upcoming release of the *World Development Report* on conflict and fragility, which will offer suggestions and approaches to addressing policy and operational issues such as those confronted by the MDRP. The Bank also plans to review its Operational Policy 2.30 on "Development Cooperation and Conflict," which among other things deals with the principles of Bank involvement in conflict set-

tings, partnerships, Bank support to countries in transition, and Bank engagement in areas affected by conflict. A rethinking of the Bank's role in the security sector will be part of this endeavor, and as expected, the experiences of the MDRP will inform the analysis.

## **Follow-up to the MDRP**

Given the magnitude and scope of the MDRP, exit strategies were discussed with MDRP partners as early as 2007. Since most countries in the region still had unfinished DDR activities, the decision was taken to establish a small regional facility to support countries in the region as they transition out of DDR and to consolidate MDRP achievements. The result was the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP), a small regional facility funded by a US\$ 31 million MDTF, which will operate from 2009 to 2012. The TDRP will continue to provide technical assistance to country counterparts of DDR programs in the GLR, provide financing of last resort for D&R, and promote a platform for collaboration and learning on DDR. The TDRP places emphasis on regional cross-border and cross-cutting issues related to DDR. The program also represents a special collaboration with the African Development Bank, which is the largest donor to the TDRP and which became a key MDRP partner in the latter years of the program.

# I. Background and Context

The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) operationalized the Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration (hereafter the Regional Strategy), a comprehensive strategy for the disarmament,<sup>1</sup> demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes Region (GLR) of central Africa.<sup>2</sup> The Regional Strategy, which was approved by the World Bank's board on March 22, 2002, and endorsed by MDRP partners on April 12, 2002, aimed to enhance the prospects for stabilization and recovery in the GLR on the premise that disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating ex-combatants was necessary to establish peace and restore security. Peace and security were recognized to be preconditions for sustainable growth and poverty reduction.

The MDRP originally targeted nine countries in the GLR that had been embroiled in a regional conflict that played out in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the 1990s and early 2000s. The countries were the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Burundi, the

Central African Republic (CAR), the Republic of Congo (RoC), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of Namibia, the Republic of Rwanda, the Republic of Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Since Zimbabwe and Namibia ultimately did not participate in the MDRP, the program's beneficiaries were limited to seven countries.<sup>3</sup> The regional conflict waged in the DRC was the largest African war in modern history and the deadliest conflict worldwide since World War II. By 2008, the war and its aftermath had left about 5.4 million people dead, with millions of others displaced.

## 1. GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHICS

Spanning 1,873,528 square miles in central Africa, the GLR is formed by countries with very different colonial legacies, geographical characteristics, population densities, and resource endowments (see Table 1 for development indicators across MDRP countries). There are immense differences between natural-resource-rich countries such as the DRC, Angola, and the RoC on the one hand and densely populated but natural-resource-scarce countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda on the other. However, the countries in the region do share

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<sup>1</sup> The MDRP trust fund did not finance disarmament, but it included partners, i.e. governments and peacekeeping operations, that were responsible for disarmament.

<sup>2</sup> For the purposes of the Regional Strategy, the GLR comprises all those countries involved in or affected by one or more conflicts in central Africa.

<sup>3</sup> Zimbabwe and Namibia never pursued MDRP resources, and in turn the MDRP did not seek their involvement. Namibia was a middle-income country and thus was not considered a good candidate for trust fund financing; political conditions in Zimbabwe were not favorable. There was also strong disagreement among donors over the inclusion of Zimbabwe on the list for political reasons.

characteristics, such as low socioeconomic development, state weakness, corruption, the prevalence of spaces outside of government control, and entanglement in regional conflict. Further, and despite the wealth in natural resources enjoyed by some, they all share the characteristics of fragile states.

## 2. POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTEXT

Although local conflicts have been taking place for much longer, regional wars in the GLR in the 1990s and early 2000s have their roots in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which saw two million Hutu refugees flee from Rwanda into the eastern DRC (then called Zaire), fearing retaliatory measures after the Rwandan Patriotic Front had taken over the country in July 1994. Among the refugees were members of the *in-*

*terahamwe*, a militia group linked to the then leading political party that had been the main executor of the genocide earlier that year. The *interahamwe* based itself in camps in eastern Zaire, from which it attacked Rwandan territory and ethnically selected parts of the eastern Zairian population, notably the Congolese Tutsis (called *Banyarwanda* in North Kivu and *Banyamulenge* in South Kivu). The Rwandan exodus and the fighting that followed in the eastern part of the country came at a time when then President Mobutu of Zaire, in power since 1965, was facing substantial internal and external pressure for democratic transition. Mobutu, whose control of the country was beginning to weaken, supported the Hutu extremists for political reasons and did little to suppress violence in the east against Rwanda and the Zairian Tutsis.

**Table 1: Development Indicators for MDRP Countries, 2007**

African Development Indicators, 2007	Population (millions) 2005	Land area (000s of sq. km) 2005	Population per sq. km 2005 <sup>4</sup>	GNI per capita (Constant 2000 prices): Dollars 2005	GNI per capita (Constant 2000 prices): Avg. annual growth (%) 2000-2005	Life expectancy at birth (years) 2005	Under-five mortality rate (per 1000) 2005	Adult literacy rate (% of ages 15 and older): Male 2000-2005	Adult literacy rate (% of ages 15 and older): Female 2000-2005	Total net official development assistance per capita (current \$) 2005
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>	743.7	23,619	31.5	572	2.1	46.7	163	..	..	41.3
<i>Excluding South Africa &amp; Nigeria</i>	595.3	21,494	27.7	362	2.1	47.2	160	..	..	41.7
<b>Angola</b>	15.9	1,247	12.8	937	6.9	41.4	260	82.9	54.2	27.7
<b>Burundi</b>	7.5	26	288.5	105	(0.9)	44.6	190	67.3	52.2	48.4
<b>Central African Republic</b>	4.0	623	6.4	227	(2.7)	39.4	193	64.8	33.5	23.6
<b>DRC</b>	57.5	2,267	25.4	91	1.5	44.0	205	80.9	54.1	31.8
<b>RoC</b>	4.0	342	11.7	994	0.9	52.8	108	90.5	79.0	362.3
<b>Rwanda</b>	9.0	25	360.0	260	2.7	44.1	203	71.4	59.8	63.7
<b>Uganda</b>	28.8	197	146.2	270	2.0	50.0	136	76.8	57.7	41.6

**Source:** African Development Indicators ([http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSTATINAFRI/Resources/adi2007\\_final.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSTATINAFRI/Resources/adi2007_final.pdf))

<sup>4</sup> Population divided by land area.

Rebellion finally erupted in eastern DRC in late 1996. The consequent security threat posed to Rwanda and the Congolese Tutsi minority triggered the first Congo war from 1996 to 1998.<sup>5</sup> Anti-Mobutu forces joined up to form the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire (AFDL), a coalition of Congolese dissidents, and partnered with Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola to overthrow the Mobutu regime. In May 1997, with AFDL forces approaching Kinshasa, Mobutu fled and Laurent-Désiré Kabila declared himself president. The country was renamed the *République Démocratique du Congo* (Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC).

The DRC-Rwanda-Uganda coalition<sup>6</sup> did not last long, however, and a new alliance supporting Kabila, consisting of Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, emerged to fight Rwanda and Uganda, which had joined to support a Tutsi/*Banyamulenge-Banyarwanda* dissident group, the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) in eastern DRC.<sup>7</sup> These differences resulted in the second Congo war (1998–2003), which became known as “Africa’s first world war.” Eventually, eight neighboring countries and a multitude of Congolese armed movements would fight in the war.<sup>8</sup> Disputes over the control of diamond mines subsequently led Rwanda and Uganda to engage in mutual violence and break their coalition, leading to further fragmentation. Outside the DRC, other GLR countries were also struggling to quell local violence and restore security and peace (see Box 1).

<sup>5</sup> Between May 1997 and August 1998 there was a brief period of peace between the DRC and Rwanda.

<sup>6</sup> The breakdown in the alliance was triggered, among other causes, by Laurent Kabila’s expulsion of Rwandan and Ugandan allies from Kinshasa.

<sup>7</sup> The RCD would eventually see factions form, including the RCD-K/ML, (*Kisangani-Movement for Liberation*), led by the original leader of RCD, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, and the RCD-National, a Ugandan-backed rebel group led by Roger Lumbala that split from the RCD-K/ML and is now allied with the MLC. The original RCD became known as RCD-Goma.

<sup>8</sup> Including Bemba’s *Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo* (MLC), and local self-defense *Mai-Mai* groups.

### Box 1. GLR Initiatives for Peace and Stability outside the DRC in the late 1990s

By 1999, the peace process in **Angola** had reached a complete impasse: following the failure of the 1995 Lusaka conference (not to be confused with its 1999 namesake for the DRC), Angola braced itself for a resumption of hostilities between the rebel group UNITA (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*) and the government-controlled MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*).

In **Burundi**, the promise of the 1999 Arusha conference seemed increasingly problematic in view of continuing Hutu-Tutsi violence – a legacy of the assassination of its first popularly elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, in October 1993.

After experiencing three separate uprisings in 1996, the **CAR** went through a major crisis in 1999 when a Uganda-backed faction led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, a Congolese, invaded the country in hopes of restoring stability to Ange-Félix Patassé’s thoroughly discredited regime, later to be overthrown by General Francois Bozizé.

The coming to power of Sassou Nguesso in the **RoC**, with the backing of Angolan troops, marked a decisive turnaround in the country’s long civil war (1997-1999), but the advent of a new government did little to stop chronic outbreaks of violence among rival factions (known as Ninja and Cobra), causing the exodus of 10,000 people into the DRC.

### 3. REGIONAL PEACE PROCESSES

After considerable international pressure, the **Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement** was signed in July 1999 by the governments of DRC, Namibia, Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, as well as the two main Congolese rebel groups, the RCD and the MLC (*Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo*), in an attempt to bring an end to the war in the Congo. Among other things, the Lusaka Agreement committed the parties to a cessation of hostilities, military disengagement, the withdrawal of foreign forces from DRC, and the start of the disarmament and cantonment of armed groups (i.e., all groups other than government troops, the MLC, and RCD-Goma). The agreement also provided for a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission. However, conflict in the Congo continued, with then-President Laurent Kabila demonstrating limited commitment to the peace process. On January 16, 2001, Kabila was assassinated, and 10 days later his son Joseph Kabila ascended to the presidency. In contrast to his father, Joseph Kabila attempted to end the ongoing war by negotiating peace agreements with rebel groups backed by Rwanda and Uganda, the same regional armies who had brought his father's rebel group to power three years earlier.

The Lusaka Agreement was followed by protracted peace negotiations with a large number of Congolese military and civilian stakeholders known as the Sun City Dialogue. In turn, this resulted in the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC signed in Pretoria in December 2002 by the Government of DRC, RCD-Goma, the MLC, RCD-K/ML, RCD-National and sections of the Congolese local self-

defense or territorial militias (the *Mai-Mai*).<sup>9</sup> The 2002 agreement maintained Joseph Kabila as president and head of state of the DRC during the transition.

### 4. GREATER GREAT LAKES REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

The idea for a multi-country regional initiative on DDR in the GLR came in early 2001 from World Bank staff, including the then vice president for the Africa Region. For followers of politics in the international development arenas, including staff at the World Bank, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999 represented hope and a window of opportunity to help the region transit out of conflict through DDR support. The region was still unstable; although ceasefires and peace agreements had begun to gain prominence as venues for exiting violent confrontations, armed groups remained a large part of the regional landscape, and civil conflicts and militarized trans-border wars were still raging. The belief was that peace could not be sustained unless combatants, who posed one of the main risks of renewed conflict, were disarmed, disbanded, and assisted in transitioning to civilian life. A process of analysis and consultation thus ensued internally in the Bank and externally with country governments, key donors, and UN agencies, and resulted in the Regional Strategy.

The Regional Strategy was the basis for the MDRP and the multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) that would co-finance DDR. It was also the genesis of the MDRP partnership. The Bank and donors rallied around the concept of partnership and joint action since it was clear that

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<sup>9</sup> Key objectives of the accord were: (i) reunification and reconstruction of the country; (ii) re-establishment of peace and restoration of territorial integrity and state authority in all the national territory; (iii) national reconciliation; (iv) creation of a restructured, integrated national army; (v) organization of free and transparent elections at all levels; and (vi) setting up of structures that would lead to a new political order.

no single donor or agency could address the magnitude and complexity of DDR issues in the region. The international community also embraced a regional DDR framework in view of the interlinked nature of the region's conflicts and the need to encourage regional stakeholders to proceed rapidly with demobilization. The Bank led the drive to design and establish the MDRP; donors in turn selected the Bank to manage the MDTF both because it had developed the vision, strategy, and program and because it had robust fiduciary oversight practices and procedures. Countries in the GLR qualified for MDRP support based on their participation in the regional peace process and their adoption of key policy measures, includ-

ing Letters of Demobilization Policy.<sup>10</sup> Institutional arrangements were drawn up that facilitated the participation of national, regional, and international stakeholders.

When designed, the MDRP was estimated to cost US\$ 500 million. This amount included financing for national programs (US\$ 446.5 million), special projects (US\$ 37.5 million), regional activities (US\$ 5.5 million), and program management (US\$ 10.5 million). There would be two principal financing windows: credits on standard IDA terms, up to an estimated US\$ 150 million, and an MDTF for an estimated \$US 350 million. The program was designed to run from 2002 to June 2007.

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<sup>10</sup> MDRP Letters of Demobilization Policy constituted the official commitment of a government to carry out DDR as part of a broader security-sector reform process. Six MDRP countries presented these letters. Only Uganda, which anticipated a broader national program to follow, did not submit a demobilization policy letter. The six letters produced included specific commitments for demobilization, integration of armed forces and broader security sector reform, disarmament, and sometimes even broader reconstruction and recovery efforts.

## II. MDRP Objectives and Design

### 1. OBJECTIVES

**Development Goal:** The Regional Strategy and the MDRP, which operationalized the Strategy, aimed to enhance the prospects for stabilization and recovery in the GLR, on the premise that the DDR of ex-combatants is a precursor for establishing peace and restoring security, which in turn are preconditions for sustainable growth and poverty reduction. The specific objectives of the program were:

- a) To provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts for both government and irregular<sup>11</sup> forces in the GLR;
- b) To establish a single mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization; and
- c) To serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to the formulation of national demobilization and reintegration (D&R) programs.

### 2. APPROACH

Three key principles distinguished the MDRP from other DDR operations:

**Regionality:** The MDRP was a regional multi-country program. The regional dimensions of

the program were aimed at: (i) *building confidence* for mutual disengagement (by improving transparency across programs and encouraging cooperation among participating countries); (ii) *harmonizing approaches* in the treatment of ex-combatants and strengthening collaboration between key regional and international actors; (iii) *knowledge sharing and capacity-building* across countries; (iv) *supporting cross-border activities* that facilitated the DDR of irregular forces operating in areas outside of the control of national authorities and *providing resettlement assistance* in third countries to ex-combatants who would not return to their country of origin; and (v) *providing flexible financing* and *optimizing resource allocation* across countries.

**Partnership:** As noted above, the MDRP established and operationalized a multi-organizational, inter-relational partnership, on the understanding that (i) no single donor or agency would be able to address the complexity of DDR in the GLR; and (ii) partnerships were the only way to carry out the component parts of DDR and create links to critical areas such as security sector reform and civilian arms reduction. The MDRP partnership comprised participating governments from the GLR, bilateral and multilateral organizations, regional entities, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

**National Ownership:** In contrast to some DDR operations that preceded the MDRP and that

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<sup>11</sup> “Government forces” included the conventional forces of the two main Congolese opposition movements; “irregular forces” referred to armed groups operating through guerilla warfare as well as to community self-defense groups.

had been managed by external organizations, the MDRP operated on the basis of national ownership, defined broadly as governments taking responsibility for the implementation of DDR programs. As such, national governments were the recipients and executing agencies of IDA and MDTF grants. The exception was the CAR, where conditions did not exist to support grant financing to the government, and programs targeting special target groups or implemented in areas out of government control. In those cases, UN agencies or NGOs implemented MDRP-financed activities on behalf of the government (see section on Special Projects below).

### 3. PROGRAM COMPONENTS

**Component 1: National Programs.** National programs comprised six sub-components: (i) disarmament; (ii) demobilization; (iii) reinsertion (a transitional cash payment that ex-combatants received to help them return to their communities and establish themselves before beginning to receive social and economic reintegration support); (iv) reintegration; (v) support to special groups; and (vi) implementation arrangements. HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation measures would be included during both the demobilization and the reintegration phase. The actual composition of national programs was determined by the specific sociopolitical context and the socioeconomic profile of ex-combatants.

**Component 2: Special Projects.** Special projects included: (i) support to special target groups (e.g., the resettlement of ex-combatants who were not returning to their country of origin, in third countries); and (ii) activities carried out in parts of a participating country

outside the control of the relevant government. Activities were designed and implemented according to local needs in consultation with the national authorities. UN agencies and NGOs able to operate in areas beyond state control developed and executed MDRP-financed activities within the framework of the program.

**Component 3: Regional Activities.** Regional activities were Bank-executed and included support for:

- a) Cross-border information and sensitization campaigns to apprise combatant groups of the options being developed under the MDRP and associated national programs and special projects;
- b) Timely and action-oriented knowledge generation and research to deepen the understanding of cross-border and cross-sectoral DDR issues (for instance, access to land, gender dimensions, mutual impact of MDRP, and national programs and special projects);
- c) Regional technical knowledge-sharing, capacity building, and joint analysis among participating national programs through semiannual meetings of the regional Technical Coordination Group (TCG); and
- d) Harmonization of databases for national programs and special projects to avoid having ex-combatants cross borders to benefit from various DDR operations.<sup>12</sup>

**Component 4: Program Management.** Program management included six main tasks: (i) managing the partnership; (ii) preparing and

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<sup>12</sup> This included harmonization with the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRRR) database held by the UN mission to the DRC (*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo* or MONUC).



supervising D&R operations (national programs and special projects); (iii) managing the MDTF, including mobilizing resources; (iv) providing technical assistance to client countries; (v) implementing regional activities; and (vi) developing and executing a communication and outreach strategy for the MDRP and reporting regularly on the program to partners.

The World Bank established an MDRP Secretariat at its headquarters in Washington, DC to manage the MDRP, including administering the trust fund and reporting on progress.<sup>13</sup> Bank staff specialized in operations were brought in as task team leaders of D&R operations financed by IDA and the MDTF. From 2002 to 2007, the MDRP Secretariat was located in the Africa Region's Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Department (ESSD), and in the latter phase (2007-2009) the MDRP Secretariat was located in the newly created Fragile States, Conflict and Social Development Unit (AFTCS) in the Africa Region.

#### 4. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

As noted above, partnership was a key pillar of the MDRP. Key partners and their roles were:

- a) The **World Bank**, which was the manager and catalyst of the MDRP. World Bank staff conceived the MDRP and led in its design; donors in turn selected the Bank to manage the MDTF for fiduciary reasons. The Bank's role was threefold:
  - (i) to manage and house the MDRP Secretariat; (ii) to administer the MDTF; and (iii) to cofinance national programs. In managing operations financed by IDA and the MDTF, the World Bank ensured that financial management, procurement, and disbursement arrangements were in accordance with World Bank policies and procedures.
- b) **National governments**, which were responsible for the implementation of DDR activities consistent with their respective peace agreements.
- c) **Bilateral donors**, which collectively contributed just over half of the program funds to the MDRP. Donors also had the responsibility of responding to security-sector reform issues as well as to political bottlenecks that emerged in the course of implementation. Donors ranged widely in their level of contribution (the largest being US\$ 125 million from the Netherlands and the lowest being US\$ 659,550 from Ireland – see Annex 1), their level of participation in the partnership, and their relative importance due to their contributions and links to the security sector.<sup>14</sup>
- d) **UN agencies**, which took on a variety of roles according to their mandates. The main UN partners included the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and their peacekeeping missions in the field (MONUC in the DRC and

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<sup>13</sup> The Secretariat originally included four DDR specialists from interested donors and agencies (two were Washington-based and two were country-based, one in Kinshasa and another in Kigali), a trust fund coordinator, an operations analyst, a communications officer, an office assistant, and a program manager.

<sup>14</sup> The Netherlands, the UK, Belgium, the EC, and France were key partners in their involvement in the security sector. They were also among the most active donors in the MDRP generally. Other consistent donors in terms of their participation over the life of the program included Canada, Germany, Sweden, and Norway.

ONUB in Burundi);<sup>15</sup> the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);<sup>16</sup> and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).<sup>17</sup> MONUC was one of the most important MDRP partners. It was mandated by the Security Council to assist with peace efforts in the DRC, initiate the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of foreign armed groups in the east of the country, and repatriate the members of these groups to their country of origin.

- e) **NGOs**, which contributed local capacity and knowledge to the program. Particularly in the most fragile settings, NGOs were more often than not the only organizations able to implement reintegration and other key activities on the ground (e.g., support to child soldiers).
- f) **Regional and other partners**, which did not fall into the above categories and included non-donor bilaterals (the United States) and regional organizations such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the African Union (AU). The AfDB became a key partner of the MDRP in the latter phase of the program, financing operations in DRC at a critical stage of DDR when the country had run short of funds and being the main financier of the transitional regional program that followed the MDRP.

The MDRP established four implementation structures: (i) the Advisory Committee (AC), comprising all MDRP partners, which was tasked with addressing policy issues; (ii) a Trust Fund Committee (TFC), which oversaw and took decisions related to the MDTF; (iii) the TCG, consisting of senior program managers from DDR programs (nationals of recipient countries); and (iv) the technical secretariat housed at the World Bank. Focal points were established in partner organizations with a view to facilitating cooperation at the technical level.

## 5. OUTCOME INDICATORS

The Regional Strategy established the following indicators:

- a) **General conflict and stability trends:**
  - (i) reduction in the number of internally displaced persons and refugees; (ii) restoration of the free movement of goods and persons within and between countries; and (iii) evolution of social expenditures in participating countries, including in relation to security spending.
- b) **MDRP as a regional framework for DDR:** (i) number of international stakeholders participating in the MDRP coordination mechanism; percent of DDR activities in the region undertaken within the MDRP framework; (ii) percent of

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<sup>15</sup> MONUC is the *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo* (in English: Mission of the United Nations Organisation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). ONUB is *l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Burundi* or United Nations Operation in Burundi. In 2007, ONUB was replaced by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), which was established by the United Nations Security Council to support the government of Burundi in its efforts towards long-term peace and stability.

<sup>16</sup> In some countries, the UNDP also acted as the "lead agency" for the MDRP (see section below on governance).

<sup>17</sup> Others included the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

DDR resources channeled through the MDTF; degree of variance between resource requirements and resource availability; and (iii) degree of harmonization of national programs.

- c) **Results on national programs and regional activities:** (i) number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving reinsertion and reintegration assistance through national programs, and number of such programs; (ii) number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving reinsertion and reintegration assistance through special projects, and number of such projects; (iii) harmonized data-

bases; frequency and effectiveness of technical knowledge-sharing activities; (iv) efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports; and (v) effectiveness of technical support.

Benchmarks defined at the outset were related to outputs and specifically projected the number of beneficiaries: the program expected that about 350,000 ex-combatants in nine countries would benefit (see Annex 2, Table A2.1). Other benchmarks were not possible because there were simply too many unknowns at the time the MDRP was designed and pressure from partners to seize the opportunity and launch the program.

# III. Results

## 1. PROGRAM RELEVANCE

The MDRP's objectives, design, and implementation were highly relevant in terms of global, regional, and country priorities. As the region emerged from conflict, countries in the GLR and the international community were grappling with how to establish a foundation for sustainable peace and how to deal with the immediate threat of the large numbers of combatants (estimated at 350,000) who needed to be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated into society. Since ex-combatants were one of the biggest potential spoilers of peace agreements, they needed immediate attention.

DDR was a central element of the peace agreements that ended the conflicts in the region. The Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement signed in 1999, for example, stated the need for tracking, disarming, cantoning, and documenting all armed groups.<sup>18</sup> The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement signed by Burundi in 2000 and the Bicesse Accords signed by Angola in 1991 similarly spelled out arrangements for establishing national armies. They also contained provisions for a DDR process that envisioned the disarmament of combatants from warring factions. Moreover, DDR was a precursor of the national elections that ended the transitional governments in Burundi and DRC. As such, bilateral donors vigorously promoted the regional peace process in the GLR. Ultimately, the ability of the MDRP to attract and maintain such a diverse and large partnership over seven years speaks to the relevance of the MDRP and DDR in the region.

The MDRP's regional approach to a regional conflict was particularly pertinent. The singular innovation of the MDRP was that it broke from past practice and organized DDR operations around a *regional framework for coordination and flexible funding*. The overall aim of the program was to contribute to a wider regional stabilization process. This aim responded to donors' concerns that they were heretofore inclined and organizationally set up only for country-by-country operations. In view of the interlinked nature of the conflicts in the region, the international community supported a regional DDR strategy and program as a framework to encourage regional stakeholders to proceed rapidly with demobilization. A common regional framework helped the international community to provide timely and flexible support. Governments in the region also expressed their support for a regional framework. In the preceding decade it had become evident that uneven and delayed funding of DDR could itself become a detrimental factor in conflict-to-peace transitions.

In terms of global priorities, the ownership and partnership core pillars of the MDRP were precursors to the international consensus on the importance of these concepts. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005 and the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 both emphasized harmonization and alignment. These aid principles remain relevant today.

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<sup>18</sup> See Lusaka Agreement, Chapter 9, "Disarmament of Armed Groups" (<http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/drcongo/cdreader/bin/2lusaka.pdf>).

## 2. ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

### a. General Trends in Regional Stability

#### STRATEGY INDICATORS


- Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees
- Restoration of free movement of goods and persons within and between countries
- Evolution of social expenditures in participating countries (including in relation to security spending)

The 2002 launch of the MDRP came at a time when all seven states in the GLR were suffering from political instability, emerging from high levels of violence, and reporting low rankings in socioeconomic development. In 2007, while the MDRP was being implemented, all seven states continued to be ranked high in both state vulnerability and susceptibility to conflict, with four countries listed among the 20 most at risk: DRC, Uganda, CAR, and Burundi.<sup>19</sup> However, as Figure 1 shows, there has been progress in political stability and violence reduction over

the period of MDRP implementation: all seven MDRP countries experienced an increase in their governments' political stability and a decrease in the level of violence within their borders between 2002 and 2008.<sup>20</sup>

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees.** The GLR has seen a positive trend in terms of refugees and IDPs (see Annex 2, Tables A2.2 and A2.3). Since the MDRP began, and despite fluctuations, the number of those internally displaced has decreased significantly as has the number of refugees across the entire region. At the beginning of the MDRP in 2002, the GLR had been severely affected by the internal displacement and exile of large populations: as many as 10 million people were either internally displaced or sought refuge in neighboring countries due to extreme levels of insecurity and conflict. When the MDRP closed in 2009, the number of people in both groups was about 3.6 million.

Figure 1: Stability Scores, GLR, 2002-2008



Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank

<sup>19</sup> Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index, 2007* ([http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366](http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366), accessed on 1 April, 2010).

<sup>20</sup> The Worldwide Governance Indicators in Figure 1 are from K. Kaufmann, D. A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996-2008* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Institute, 2009). Note: governance indicators represented in the graph aggregate data on political stability and absence of violence from a number of sources.

### Free Movement of Goods and Persons.

Regional data registering the free movement of goods and persons for the region are unavailable; however, other indicators suggest significant improvements in this regard. As shown in Annex 2, Tables A2.4–A2.6, there was an overall increase in GDP in all MDRP countries as well as an increase in exports over the life of the MDRP (from US\$ 12.4 billion in 2002 to US\$ 53.3 billion in 2007). GDP growth also increased in the majority of cases. These positive developments can be attributed to gradual improvements in the level of security and consequently enhanced conditions for trade. This said, most MDRP countries remain highly fragile. Parallel progress is required in other key areas, such as private-sector investment climate, protection of private property rights, infrastructure development and the management of natural and other resources, before more substantive economic growth is possible.

### Evolution of Social and Security Spending.

Tracking trends in social expenditures relative to defense spending posed a challenge during the implementation of the MDRP because data are collected differently across countries and in some cases are not available. Regarding military expenditures, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which collates this information worldwide, budget allocated to the military decreased in the region overall since the MDRP began, with countries such as Angola, Burundi,<sup>21</sup> and Rwanda seeing the biggest drops and the DRC actually recording an increase (from 1.4 percent in 2003 to 2.0 percent in 2007) – see Table 2 below.

As for trends in budget allocations for social sectors, regionally comparative data were not available but there was some information at the country level. Burundi, for example, saw an increase from FBU 51.3 billion in the social sectors to FBU 132.3 billion for education and

**Table 2: Evolution of Military Spending  
(as percentage of GDP) by country, 2002-2007**

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Angola	4.5	4.8	4.0	4.7	4.6	3.9
Burundi	7.2	2.3	6.6	6.2	4.7	4.9
CAR	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.1	No data	1.1
DRC	No data	1.4	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.0
RoC	1.7	1.9	1.7	1.4	1.1	1.5
Rwanda	3.1	2.5	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.7
Uganda	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.2

*Source: SIPRI (<http://milexdata.sipri.org/>)*

<sup>21</sup> According to project data, however, the increase in expenditures on the police has more than offset savings on the military.

health (a 158 percent rise). In the DRC, according to the country's Ministry of Defense, the ratio of pro-poor/basic social services budgets to defense budgets increased from 1:1 in 2003 to 3:1 in 2007. Other indicators, such as life expectancy in all countries in the region, point to an improvement, albeit still modest, in humanitarian conditions (see Annex 2, Table A2.7): Uganda, Rwanda, and Angola have seen the largest increases (more than three years).

### ***b. MDRP as a Regional Framework for DDR***

#### **PROGRAM INDICATORS**

- Number of international stakeholders participating in MDRP coordination mechanism and percent of DDR activities in the region undertaken within MDRP framework
- Percent of DDR resources channeled through the MDTF; degree of variance between resource requirements and resource availability
- Degree of harmonization of national programs

**International Stakeholders Participating in MDRP Coordination Mechanism.** Forty-three international stakeholders were formally part of the MDRP coordination mechanism, although only about 25 were active. Partners, which are all listed in Annex 3, included seven country governments engaged in DDR in the GLR, the World Bank, 13 donors, 12 UN agencies, two UN peacekeeping operations, and international NGOs and regional organizations, including the AfDB and the African Union. In addition, five international NGOs received MDRP grants to implement targeted projects in the DRC. Civil society was also represented

at the local level through the participation of national NGOs.

Beyond the numbers, the Regional Strategy was purposefully ambiguous about the specific functions of individual partners to leave room for flexibility according to context and to allow for comparative advantages to emerge as implementation of the program progressed. However, lack of clarity in members' roles surfaced in 2004 during the midterm review (MTR) of the program. Subsequently, in a meeting of partners in April 2005, the responsibilities of key MDRP partners were discussed and agreed upon (see Table 3 for a summary of meeting results). The April 2005 meeting did not bring to an end questions related to the partnership. Managing a partnership of a large collection of diverse organizations with differing cultures, mandates, and scope was inherently challenging. High turnover of focal points, both in-country and at headquarters, further reduced institutional memory about partners' agreements and commitments. Moreover, maintaining the multilevel sets of relationships that were established by the MDRP and resolving the misunderstandings and differences that sometimes resulted took dedicated time, which was often in short supply because of the operational exigencies of the program.

**DDR Activities Undertaken Within the MDRP Framework/DDR Resources Channeled Through the MDTF.** The MDRP's regional approach ensured coherence and coordination of DDR in the region. The percentage of DDR activities in the region undertaken within the MDRP framework is estimated to have been 96 percent. This figure, based on planned program costs, assumes that cancellations (unused funds) within the MDRP framework are proportionately equal to those outside of it. Parallel financing for MDRP activities outside the MDRP framework was around US\$ 23 million, with outside funding coming mainly from the African Union Commission (AUC), Japan, and the UNDP.

**Table 3: Partnership Roles and Responsibilities:  
Primary (P), Facilitative (F), and Informational (I)**

Role/Responsibility	National Governments	Bilateral Donors	DPKO	UNDP	NGOs	WB
Regional political & peace processes	P	P	P			I, F
National political & peace processes	P					I
Security framework	P	F				F
Economic recovery	P	F				P
Humanitarian needs		F		P	P	
Confidence building		F				F
Foreign armed groups			P			I
Security sector reform/army reintegration	P	P				
Harmonization and coordination	F	F	F	F	F	P
Disarmament	P		P			
National demobilization and reintegration	P					F
Communications and information flow	F	F	F	F	F	P
Overall MDRP management						P
Funding		P				P
Financial management, disbursement, procurement	P					F
Supervision, M&E	P					P/F

*Source: World Bank (forthcoming).*

**Variance Between Resource Requirements and Resource Availability.** The MDRP was an efficient and effective mechanism for mobilizing and coordinating financial resources for DDR, ensuring transparent funding allocations, guaranteeing consistent financial management, and providing harmonized reporting.

At no point in the life of the MDRP did resource requirements exceed resource availability.<sup>22</sup> However, commitments to recipient countries in the early life of the MDTF did exceed the Trust Fund's income, which subsequently led to policy changes at the World Bank to avoid such future occurrences.

<sup>22</sup> By late 2006, the DRC Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project, which financed the DRC national DDR program and which was funded by a US\$ 100 million IDA grant and a US\$ 100 million MDRP grant, had used up all its resources before being able to complete its objectives. The MDRP/World Bank leveraged additional financing of US\$ 50 million from IDA and US\$ 25 million from the AfDB to complete the project, which is ongoing and is likely to run a small surplus.



In 2004/2005, donors raised the question of the timeliness of MDRP financing for special projects, but the issue was subsequently resolved in 2005. Of greater magnitude, however, were the preoccupations over slow disbursements early in the implementation of the MDRP and delays in getting DDR off the ground, particularly in the DRC. The hold-up in implementation raised alarm bells at the highest levels and caught the attention of (among others) Thabo Mbeki, who called the World Bank's president personally to press for action. In late 2005-early 2006, political obstacles began to be addressed in the DRC, DDR began in earnest, and disbursements shot up.

**Harmonization of DDR Activities.** The vast majority of ex-combatants targeted in the GLR in the seven years that the MDRP operated were demobilized within the MDRP framework. There were exceptions in the eastern DRC region of Ituri, where an estimated 1,658 ex-combatants were demobilized outside MDRP by UNDP, MONUC, and UNICEF at the request of the Government of the DRC during Phase III of the Ituri program.

In terms of the MDRP providing a framework for reintegration, some targeted reintegration assistance was provided to ex-combatants outside of the MDRP. In particular, this was the case in the Ituri district of the DRC. In Rwanda, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) provided vocational training support to 800 disabled ex-combatants, and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) assisted with the disabled as well, though implementation of this was closely coordinated with the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). The AUC provided parallel reintegration assistance for child soldiers in Burundi and Rwanda; however, that support was channeled through existing national commissions. Similarly, GTZ provided some technical assistance for the disabled in DRC.

### **c. Results on National Programs and Regional Activities**

#### **OUTPUT INDICATORS**

- Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving reinsertion and reintegration assistance through national programs, and number of such programs
- Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving reinsertion and reintegration assistance through special projects, and number of such projects
- Harmonized databases
- Frequency and effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities
- Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports; effectiveness of technical support

**Number of Ex-Combatants Demobilized and Receiving Reinsertion and Reintegration Assistance Through National Programs and Special Projects.** As show in Table 4, the MDRP financed five national programs in the amount of US\$ 167.3 million, and 10 special projects in the amount of US\$ 54.9 million; the bulk of the latter were implemented in the DRC (see Annex 4 for a description of all national programs and special projects). Numbers of beneficiaries for both special projects and national programs, which included male and female adult ex-combatants and child soldiers, are summarized in Tables 5 and 6. Special projects included: (i) five projects targeting child soldiers; (ii) a DDR program implemented by the UNDP in CAR; (iii) a small project in Uganda aimed at supporting the return of combatants who were eligible for amnesty under the

**Table 4: National Programs and Special Projects Funded by the MDRP and IDA**

Activity and Country		MDTF	IDA	Total
National Programs	Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP)	20,711,832	33,691,833	54,403,664
	Burundi Emergency, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Program (EDRRP)	29,171,408	29,318,586	58,489,994
	DRC Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program (EDRP)	90,550,444	96,208,544	186,758,987
	RoC Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP)	13,298,226		13,298,226
	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project (RDRP)	13,601,864	29,147,689	42,749,553
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>167,333,774</b>	<b>188,366,651</b>	<b>355,700,424</b>
Special Projects	Angola UNDP	4,245,592		4,245,592
	Burundi Child soldiers–UNICEF	3,474,016		3,474,016
	CAR PRAC–UNDP	9,727,000		9,727,000
	DRC Child soldiers–SCF	5,366,000		5,366,000
	DRC Child soldiers–Cons	8,846,595		8,846,595
	DRC Comrec–UNDP	4,998,006		4,998,006
	DRC RRM–UNDP	8,121,560		8,121,560
	DRC Child soldiers–BRC	1,138,580		1,138,580
	DRC Child soldiers–UNICEF	4,833,028		4,833,028
	Uganda RRRRU–Amnesty Commission	4,143,066		4,143,066
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>54,893,443</b>		<b>54,893,443</b>
Regional Activities (including LEAP)		2,362,580		2,362,580
Program Management + Non-Project Costs <sup>a</sup>		26,489,497		26,489,497
<b>Total</b>		<b>251,079,294</b>		<b>439,445,945</b>

Source: MDRP

<sup>a</sup> *Non-Project Costs* refer to the Bank’s administration fees for managing the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, based on contributions received from donors.

Amnesty Act<sup>23</sup>; (iv) two projects that provided support to national governments while they were establishing/implementing their national DDR programs; and (v) another UNDP project targeting combatants in the region of Ituri, an area outside government control in the DRC.

<sup>23</sup> In Uganda, these ex-combatants who meet the amnesty criteria are called “reporters.”

**DEMOBILIZATION.** A total of 279,263 combatants were demobilized through MDRP-supported national programs and special projects (see Table 5), representing 78 percent cumulatively of the original number of combatants targeted for all country programs. However, an explanation of what the figures represent is important. At the outset, the number of combatants targeted to be demobilized could only be estimated, since at the time the MDRP was designed the number of actual fighters in different rebel groups and armies was unknown<sup>24</sup>; thus, the numbers noted as “targets” were actually projections or ceilings rather than targets. Angola and Rwanda, for example, which according to Table 5 show achievement rates of 93 and 83 percent respectively, processed all eligible beneficiaries and members of foreign armed groups that came forward, so their rate of achievement was in effect 100 percent.

DRC, Burundi, and RoC, however, did register shortfalls. These were due to: (i) resistance on the part of different factions in the DRC to demobilize the hard-core elements of their forces (including the Republican Guard and combatants loyal to RCD Goma and MLC); (ii) an incomplete peace process and stalled negotiations in Burundi, which saw demobilization of the last rebel force, the FNL-PALIPEHUTU, begin in April 2009 after the Burundi program was closed; (iii) delays in the launching of government-run disarmament operations in the Pool region of RoC, which in turn made the government reluctant to downsize its national armed forces; and (iv) the lingering problem of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)<sup>25</sup> in the eastern DRC, estimated to number about 5,500, which accounts for the differences in the Rwanda numbers. These fac-

tors were all outside the control of the MDRP. It should also be said that before the closure of the MDRP, new financing was put in place for the DRC, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda to enable those countries to complete their case-loads.

Beyond the numbers, the biggest hurdles in demobilization, which were related to lack of political will, were observed in the DRC. As a result, it took almost 18 months for all demobilization sites (called “orientation centers” or COs) to become operational. The delay affected downstream reinsertion and reintegration activities and also contributed to a financing shortfall because COs had to stay open much longer than anticipated. The funding issue, in turn, further delayed project activities and reintegration in particular.

**REINSERTION.** The MDRP did well in providing reinsertion support (transitional cash payments, for the most part) to beneficiary groups: the program reached 82 percent of the target by program closure. While distributing cash payments is more straightforward technically than reintegration support, it posed a significant challenge in the DRC due to the size of the country, the dispersion of beneficiaries, the country’s limited infrastructure, and the complete absence of a rural banking system. However, a payment method using the country’s cell phone system was eventually put in place, one which is now considered innovative and “best practice.” An independent audit of cash payments in the DRC found a remarkably low error rate of 0.2 percent, which was significantly lower than the target of 5 percent.

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<sup>24</sup> The wording in the Regional Strategy was “Preliminary figures indicate that potentially 350,000 ex-combatants could be demobilized and reintegrated under the MDRP.”

<sup>25</sup> In French, *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda*.

**Table 5: Number of Adult Ex-Combatant Beneficiaries of DDR Programs, by Gender and Country**

Country	DDR Process	Beneficiaries			Target <sup>a</sup>	% Achieved
		Male	Female	Total		
Angola	Demobilization	94,052	3,338	97,390	105,000 <sup>b</sup>	93%
	Reinsertion			52,721	62,716 <sup>c</sup>	84%
	Reintegration			92,297	133,662 <sup>d</sup>	69%
Burundi <sup>e</sup>	Demobilization	25,767	516	26,283 <sup>f</sup>	35,000	75%
	Reinsertion			23,022	35,000	66%
	Reintegration			21,012	35,000	60%
CAR	Demobilization	6,380	1,176	7,556	7,565	100%
	Reinsertion			7,533	7,565	100%
	Reintegration			7,556	7,565	100%
DRC	Demobilization	99,404	2,610	102,014	150,000	68%
	Reinsertion			102,014	120,000	85%
	Reintegration			52,172	90,000	58%
ROC	Demobilization				11,000	0%
	Reinsertion				11,000	0%
	Reintegration			15,179	30,000	51%
Rwanda	Demobilization	29,699	65	29,764	36,000	83%
	Reinsertion			44,491	47,400	94%
	Reintegration			43,891	50,000	88%
Uganda	Demobilization	14,115	2,141	16,256	15,310	106%
	Reinsertion			14,816	15,310	97%
	Reintegration			n/a	n/a	n/a
<b>MDRP Total</b>	<b>Demobilization</b>	<b>269,417</b>	<b>9,846</b>	<b>279,263</b>	<b>359,875</b>	<b>78%</b>
	<b>Reinsertion</b>			<b>244,597</b>	<b>298,991</b>	<b>82%</b>
	<b>Reintegration</b>			<b>232,107</b>	<b>346,227</b>	<b>67%</b>

Source: MDRP Quarterly Reports

<sup>a</sup> These represent the revised targets, although the original estimates of 55,000 and 300,000 for Burundi and DRC respectively were not officially changed in the project's legal agreements. Original targets were based on guesstimates at the time each program was designed.

<sup>b</sup> Includes UNITA forces originally estimated to be 105,000 but which turned out to be only 97,297, and excludes 30,000 FAA, which were supposed to be included in the beneficiary group.

<sup>c</sup> Of the 97,297 from UNITA forces that came forward, only 62,716 were eligible for reinsertion support. The remainder came forward after the demobilization deadline had passed.

<sup>d</sup> This figure includes all the 105,000 UNITA former combatants, as well as some 28,600 vulnerable community members targeted through a parallel EC grant.

<sup>e</sup> In the case of Burundi, and in contrast to other countries, no adjustments were made to reinsertion and reintegration targets to compensate for the fact that typically 20 percent of ex-combatants do not actually claim benefits after demobilization. Thus demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration targets were all the same.

<sup>f</sup> The project further demobilized 28,383 local militia (*Guardiens de la Paix and Combattants Militants*) of an estimated 30,000 (i.e. 95 percent of the target).

**REINTEGRATION.** At a glance and looking purely at the figures, achievements in reintegration would seem disappointing. But looking more closely at the numbers reveals a more positive picture. As indicated in Table 5, by the program's close, 232,107 ex-combatants had received reintegration assistance through MDRP-supported programs, which represents 67 percent of the "target." Angola would appear to account for the biggest proportion of the shortfall (~40,000 ex-combatants), followed by the DRC (~38,000), RoC (~15,000), Burundi (~13,000) and Rwanda (~6,000). However, if one takes into account the following factors, the MDRP's overall reintegration achievement would actually jump to 90 percent:

- For Angola, the reintegration figure represents those registered in the project's MIS as having completed all phases of reintegration, rather than opportunities created and ex-combatants in the process of reintegration, which is what the DRC and other countries reported. The number of opportunities created in Angola was in fact 148,000; thus, by the same standards as other countries used, Angola actually exceeded its goal.
- Reintegration follows demobilization. Political stalemates led to demobilization being stalled in RoC, Rwanda, and Burundi, and accounted for some of the shortfall in reintegration in the DRC. If one considers the numbers actually demobilized, which is the maximum that a given program can reintegrate, reintegration targets for Burundi, Rwanda, and RoC would fall by about 10,000, 5,000,

and 16,000 ex-combatants respectively, thus affecting achievement rates significantly.

A further consideration is that in the case of the DRC, the Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program (EDRP) under-budgeted and ran out of funds in late 2006, thus bringing to a halt its reintegration activities; additional IDA and AfDB financing was mobilized to support the project, but it took time to put the resources in place.<sup>26</sup>

**Child Soldiers.** In recognition of their particular needs, the MDRP used its special project window to assist children associated with fighting forces. The MDRP financed five special projects for child soldiers, one in Burundi and four in the DRC, totaling US\$ 23.7 million.<sup>27</sup> National D&R programs in Rwanda, Angola, and RoC, as well as the Uganda special project for reporters, also included activities targeting children. Overall, across MDRP-supported programs, about 53,880 children, both girls and boys, received support, which was a significant accomplishment in light of the volatile security situations in some countries and the stigmatization that often discourages these children from seeking assistance. Alongside children associated with fighting forces, the MDRP contributed to educational and training support for other vulnerable children in communities and to capacity building for communities, schools, NGOs, and other local actors in psychosocial care, project identification and management, and youth empowerment. These were important investments that will serve as foundations for ongoing peace-building and community recovery, as well as for conflict-prevention.

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<sup>26</sup> One of the conditions of additional financing for example was that the government had to repay almost US\$ 6 million as a result of ineligible expenses and misprocurement.

<sup>27</sup> In the DRC, the MDRP supported a "consolidated" project, which was to be implemented by three NGOs: IFESH, CARE and IRC, based on their comparative advantages. However, the Bank required that the three individual grant agreements be drawn up with each respective agency (and activities also divided up), which caused problems later in implementation.

**Table 6: Child Soldier Beneficiaries, by Sex<sup>a</sup>**

Country	Female	Male	Total
Angola <sup>b</sup>	-	-	13,804
Burundi	49	3,212	3,261
CAR	9	14	23
DRC	-	-	30,219 <sup>c</sup>
RoC	-	-	348
Rwanda	2	669	671 <sup>d</sup>
Uganda	1,778	3,776	5,554
Total			53,880

Source: MDRP

<sup>a</sup> Gender breakdowns not available for all countries.

<sup>b</sup> Officially, there were no child soldiers in the program of the Government of Angola. Rather, it provided support to children associated with fighting forces (CAFF), together with other vulnerable children in communities. The total listed here is the cumulative total of CAFF and civilian children under the project.

<sup>c</sup> This number is not final. Some children received assistance from more than one implementation partner and thus were counted twice in the database – an ongoing database consolidation exercise continues under the new phase of the national program (supported by IDA only). Of the 30,219 total children, 22,046 were certified by the DRC National Program, and of these, 2,075 (or about 12 percent) were girls and 19,971 were boys. A gender breakdown of the total number of children beneficiaries was not available.

<sup>d</sup> According to the last quarterly report; the Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) for Rwanda indicates that 672 children were demobilized and received reintegration support, but these data are not disaggregated by sex.

The largest number of child soldiers assisted was in the DRC, where some 30,000 child soldiers were removed from armed groups. Providing primary services and interim care to released children prior to reunification went relatively well. Some important innovations were implemented, such as placing children in a comprehensive foster family system rather

than in institutionalized care during the interim period, which was both more effective and less expensive than conventional care. Providing second-tier reintegration assistance was not so easy, however, if for no other reason than the huge logistical challenges associated with assisting children dispersed over a large territory with limited infrastructure. For example, it could take one social worker up to four days by boat and on foot to reach one child – reaching 30,000 was thus completely unrealistic. The effectiveness of reintegration was also dependent on the age of the child and type of support given: it was much easier to help the younger beneficiaries (under age 15) enter school than to provide apprenticeships and training for the older group (ages 15-18) because training programs simply did not exist.

The role of UNICEF was an issue in the DRC. MDRP partners had hoped that UNICEF would take on all of the support for child soldiers in the DRC, but for a host of reasons UNICEF staff declined and only entered the program later after child protection NGOs had already been contracted. In the end, UNICEF performed well in providing strategy and design inputs into child soldier activities, but it was unable to deliver in the important role of coordinating NGO implementing agencies. This led to a number of problems, including maintaining accurate data on beneficiaries. In turn, additional pressure was placed on the MDRP Secretariat, which had limited capacity to carry out coordination and close supervision of NGOs. Lastly, UNICEF and NGO implementation agencies in general could have been more aggressive in pushing for and facilitating the release of female children associated with armed forces, although this was not always the case: some staff reportedly risked their lives by advocating for the release of these children.

In Burundi a UNICEF-implemented special project succeeded in demobilizing and reinserting over 3,200 children, which was a high-

er number than expected. In terms of performance, a 2006 beneficiary assessment found that targeted assistance provided had reduced the vulnerability of child soldiers and that the impact of project assistance was both visible and acknowledged by beneficiaries. For the majority of social and economic indicators, beneficiaries were as well off as, and sometimes fared better than, their civilian peers—which is a powerful indicator of the success of the project. Socially, a vast majority of program beneficiaries reported good or very good relations with their family members and participation in community life.

In Rwanda, a study commissioned in 2005 found that social reintegration of child soldiers had been successful, with the vast majority being welcomed by their communities of origin and enjoying harmonious relations with their families. In terms of economic reintegration, a majority of the children who were students at the time they joined the conflict had returned to school, entered vocational training, or were in apprenticeships after demobilization, and their drop-out rates were low.

**Female, Disabled, and Chronically Ill Ex-Combatants.** In contrast to the approach to children, the MDRP took a mainstreaming approach to gender, the disabled, and the chronically ill, that is, national programs and special projects set objectives and allocated budgets to deal with these groups rather than having gender and DDR special projects. In 2005, the MDRP commissioned a gender desk study as well as country-specific gender stocktaking that culminated in a Joint MDRP-UNIFEM Gender Workshop in Kigali in November 2005. The workshop confirmed that there were weaknesses in services to women but at the same time served to generate demand for gender expertise and political will to address the issue.

The MDRP's response was the LEAP program, which aimed to strengthen gender-responsive DDR programming across MDRP countries. LEAP was launched in mid-2007 toward the end of the program. However, within a few years, LEAP was able to: (i) identify some innovative ways to strengthen gender approaches in D&R (e.g., through two pilot projects in DRC on improving the socioeconomic livelihood and psychosocial well-being of female victims of gender-based violence); (ii) contribute to increased understanding of gender and DDR through analytical work; and (iii) provide technical assistance to implementing partners and project counterparts on the gendered aspects of DDR at the national and regional level. A follow-up LEAP program with broader scope and coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa was subsequently designed by the Bank and is currently under implementation.

Reaching and meeting the needs of female and disabled ex-combatants was not easy. In **Rwanda**, which was the only country to have investigated these groups, a baseline survey carried out in 2005 found 25 percent of female ex-combatants to be unemployed compared with 20 percent of their male counterparts; a follow-up survey two years later indicated that the number had increased to 57.9 percent for females and 27.2 percent for males. Also in Rwanda, survey data revealed that as many as two in three disabled ex-combatants were unemployed. The program responded in a number of ways, including: (i) advocating for female ex-combatants to apply for additional reintegration support; (ii) lobbying for a new law that would make the government responsible for providing residences to the severely disabled; after the law was enacted the project established housing for 162 of the 176 ex-combatants who qualified;<sup>28</sup> and (iii) facilitating GTZ and JICA bilateral contributions to support the

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<sup>28</sup> Rwanda ICR

disabled through vocational training and provision of prostheses.

In **Angola**, over and above the original targets of the project, the ADRP prioritized vulnerable groups in the last two years of the operation with the use of a European Commission (EC) grant, providing specialized support for female and disabled ex-combatants and the widows, young children and certain groups of wives of eligible ex-combatants, most of whom were not registered as part of the demobilization process.<sup>29</sup> In the **DRC**, very few female or disabled ex-combatants were demobilized because it was reportedly more attractive for these groups to stay in the army than enter civilian life (due to the social status associated with being in the military)<sup>30</sup> and the EDRP was unable to resolve institutional issues around their certification and registration. In **Burundi**, disabled ex-combatants received targeted medical assistance, but there were significant delays in contracting implementing partners and purchasing prosthetic materials (despite substantial technical support from the MDRP).<sup>31</sup> In **RoC**, neither females, nor the disabled, nor children received serious attention, according to MDRP Secretariat staff.<sup>32</sup> In **Uganda**, the project was reportedly weak in providing gender-sensitive assistance and support to the disabled.<sup>33</sup>

**Psycho-social Support to Ex-Combatants.** Providing psycho-social assistance to ex-combatants was similarly not easy because of

capacity constraints in client countries. However, the MDRP did sponsor a TCG meeting on the subject and subsequently assisted the Government of Rwanda in developing a national strategy on psycho-social support and DDR as well as training materials for referral services. The TCG meeting, which was held in Rwanda in June 2007, was the first of its kind on the continent, which represents an achievement for the MDRP.

### Harmonized Databases

While originally conceptualized as a very desirable outcome of the MDRP regional program, a regional database of ex-combatants proved impractical and unfeasible for a number of reasons. First, several DDR programs (and their respective management information systems - MIS) were already in place and therefore outside of the MDRP's control when the program began (e.g., in Rwanda). Second, not all of the registration systems were managed by MDRP financed activities (e.g., in Angola) and thus they were also out of the program's control. Third, the objectives and components of DDR programs varied across countries, with some systems only designed for identification and registration and not for reinsertion and reintegration. And fourth, a robust and consistent biometric registration system would have been required to generate a regional database, but the technology was unavailable at the time the MDRP began.

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<sup>29</sup> Angola ICR.

<sup>30</sup> The problem for the disabled/chronically ill in the DRC was apparently two-fold: first, the disabled requested monetary compensation for the injuries incurred which was not part of the proposed package; and second, the military offers the disabled a certain social status they would otherwise not get as civilians – in Congolese society, people with physical deficiencies are stigmatized. As for female ex-combatants, the DRC national program failed to put in place specialized reintegration support for this group as originally planned. A gender action plan was subsequently established.

<sup>31</sup> The ICR does not provide information on gender outputs or outcomes.

<sup>32</sup> TTL for RoC project, personal communication.

<sup>33</sup> Uganda ICM.



## Frequency and effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities

**Technical Coordination Group Meetings and Events.** TCG meetings, workshops, and study tours were the main vehicle for sharing knowledge across countries. The TCG comprised senior national government counterparts responsible for implementing DDR programs as well as the MDRP Secretariat. In total, ten events took place, with seven being stand-alone (the first six and the eighth) and three taking place in conjunction with AC and TFC meetings. Themes responded to the challenges of the day: the first two focused on planning and M&E and the remaining ones focused on taking on reintegration and other implementation issues. According to the MDRP Independent Evaluation, much of the value of TCG meetings was the implicit learning and networking that took place.<sup>34</sup> The evaluation also noted that TCG meetings served to build confidence and trust. For example, it noted, “The so-called Pretoria Accords between DRC and Rwanda regarding the DDR of Rwandan combatants on foreign soil in the eastern DRC were signed at the time of the first TCG meeting in Luanda in July-August 2002. Informal talks during the TCG led subsequently to a September meeting hosted by MDRP in Nairobi between the parties and with MONUC and UNDP, both of whom had been at the Luanda workshop.”

**Advisory Committee Meetings.** AC meetings were another effective mechanism for sharing knowledge and networking. They worked well as a forum for raising and debating implementation and policy issues. Meetings reflected a wide-ranging agenda, looking at both upstream and downstream concerns and provid-

ing a medium for the dissemination and discussion of MDRP analytical work. In total, the MDRP held ten AC meetings with the last two including learning events.<sup>35</sup> Annex 5 provides an overview of AC and TCG meeting topics.

**MDRP Analytical Work.** Technical knowledge was generated through MDRP-financed analytical work, which was disseminated widely across the partnership. The MDRP produced a total of 19 reports and dissemination notes (see Annex 6 for a list of analytical pieces completed). Topics ranged widely, including the experiences of social and economic reintegration, gender, psychosocial issues, disabled ex-combatants, HIV/AIDS, security sector reform, foreign armed groups, and the dynamics of militia and foreign armed groups. Topics were selected based on their relevance to DDR as well as on demands from stakeholders and country clients. Finally, the MDRP produced a video documentary covering general aspects of the program, which was an effective tool for awareness raising and outreach.

## Efficient Organization of Joint Missions and Preparation of Reports

**Joint Missions.** The MDRP partnership carried out annual regional Joint Supervision Missions from 2002 to 2005, during which focal points from capitals and headquarters visited MDRP countries to observe progress; the tour of MDRP activities culminated in a regional meeting of all partners to discuss findings. These missions served several purposes, including identifying the status of DDR operations at the country level, monitoring regional program indicators, and contributing to coordination and collaboration among partners. In

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<sup>34</sup> Scanteam, “Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program,” End of Program Evaluation (Washington, DC: World Bank, June 2010).

<sup>35</sup> The second to last AC meeting included a one-day learning seminar. For the final AC meeting, a reflection workshop and policy forum were added.

2005, partners suggested that the MDRP decentralize supervision tasks to the local level on the premise that local partners could follow up more regularly on progress and intervene in a more timely and efficient fashion. Thus in 2005 and 2006 joint supervision missions took place at the country level (headquarters staff were informed and welcome to participate). These local Joint Missions were timed to feed into annual AC meetings, although some countries carried out Joint Missions more than once a year. Then, in October 2007, a last regional Joint Mission took place with a view to refocusing the MDRP on cross-border aspects and bringing a regional perspective back into discussions among partners.

The shift to local Joint Missions produced greater efficiencies than the regional missions. The latter had been time-consuming and difficult to organize for the Secretariat, which was under great pressure to deliver results on the ground<sup>36</sup>. However, local missions had the disadvantage of losing the regional perspective. All Joint Missions produced comprehensive reports, which helped grant recipients, partners, and other stakeholders to share information and coordinate their activities.

**Communications and Reporting.** Transparency was one of the MDRP's guiding principles and was concretely translated into regular and extensive reporting on partner meetings and activities, all of which were posted on the MDRP website. After the 2005 mid-term review, which cited the need for renewed commitment to the partnership, a new MDRP

communications strategy was developed and implemented, which helped to increase information exchange and transparency and in turn strengthened the partnership.

As for regular reporting, the MDRP initially produced biweekly and quarterly reports that were transmitted to all partners. In January 2006, responding to feedback from partners, monthly reports replaced biweekly reports. National governments and executing agencies (as opposed to Secretariat staff) were also increasingly called upon to provide inputs into progress reports, which increased efficiency, ownership, and in-country capacity.

**Effectiveness of Technical Support.** While not explicit in the Regional Strategy, the MDRP's approach to providing technical support and strengthening capacities in-country was fourfold: first, UN agencies and NGOs were engaged by the MDRP to provide support through the special projects window; second, technical assistance was built into the design and budgets of projects executed by recipient governments; third, technical knowledge was transmitted through the TCG; and fourth, the MDRP Secretariat used program management resources to provide technical assistance through consultants as well as a few in-house staff.<sup>37</sup>

The capacity of MDRP countries, however, turned out to be significantly lower than anticipated, and the approach to capacity building turned out to be insufficient. Most special projects implemented by the UN and NGOs,

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
<sup>36</sup> In some cases, the MDRP had to hire planes to transport focal points from country to country.

<sup>37</sup> Although according to the original terms of reference for these Secretariat staff, the vision was that they would provide technical support to the Bank teams managing operations rather than to the countries directly. The Secretariat originally included four senior-level technical staff: (a) two subject matter specialists to provide technical support to World Bank task teams preparing and supervising DDR projects financed through the MDRP, as well as to supervise the program's progress; and (b) two specialists located in the region to advise World Bank task teams, participate in the design, appraisal, and supervision of MDRP activities, represent the MDRP with government counterpart officials and partners, and coordinate efforts on regional (cross-border) activities.

for example, were substitutes for the governments' work and provided the governments with limited technical support. The exception was the UNDP-implemented Rapid Response Mechanism, which had an explicit objective of providing technical assistance to the Government of the DRC. Furthermore, technical support built into projects and managed by recipients also had its shortcomings. In some cases, there was simply not enough assistance (as in Uganda); in other cases, governments resisted bringing in qualified international staff and when they were in place marginalized them, thereby reducing their ability to be effective (as in DRC). In yet other cases, governments had limited capacity to manage their internal organizations, even when technical support was in place. As noted in the MDRP Independent Evaluation, "you need capacity to absorb additional capacity."<sup>38</sup>

It quickly became evident, therefore, that the MDRP model for addressing capacity issues needed to be modified and that the Secretariat would need to deepen its technical support to countries. The Secretariat responded in 2004 with the recruitment of five extended-term consultants (ETCs) and then in 2005, following the MDRP mid-term review, with the conversion of those ETCs into term positions. It also deployed on the ground a cadre of short- and long-term consultants and decentralized by relocating to Uganda one of the key Washington-based Secretariat positions.<sup>39</sup> Figure 2 shows the trends in program management expenses. Increases from 2003 to 2006 — an almost tripling of the annual budget — largely reflect changes in staffing and the provision of technical assistance on the part of the Secretariat.

**Figure 2: MDRP Secretariat Program Management Expenses, by Country and Fiscal Year**



<sup>38</sup> Scanteam, "Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program," End of Program Evaluation.

<sup>39</sup> Among other things, the MTR highlighted the need for more MDRP field staff (Development Alternatives Inc., 2005, A Partnership in Need of Reaffirmation: Midterm Review of the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program).

#### d. Outcomes

The Regional Strategy did not define outcome indicators; however, national programs and special projects financed by the MDRP did. Highlights of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) findings are synthesized below. Unfortunately, data are incomplete and inconsistent across countries. However, available information suggests reasonable results overall, especially if one considers the objective of reintegration, which is to put ex-combatants on par with other community members. In many areas, this implied being reintegrated back into poverty and in some cases extreme poverty.

- **Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program:** According to project M&E data, 56.8 percent of ex-combatants reported being self-employed, 36.8 percent were unemployed, and 4.6 percent were formally employed; but 91.2 percent said they had access to land. A 2008 independent evaluation of the ADRP indicated that “there is a general feeling of social and economic integration among beneficiaries and some cases of significant improvement in living conditions.” A 2007 survey indicated that “a significant number of beneficiaries say they achieved better social and economic conditions than the rest of the community.”
- **Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program:** According to the project’s third verification survey, 69.1 percent of ex-combatants had established an income-generating activity; in a 2008 reintegration study, only 12.4 percent of ex-combatants reported being unemployed. In terms of relative poverty, according to the survey 38.4 percent of ex-combatants indicated that they thought their socioeconomic situation was the same as other members of their community and 42.8 percent thought it was worse. Using another ranking method, 37.3 percent of respondents said they could get by, 31.3 percent said they were “poor,” and 5.0 percent said they were “very poor.”
- **CAR Project for the Reinsertion of Ex-Combatants and Support to Communities:** PRAC did not maintain data on the outcomes of its reintegration. However, according to ex-combatants interviewed for the final independent evaluation of the project, long-term training and rural activities were the most successful. Not surprisingly, the choice of training was also a key to success; animal husbandry and mechanics were the most effective.
- **DRC Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program:** According to two 2007 surveys, 54 percent of ex-combatants interviewed said they could meet their basic necessities; only 25 percent of those interviewed indicated that they thought ex-combatants had a harder time finding jobs than other community members. When asked whether their income was higher than the community average, two-thirds of ex-combatants said it was not, while one-third said it was.
- **RoC Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project:** According to a 2009 beneficiary survey, 96 percent of beneficiaries of reintegration support felt that their incomes were equivalent to or greater than those of their neighbors (75 percent felt it was greater; 21 percent felt that it was the same). Furthermore, 85 percent said their incomes had improved due to their participation in the project and 89 percent said that they were able to meet the essential needs of their families.

- **Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program:** According to the 2007 tracer study and beneficiary impact assessment, 64.6 percent of male, 43.1 percent of female, and 73.4 percent of child ex-combatants surveyed claimed their living standards were better than those of their neighbors. This represented a significant increase from when the baseline assessment was conducted in 2004, at which time an average of only 50 percent among those populations made that claim. Unemployment levels also decreased over that time period for men, though not for women. In the first tracer study, slightly more than half of respondents also said their housing was worse than that of their neighbors, whereas in the second tracer survey, 64.9 percent of male ex-combatants, 43.1 percent of female ex-combatants, and 73.4 percent of child soldiers stated that their living conditions were actually better than those of their neighbors. According to the 2008 final project evaluation, 66.0 percent of all respondents indicated that their living conditions had improved and only one percent said that their conditions had worsened. Some 93 percent expressed optimism about future economic opportunities.
  
- **Uganda Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration of ‘Reporters’:** The Amnesty Commission did not have a systematic approach for referring reporters nor for assessing the outcomes and impacts of such support. According to the project’s final independent evaluation, overall the project had had a relatively positive impact on some reporters’ ability to reintegrate back into

society, but many reporters fell between the cracks and remain economically vulnerable today.

Some data limitations need to be mentioned here. First, most surveys did not sample from the entire population of ex-combatants that had been demobilized. For instance, the cash payment survey in the DRC had to be limited to ex-combatants in the western part of the country for security reasons. Second, most surveys were unable to retrace all ex-combatants in the original sampling, generally because of the high mobility of ex-combatants (for whom the MIS do not usually have an updated address), safety reasons, or limited road access. And third, the majority of studies conducted did not gather comparative data on the socio-economic status of other members in the communities into which the ex-combatants were reintegrated.

A final word: Reintegration is “a long term social and economic process with an open time frame designed to facilitate the assimilation of ex-combatants in a way that allows them and their families to adapt to civilian life in communities that may not necessarily be ready to accept them.”<sup>40</sup> It is therefore early in the day to assess the outcomes of reintegration financed by the MDRP, given the short time frame between the provision of reintegration assistance and the completion of the program.

#### **e. Program Efficiency**

**Management Costs.** The Secretariat’s program management totaled US\$ 24.9 million or approximately 9.9 percent of the MDTF. If one considers the total IDA and MDTF program costs combined (US\$ 439 million), the

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<sup>40</sup> A.W. Knight, “Linking DDR and SSR in Post-Conflict Peace-Building in Africa: An Overview,” *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 4 (1): 029-054.

management costs would actually be 5.7 percent. The original budgeted cost for program management was even smaller. According to the MDRP end-of-program Independent Evaluation: “The original shoe-string budget of about two percent of the funding and the underlying assumptions of a minuscule Secretariat in Washington was unrealistic. In the end the overhead costs nearly tripled, which the donors accepted, but less than six percent overhead must still be considered low for the complexity of the program and the difficulty of the environment.”<sup>41</sup>

**Implementation Period.** The MDRP was to have run from mid-2002 to mid-2007. However, the trust fund closing date was extended by two years from June 30, 2007, to June 30, 2009, to allow sufficient time to achieve program objectives. Given that peace had yet to be consolidated in the GLR when the MDRP began in 2002, the original time frame of five years was unrealistic. Indeed, with two postponements of the DRC presidential elections, the first phase of demobilization in that country was only completed in late 2006, about eight months before the MDRP originally was to have closed, and the full DDR process in the DRC and other countries was still ongoing.

### 3. MDRP EXIT STRATEGY

Given the magnitude and scope of the MDRP, exit strategies were discussed at the December 2007 AC meeting and subsequently in May 2008 at an MDRP TFC meeting. At the latter meeting, two options were considered: (i) full closure of the MDRP in June 2009; or (ii) a small regional structure to support the completion of ongoing national-level D&R operations and to consolidate MDRP achievements in the GLR. Consistent with the views of country counterparts at the December 2007 meeting, donors

agreed that the continuation of a regional facility was justified, albeit a more modest one than the MDRP.

The result was the **Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP)**, an MDTF-supported US\$ 31 million program, which among other things continues to provide technical assistance to project and country counterparts of DDR programs, provide gap financing for D&R, and promote a platform for collaboration and learning on DDR. Seven donors are funding the TDRP: the AfDB, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, and Sweden. The TDRP represents a special collaboration with the AfDB, which is the largest donor to the TDRP and which became a key MDRP partner in the latter years of the program.

The MDRP also facilitated the following successor operations/programs:

- **Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project:** The Government of Angola has adopted a transitional strategy and program to conclude reintegration activities under the ADRP. The total budget for the program is estimated at US\$ 300 million, to be covered in totality by the government.
- **Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project:** Presented and approved by the Board of Directors of the World Bank on June 16, 2009, the project has financing of US\$ 10 million from IDA and US\$ 12.5 from a single-country, single-purpose MDTF.
- **DRC Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project:** The MDRP fa-

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<sup>41</sup> Scanteam, “Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program”. End of Program Evaluation.

cilitated additional IDA financing of US\$ 50 million, a parallel US\$ 25 million operation for reintegration from the AfDB, and a single-purpose emergency trust fund of US\$ 12 million for reintegration of ex-combatants in the eastern DRC.

- **Rwanda Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project:** Presented and approved by the Board of Directors of the World Bank on August 27, 2009, the project has financing of US\$ 2 million in counterpart funding, a US\$ 8 million IDA grant, US\$ 9 million from a single-country,

single-purpose MDTF, and US\$ 4.5 million from the TDRP.

- **Uganda Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project:** Approved by the World Bank on July 24, 2008, with a single-country, single-purpose MDTF of US\$ 4.9 million.
- **Learning for Equality, Access and Peace Program:** Follows the LEAP Program established in the MDRP, a regional US\$ 6 million program for gender and conflict issues in Sub-Saharan Africa.

# IV. Performance

## 1. THE PROGRAM

The MDRP as a regional framework for DDR is considered satisfactory<sup>42</sup> in the World Bank Implementation Completion Memorandum (ICM) of the Trust Fund. As explained in the preceding sections, almost all objectives of the MDRP as a regional framework were achieved. A synthesis of the outputs and outcomes vis-à-vis indicators established in the Regional Strategy is as follows:

### Strategic Indicators

- The region has seen a reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.
- The region is showing indications of economic growth, which has led to improved trade and is linked to the restoration of free movement of goods and persons within and between countries.
- The region has seen a reduction in spending on the security sector overall and shows indications of increased social expenditures in participating countries.

### Program Indicators

- Forty-three international stakeholders participated in the MDRP coordination mechanism, and almost all DDR activi-

ties in the region were undertaken within the MDRP framework.

- About 96 percent of DDR resources were channeled through the MDTF; while there was a trust fund shortfall on paper, there was no variance between resource requirements and resource availability over the life of the program.
- The vast majority of ex-combatants demobilized in the GLR in the seven years that the MDRP operated were demobilized within the MDRP framework, thus demonstrating the degree of harmonization among national programs. The few exceptions were in the Ituri region and in Rwanda and Burundi (for example, in dealing with child soldiers and the disabled).

### Output Indicators

Output indicators were similarly favorable. Gaps that did exist were due to political issues or stalemates, for the most part. Implementation problems were evident in terms of launching the programs overall (CAR, DRC, RoC, Uganda), in delays in initiating demobilization (DRC), and in providing reintegration support (Burundi, DRC, CAR). However, available M&E data point to satisfactory results across countries. Among the output indicators, the program was not able to harmonize databases as anticipated, but the goals proved to be elusive

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<sup>42</sup> Possible ratings are: Highly Satisfactory; Satisfactory; Moderately Satisfactory; Moderately Unsatisfactory; Unsatisfactory; Highly Unsatisfactory.



for a number of reasons. Technical knowledge sharing activities were achieved through an effective MDRP communications strategy and through AC and TCG events. Joint missions were organized yearly (or as needed), first regionally and then nationally, prior to AC meetings. Lastly, while the MDRP did not foresee the extent of the technical support that would be required on the ground, counting instead on the projects to put it in place, the MDRP Secretariat adapted accordingly.

Ratings from implementation completion and results reports (ICRs) or ICMs that were prepared for national programs and special projects funded by the MDRP are summarized in Tables 7 and 8. Most national programs received a moderately satisfactory rating, the only exception being the Rwanda RDRP, which

was rated satisfactory. In contrast, most special projects received a satisfactory or moderately satisfactory rating, the outliers being two of the UNDP-executed projects, PRAC in CAR and COMREC in the Ituri region of eastern DRC, which were rated unsatisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory, respectively.

The lower than satisfactory ratings resulted from numerous factors, the main one being that projects had to be judged in terms of the original objectives set out in each respective project document, many of which were based on unknowns, projections and/or assumptions that turned out to be incorrect or were overly ambitious or unrealistic. Difficult operating conditions were not sufficiently considered during project design in some cases (e.g., child soldiers in the DRC), and in others, DDR activi-

**Table 7: National Programs and Uganda and CAR Special Projects Ratings from ICMs and ICRs<sup>a</sup>**

	Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation <sup>b</sup>	Overall Program/TF Outcome	Overall Risk to Development Outcome	World Bank Performance	Recipient/Borrower Performance
Angola ICR	Highly Substantial	MS	Low	S	MS
Burundi ICR	Highly Substantial	MS	Significant	MS	MU
Rwanda ICR	Substantial	S	Moderate	S	S
CAR ICM	NR	U	Negligible	MS	U-MS <sup>c</sup>
DRC ICM <sup>d</sup>	NR	MS	Significant	MS	U
RoC ICM	NR	MS	Moderate	MS	MU
Uganda ICM	NR	MS	Moderate	MS	MS

<sup>a</sup> Ratings: **HS**=Highly Satisfactory; **S**=Satisfactory; **MS**=Moderately Satisfactory; **MU**=Moderately Unsatisfactory; **U**=Unsatisfactory; **HU**=Highly Unsatisfactory; **NA**=Not Applicable; **NR**=Not Rated.

<sup>b</sup> The indicator “Relevance of objectives, design and implementation” is used for ICRs but not ICMs.

<sup>c</sup> Unsatisfactory rating for the UNDP; moderately satisfactory rating for the Government.

<sup>d</sup> ICR is forthcoming, since the IDA project was extended with additional financing.

**Table 8: Ratings for NGO- and UN-Funded Special Projects from ICMs**

Special Project	Implementing Agency	Overall TF Outcome	Overall Risk to Development Outcome	World Bank Performance	Recipient/Borrower Performance
Angola Reintegration	UNDP	S	NR	S	S
DRC Child Soldiers	Belgian Red Cross	MS	Low	MS	MS
DRC Child Soldiers	CARE (Maniema Province)	MS	Moderate	MS	MS
	IRC (Oriental Province)	MS	Significant	MS	MS
	IFESH (Northern Katanga Province)	MS	Significant	MS	MS
DRC COMREC	UNDP	MU	Moderate	MS	U
DRC Child Soldiers	UNICEF	S	Significant	MS	S
DRC Child Soldiers	Save the Children Fund U.K.	S	Significant	MS	MS
DRC RRM	UNDP	MS	Moderate	MS	MS
Burundi Child Soldiers	UNICEF	S	Moderate	S	MS

ties were dependent on political preconditions that were not present.

## 2. RISK TO PROGRAM OUTCOMES

In contrast to the pattern of regional insecurity in the early 2000s, the current environment in the GLR is characterized by remarkable strides in the reconstruction of states, societies, and economies. For the most part, the region has steadily entered a post-conflict phase, even though a transition to economic recovery has not found a solid anchor and some areas still face violent conflicts. The core states of the GLR—Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda—have witnessed improvements in peace and security due to political settlements among former foes. In the contiguous states – Angola, CAR, and RoC—previous widespread challenges to central authorities have gradually weakened.

But the lessening of violent conflicts belies formidable obstacles to building durable peace, sturdy governance structures, and sound economic institutions. Armed insurgencies and rebellions in Burundi, eastern DRC, and Uganda continue to challenge legitimate authorities, exacting a toll on civilians and impeding the return to economic normalcy. Furthermore, although peace agreements ended the spates of violent conflict in the GLR, the resulting political compromises still exhibit signs of fragility as elites jostle to adapt to new and untested rules of competition.

These regional security trends form a large part of the uncertainties in the transition from conflict to recovery, with regional actors still refining and defining post-conflict institutions. Some states are further along in rebuilding institutions of order, participation, and prosperity, but others face overwhelming odds in meeting these objectives. Given this context, the dangers of relapse into conflict may po-

tentially overshadow the regional gains in the restoration of durable peace and security. This is particularly pertinent in the GLR, which has had a legacy of weak regional institutions for security, stability, and development.

Risks to renewed conflict are highest in countries such as the DRC and Burundi. In Burundi, the overall political context remains uncertain, and the 2010 elections could provide momentum for civil unrest and political instability. Moreover, the long-term results of reintegration activities cannot be measured in the short term and will only be observed over time. Registration and verification against pre-existing lists from the new D&R project could provide supporting data for this analysis. In DRC, gains achieved from the EDRP remain precarious. Insecurity and conflict persist in the east of the country, threatening the underlying MDRP objective of contributing to overall stability. Some of the MDRP's accomplishments were consolidated by the Additional Financing for the EDRP. However, the inability of the country to achieve lasting peace in the east and the failure to push through credible reforms in the security sector constitute real threats to gains made.

### 3. WORLD BANK AND RECIPIENTS

#### a. World Bank

As noted previously, the role of the World Bank in the MDRP was to: (i) manage and house the MDRP Secretariat; (ii) administer the MDTF; and (iii) cofinance national programs.

**Managing and Housing the MDRP Secretariat.** For the most part, and during its most critical years, the Secretariat was tucked into a large rural development department operat-

ing in a complex hierarchical matrix (six sector managers/directors, four country directors, and seven country managers, and with Secretariat staff dispersed in five sector units across six countries in two continents). During this period, the Secretariat was not a separate unit but rather operated like an informal or virtual group, which made managing the Secretariat difficult at best. Although the program maintained a full-time program manager, Secretariat staff were located across sector units, with each staff person reporting to his/her own line manager.<sup>43</sup> The MDRP Secretariat also had four program managers in seven years (one on an interim basis) and went through two restructurings. Only two of the program managers had had previous experience in DDR.

The implementing model initially adopted by the Bank, that is, using existing task team leaders and having only a small Secretariat, did not work as planned. Africa Region senior management did not offer its best operational staff as promised. When one experienced task team leader did come forward, the job of managing the intricate political environment of DDR operations proved to be more difficult than anticipated. The Bank also did not have a pool of DDR experts from which to draw. The Secretariat thus had to manage operations relying on staff recruited from the outside who were inexperienced in Bank procedures. Naturally, it took time for these relative newcomers to become acquainted with and agile in dealing with Bank systems, and some were unsuccessful in making the transition to task team leadership through no fault of their own – they had been recruited for other jobs. As for the size of the Secretariat, the limited capacity of country counterparts and the difficulties in managing a complex partnership became evident early

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<sup>43</sup> At its height in early 2006, the Secretariat included 18 staff: a program manager, a Trust Fund coordinator, nine senior level specialists, five junior to mid-level staff, and two support staff. Of those, eight were Africa-based. The Secretariat also counted on several full-time consultants in the DRC and another in Bangui.

on. The Secretariat reacted by beefing up its capacity, putting in place a cadre of experts on the ground, and bringing in specialized staff (in M&E, communications, procurement, gender). But identifying and recruiting staff in a timely and flexible manner also turned out to be a hurdle since the Bank's human resources policies were inadequate for emergency settings and post-conflict and fragile states.<sup>44</sup>

**Administering the MDTF.** According to the Regional Strategy, the Secretariat's role was to coordinate international efforts under the MDRP and administer the MDTF. Specific responsibilities included: (i) organizing AC, TFC, and TCG meetings as well as Joint Supervision Missions; (ii) mobilizing resources; (iii) establishing a database of beneficiaries; (iv) providing guidance and technical advisory services to national counterparts; (v) recruiting consultants to carry out regional activities; (vi) coordinating with security and political stakeholders represented in the AC with a view to ensuring complementarity with MDRP activities; and (vii) carrying out communications and outreach, including reporting on the status of MDRP activities to the Partnership. The focus of the Secretariat changed over time in response to the needs of the program, with greater emphasis placed on leading and managing MDRP projects as well as providing technical assistance to country counterparts. The Secretariat also had to adjust its approach to communications and outreach and place greater focus on managing the interrelations of the MDRP Partnership. The MDRP Secretariat thus evolved in order to achieve its objectives, as well as to compensate for shortcomings in the design of the program. All of this was done in real time with deadlines looming and pressures from all

sides to resolve problems that arose.

The ability of the World Bank to mobilize US\$ 165 million in donor pledges to launch the MDRP was unprecedented in emergency financing for DDR. It ultimately secured funding of US\$ 439 million (IDA and MDTF) and leveraged another US\$ 100 million in IDA Additional Financing and AfDB and bilateral monies. However, in 2004, with the signing of the DRC EDRP, the MDRP began to operate with a funding gap on paper, that is, the amount stated in signed agreements with executing agencies exceeded contributions and pledges from donors. The Secretariat closely monitored operations to ensure that actual financing requirements would be met; indeed, no national program or activity supported within the MDRP framework ever reported delays in implementation due to a lack of financial resources.<sup>45</sup> However, a number of weaknesses in the Bank's trust fund systems were revealed in the process, although these have now been corrected (such as the Bank's being able to enter into legal agreements with governments for trust fund resources when those funds have only been committed on paper but not yet received by the Bank). The fact that one donor, the Netherlands, contributed almost 50 percent of the total donor funding also put the Bank in a precarious position (see Section V, below, on lessons learned).

**Cofinancing National Programs.** The Bank provided a greater share of the financing of national programs than was originally envisaged in the Regional Strategy: 46 percent compared to 30 percent. The Bank also contributed \$50 million of Additional IDA Financing to the DRC EDRP, when it was clear that the program would

<sup>44</sup> Recruiting short-term consultants (STCs) was the easiest and fastest way of bringing in technical assistance, but contracts were limited to a maximum of 150 days annually. ETCs (extended-term consultants), which were full-time consultants, were a second alternative but were limited to a maximum of two years.

<sup>45</sup> Although some countries used that as an excuse to delay demobilization.

have a shortfall. Lastly, in the latter phase of the MDRP, the Bank provided financing in the amount of US\$ 10 million and US\$ 9 million to allow for the completion of pending caseloads in Burundi and Rwanda, respectively.

### **b. Recipients**

Executing agencies of projects funded by the MDRP Trust Fund included national governments, UN agencies (UNDP and UNICEF), and NGOs. According to Tables 7 and 8, recipient performance ratings in completion reports ranged from unsatisfactory to satisfactory, with most being moderately satisfactory.

The projects that were implemented in countries with more stable political regimes and stronger institutions, namely Angola and Rwanda, delivered better quality services overall and received a satisfactory rating in their respective ICRs. The quality of services was substantiated by beneficiary feedback and project data. For example, in the 2008 final payment verification survey in Rwanda, most ex-combatants surveyed (89.8 percent) reported receiving their Basic Needs Kit within one to seven days, hence with no delay, and the 2008 final evaluation reported a very high level of satisfaction among beneficiaries of education/training reintegration benefits. Moreover, when problems were detected, these programs were able to adapt (e.g., addressing the needs of female and disabled ex-combatants in Rwanda, and providing support for widows and other vulnerable community members in Angola).

In contrast, the institutionally weaker countries with fragile political regimes, such as the DRC and Burundi, encountered many delays and problems with service delivery. The borrower performance rating for the Burundi PNDRR was moderately satisfactory and for the DRC EDRP was unsatisfactory. In Burundi, the average time period between the return of ex-combat-

ants to their communities and the initiation of reintegration support was one year, compared to the indicator of nine months established by the project. Given that this was the average wait time, some ex-combatants waited significantly longer, which led to some unrest among ex-combatants and caught the attention of politicians and the international community. In DRC, due to the EDRP's overspending and budget shortfall, the wait was two years or more. But DRC's lower rating was due largely to obstruction and mismanagement of funds, which resulted in the dissolution of the EDRP's executing agency, CONADER. M&E systems in both Burundi and DRC tended to be weaker, particularly in DRC.

RoC and Uganda also had problems in service delivery, but for other reasons: the former's recipient performance was rated moderately unsatisfactory and the latter's was rated moderately satisfactory. In the case of the RoC, capacity was an issue, but the biggest hurdle seemed to be political will to support a DDR process in the Pool region of the country. Uganda, which is characterized by greater stability and stronger institutions, displayed weak performance in processing ex-combatants according to agreed standards and weakness in outreach to reporters, resulting in concerns about re-recruitment. Delays between reporting and the delivery of the reinsertion package also occurred. Ultimately, the executing agency, the Amnesty Commission, was not given the adequate human, institutional, and financial capacity required to run the project, which suggests a lack of commitment or incentives on the part of the Government of Uganda.

CAR was a special case. Given the fragility of the state, clearly the operating environment was never going to be easy, yet most ex-combatants were demobilized in urban areas, thereby lessening the logistical challenges for PRAC. Moreover, since the project was imple-

mented by the UNDP, it was expected to perform well. Of all the MDRP countries, for example, PRAC produced the least information on the outcomes of its reintegration support. As a result, the ICM rates UNDP's performance as unsatisfactory.

As for the other special projects implemented by UNICEF, UNDP, and the NGOs, most recipients were rated moderately satisfactory. As noted above, the child-soldier projects in

the DRC had unrealistic goals for reintegration support, and implementing agencies faced formidable logistical challenges, yet there were some areas where performance could have been improved (e.g., in facilitating the release of female child soldiers in the DRC, in coordination, and in MIS). Considering the overall performance of special projects, the notable exception was the UNDP, which in its capacity as implementing agency of COMREC in Ituri was rated as unsatisfactory.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> The rating was based on an external evaluation of COMREC, which found that: (i) the project had only placed 83 ex-combatants out of a target of 10,000 in reintegration projects; (ii) too few community projects for ex-combatants were implemented; (iii) there were long delays between demobilization and reintegration; and (iv) human resources were very poorly handled, thus crippling performance.

## V. Lessons and Implications for Future Programs

The MDRP has generated useful lessons in terms of both the architecture for a regional DDR framework and operations. The most important lessons relate to: (i) using a regional approach to address regional conflict; (ii) applying the concept of national ownership in fragile and post-conflict settings; (iii) building and managing a multifaceted interagency partnership to implement complex and politically sensitive emergency operations across countries; (iv) managing MDTFs for post-conflict operations and dealing with budget gaps; and (v) applying the Bank's policies and procedures in post-conflict and fragile settings. The program also built technical knowledge on DDR, which can be fed into future programming. Lessons from the MDRP are replicable primarily in post-conflict and fragile environments, but some experiences (e.g., with national ownership and partnership) are more broadly applicable.

### 1. A REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO DDR

At the close of the MDRP, the biggest question that arises is whether the MDRP model should be replicated under similar conditions to those of the GLR. The experience of the MDRP af-

firms that a regional multi-partner coordinated response to DDR was the most appropriate, if not the only, possible approach to the regional conflict that had scarred the sub-region. The counterfactual – an uncoordinated, piecemeal, and fragmented response – would likely have led to duplication, inefficiencies, and gaps in programming<sup>47</sup> and could have affected the goals of bringing stability to the region. The MDRP's regional partnership approach ensured coherence and coordination of DDR in the region. It also offered an efficient and effective mechanism for mobilizing and coordinating financial resources for DDR and ensured large-scale and flexibly programmable funding, transparent funding allocations, consistent financial management, and harmonized reporting.<sup>48</sup>

**Accepting the Risks and Payoffs.** Undertaking a large multi-country, multi-stakeholder initiative like the MDRP was inherently high-risk and high-stakes, but it was the only kind of program that had a real chance of generating the DDR outcomes that were needed when the MDRP was conceived. The Lusaka peace process presented a window of opportunity and a chance for peace. Countries fatigued with war were looking for a way out, and the MDRP helped with the promise of funding for D&R, but the international community had to

<sup>47</sup> For example, in countries such as CAR where donor support and presence has been limited.

<sup>48</sup> Scanteam, "Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program," End of Program Evaluation.

respond quickly, leaving little time for in-depth planning. Details had to be worked out along the way in real time, and after the program got going, elections in key countries (DRC, Burundi) set a rapid pace of implementation. A key lesson from the MDRP therefore is that donors, the Bank, and the development community generally must be prepared to accept the risks, difficulties, and uncertainties inherent in implementing a large, complex multi-country program in a post-conflict setting when peace processes and elections dictate the speed of operations.

**Delivering Regional Public Goods.** A regional approach made sense in terms of pooled and flexible financing, confidence building for mutual disengagement, coordination and consistency of approaches across country programs, and harmonization in the treatment of ex-combatants. Delivering on regional cross-border activities such as combatants on foreign soil, however, proved more difficult for a number of reasons. First, although political and military cooperation between DRC and Rwanda has resulted in a general weakening of the FDLR in the DRC, the FDLR remains a robust and determined political/military movement with the capacity to continue to undermine the peace process in the region. For its part, the Lord's Resistance Army appears to be slowly withdrawing from DRC but remains a substantial regional threat through operations in CAR and Sudan. The MDRP was able to support cross-border activities that facilitated the DDR of irregular forces operating in the DRC outside the control of national authorities, through activities such as cross-border communications and the monitoring and generating of infor-

mation about the dynamics of foreign armed groups in the eastern DRC. But there was little else the program could do in the absence of an international solution to these regional issues. A second problem was the inherent difficulty in producing regional products. Consistent with international experience, generating collective action for regional activities and establishing incentives for actors to think beyond their country borders was not easy, particularly when countries faced so many problems on their home fronts. Expectations for regional outputs under such circumstances must therefore be modest.

## 2. THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF DEMOBILIZATION

The MDRP was technocratic in its approach and did not give enough consideration to the political dimensions of demobilization. This was especially problematic in the DRC. The EDRP encountered persistent political hurdles and blockages and, as a result, was very slow to get off the ground and ultimately had difficulty in achieving its objectives. Problems can be traced back to the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on which DDR was premised and which, many have observed, was flawed. The political landscape in the DRC during implementation was also highly charged and complex, if for no other reason than due to the large number and diversity of armed groups being targeted.<sup>49</sup> DDR's full success depended on all the preconditions being met, preconditions such as peace, political will, buy-in, and global political support, yet all of these rested on a shaky peace deal.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> C. Clement, *Taming the Devil Inside: The Politics Behind DRC's Demobilization Program* (forthcoming).

<sup>50</sup> R. Muggah and E. McCandless, *Second Generation DDR Practices in UN Peace Operations: A Contribution to the New Horizon Agenda*, Draft report (DPKO: 2009) (cited in Clement, *Taming the Devil Inside*).



The Regional Strategy recognized the political dimensions of DDR; however, it presented them as considerations of DDR rather than as preconditions for demobilization. It noted, for example, *“In the absence of the complementary political, security and reconstruction efforts ... the [Regional] strategy and programs are unlikely to accomplish their objectives,”* and *“The [Regional] strategy seeks to complement and reinforce efforts by the international community in the political, security and recovery sphere.”* The strategy also highlighted the importance of MDRP partners in addressing political obstacles and supporting security sector reform and noted the centrality of bilateral donors in this regard, but it did not give sufficient attention to how the politics would actually be dealt with nor did it establish mechanisms for this purpose. The inability of donors to collectively act on the political dimensions of the program became a nagging issue over the course of implementation and a source of tension between partners. A lesson for the future, therefore, is to recognize and factor in both the political and technical aspects of demobilization in the design of DDR programs. In hindsight, for example, the MDRP could have dedicated resources for the political aspects of DDR, recruited appropriately specialized staff, and/or supported a high-level political structure to engage on DDR and related issues over the life of the program.

### 3. NATIONAL OWNERSHIP

**Accepting the Risks and Tradeoffs of National Ownership.** The intent of national ownership in the MDRP was correct. The program acknowledged governments as the primary and legitimate representatives of national interests in post-conflict settings and institutionalized their central role in program delivery. But given the key role of government in implementation, the legitimacy or strength of respective political systems and the capacity of government

in a given country were pivotal to achieving the objectives of ownership. Ownership was inherently stronger in countries with victory settlements or elected governments (Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, RoC) and weaker in transitional caretaker regimes that came to power under negotiated peace deals or coup d'états (Burundi, DRC and CAR). In the MDRP, a given country's political environment and the nature of its peace process largely shaped the willingness or capability of government officials to act on DDR. A government's real political control may be severely compromised or challenged, especially when the state is weak or has a transitional government in place. Donors and other partners who buy into a national ownership model must be cognizant of the risks and tradeoffs associated with this approach. Governments may not be fully in control over DDR processes or may take decisions and actions that donors may disagree with.

**Understanding Political Security Issues and Maintaining Flexibility during Program Implementation.** National ownership requires the commitment and guidance of a coalition of actors to pursue the objectives of a peace process and DDR, to undertake actions in support of those objectives, and to sustain those actions and the costs they entail over time. In other words, in a given context a coalition of country actors needs to own the peace process and have the power, determination, and capacity to carry out DDR activities set out in the peace agreement. Identifying the guiding coalitions that could fulfill DDR objectives was a challenge in MDRP countries that were in transition before a legitimately elected government was in place and in those countries that had incomplete peace processes. Under these circumstances, a DDR program would do well to: (i) guarantee flexibility in implementing arrangements to accommodate changes in the political security environment (i.e., rather than a 'one-size fits all' approach of creating gov-

ernment-led national commissions to execute DDR programs);<sup>51</sup> (ii) ensure that structures/ staff are in place in-country to continuously inform the Secretariat and the partnership of changes in the dynamics of the political economy and their corollary implications for DDR objectives; and (iii) put in place sufficient technical expertise to guide and monitor DDR activities of national executing agencies.

#### 4. THE MDRP PARTNERSHIP

**Working in Partnership.** The MDRP partnership represented an intricate set of inter- and intra-organizational relationships operating at different levels. Not surprisingly, the experience of the MDRP demonstrated that complex partnerships with a large collection of dissimilar organizations are inherently difficult to manage. MDRP members commonly faced dual or multiple allegiances and varied in their expectations regarding contributions and benefits. Inside some of the partner organizations, internal tensions were common between head office and decentralized staff and between those working in the development, diplomacy, and security quarters. The partnership was further complicated by the fact that partners were not equal. Some partners (e.g., MONUC, the large donors, and donors involved in security sector reform or with strong political linkages in the region) were much more central to the success of the MDRP than others, and this sometimes led to tensions among partners. However, the diversity of the partnership was also necessary for the success of the MDRP.

#### Understanding the Disconnects in Expectations and the Tensions in the Partnership.

Tensions in the partnership arose with organizations that had overlapping mandates and in particular with some of the UN agencies that had unmet expectations vis-à-vis the program. Table 9 provides an analysis of disconnects in this regard. The UNDP had hoped to take a greater leadership role in the MDRP overall because of its previous experiences in DDR and its strong presence on the ground – especially in countries with peacekeeping missions.<sup>52</sup> In fact, the UNDP was selected as the lead MDRP agency in three countries and had responsibility for three special projects. However, according to the MDRP Independent Evaluation, the UNDP saw its “role diminished in some countries” and “attempts to take the leadership in others rebuffed.” Furthermore, accessing resources for D&R meant new standards of accountability with the World Bank.<sup>53</sup>

World Bank-donor tensions also related to unmet expectations – on both sides. Donors anticipated faster responses and more direct intervention from the Bank when obstacles in implementation surfaced. For its part, the World Bank expected more from the donors in addressing political and security-sector bottlenecks. But experience demonstrated that bilateral donors were often concerned about being politically exposed vis-à-vis governments. Moreover, donor interests sometimes diverged, making it difficult for them to work together and present a common political front.

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<sup>51</sup> For example, in DRC the smaller Project Implementation Unit in the Ministry of Defense, which was put in place after the dissolution of CONADER, has worked well.

<sup>52</sup> Scanteam, “Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program,” End of Program Evaluation

<sup>53</sup> In CAR, the UNDP was forced to reimburse the MDTF US\$ 650,000 following an external audit which identified expenditures that were later deemed ineligible by World Bank financial management specialists.

**Table 9: MDRP Partners: What they sought from the partnership and what they got**

Partner	National Govts		Bilateral Donors		DPKO		UNDP		NGOs		WB/Secretariat	
	S	G	S	G	S	G	S	G	S	G	S	G
Funding/financing	✓	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓		
Leveraging of funds contributed			✓	✓							✓	✓
Lead role in the MDRP					✓		✓				✓	✓
Technical assistance/expertise	✓	✓										
Accountability		✓	✓	✓				✓		✓		
Pooling of resources		✓									✓	✓
Political leveraging			✓	✓							✓	
Coordination					✓	✓					✓	✓
Legitimacy			✓	✓								
Control over DDR		✓				✓		✓				
Risk sharing			✓	✓							✓	✓

Source: World Bank (forthcoming).

**Managing Inter- and Intra-Agency Relations.** Very little effort went into planning and discussing how the multifaceted web of inter- and intra-organizational MDRP relations would be managed.<sup>54</sup> For example, the Bank had no authority over the partners; persuasion and communications were the only way for the Bank to relate to these groups. But increasingly, the World Bank and other development organizations will be faced with issues that require collaboration and new forms of organizing. Today, climate change, disaster response, food insecurity, and other pressing issues on the development agenda are far too complex to

be solved by a single organization; they require skills, knowledge, and resources from a wide spectrum of actors. Thus, the MDRP’s experience and lessons in managing the MDRP Partnership will also become increasingly relevant.

As to the lessons from the MDRP in relation to the partnership: first, coordination is time consuming. A tiny Secretariat with so few resources was never going to be sufficient to confront the multiplicity of issues the MDRP would face. Improved communications and outreach as well as more frequent donor and partner visits all helped but did not come close to what was

<sup>54</sup> World Bank (forthcoming).

required. Dedicated resources and staff who specialize in managing inter-organizational relationships would have been a plus for the MDRP during implementation. Second, different mechanisms to address political hurdles should be identified and pursued, depending on the context. For example, in the DRC non-attributable “MDRP Notes of Concern” prepared collectively by the Bank and donors and presented to government worked well.

**Nurturing Regional Partners in Africa.** Over its lifetime, the MDRP sought to establish and nurture relationships with regional organizations engaged in fragile settings generally and DDR programs specifically. But like most other parts of Africa, the GLR has had problems constructing meaningful multilateral institutions for security and development, and the MDRP had limited time for capacity building of regional bodies. Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda have been trying to revive the *Communauté économique des Pays des Grands Lacs* (CEPGL), in the hope that the organization will open vistas for expansion into the areas of peace and security; however, it is unlikely that the CEPGL will have the ability to be a decisive actor on the security front in the short term. In another initiative, the UN initiated a comprehensive multilateral process billed as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) that embraced 11 regional states.<sup>55</sup> While having been hailed as transforming the GLR into a haven for peace, stability, and shared development, there is skepticism about the ability of such an amorphous group of nations to muster the will and capacity to implement a raft of security and

economic programs in the near term. In 2003, the African Union established the Peace and Security Council (modeled somewhat on the UN Security Council) and developed a peace and security directorate and program. But the latter has limited capacity and has opted not to engage directly on DDR related programming, which is considered to be too technical for its mandate.<sup>56</sup> Recognizing the imperative of building regional capacity on the continent, the MDRP’s successor program, the TDRP, has a central objective: to identify a regional body (or bodies) that will serve as a repository for the experience, expertise, and materials gleaned over the last decade of DDR in the GLR, and to build the capacities of these regional entities.

## 5. MOBILIZING AND MANAGING TRUST FUND RESOURCES

**Leveraging Scarce IDA Resources for DDR in the GLR.** Having the MDRP embedded within the World Bank allowed the program to leverage concessionary IDA funding that would otherwise have been highly unlikely under the leadership of any other organization. The MDRP leveraged almost US\$ 250 million of scarce IDA resources to supplement the US\$ 260 million in the MDTF. Furthermore, with DDR unfinished in the region and the MDRP coming to a close, the World Bank injected more resources into MDRP countries, including US\$ 50 million of Additional IDA Financing when the EDRP ran out of money in the DRC in 2007 and US\$ 18 million in new IDA funds to deal with remaining caseloads of ex-combatants in Burundi and Rwanda in 2009. Because MDRP projects became an integral part of the Bank’s portfolio, Bank country di-

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<sup>55</sup> Angola, Burundi, CAR, DRC, Kenya, RoC, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia are the ICGLR member states.

<sup>56</sup> The overall objective of the Peace and Security Directorate is to maintain peace, security and stability through the coordination and promotion of African and other initiatives on conflict prevention, management, and resolution within the context of the UN.

rectors and country teams became engaged in DDR processes with country clients, thus creating ownership over DDR at the Bank's country-unit level. In turn, this created the commitment on the part of Bank country management units to invest in continued D&R when the MDRP came to an end.

**Having One Dominant Donor.** MDRP mobilized US\$ 165 million in donor pledges to launch the MDRP and establish the MDTF, which represented 47 percent of estimated donor contributions to the MDRP. The ability of the Bank to generate these funds was unprecedented in DDR financing. However, of the pledged amount, about US\$ 108.8 million,<sup>57</sup> or nearly 66 percent, came from a single donor, the Netherlands.<sup>58</sup> In other words, had it not been for the Netherlands, the MDRP would almost certainly not have materialized. Other donor pledges totaled \$US 55.2 million, with the second largest pledge coming from the UK (about \$US 35 million),<sup>59</sup> which was only about a third of the Dutch pledge. Reliance on one donor for such a large proportion of financing put the MDRP in a vulnerable position when in late 2006 the Dutch government, under a new political administration, threatened to leave the MDRP and cancel its contribution. The ability of a donor to retract funds that have not been disbursed after an administrative agreement had been signed was a major weakness in the Bank's trust fund policies and systems, which subse-

quently were changed as a result of the MDRP experience.

### **Operating with a Funding Gap in the MDTF.**

A second issue was the MDRP funding gap in the trust fund. In 2004, with the signing of an MDRP grant of US\$ 100 million for the EDRP in the DRC, the amount of all MDTF grants signed between the Bank and recipients exceeded the total amount of donor commitments at the time. In late 2007, despite having provided the clearances for all MDRP Trust Fund grants, the Bank's trust fund accounting department became aware of the funding deficit, which at the time stood at some US\$ 39 million. The gap subsequently had to be reported to the Bank's auditors and risked the Bank's SEC rating. An opinion from the Bank's legal department determined that the Bank, as trust fund administrator, was not legally liable for covering the gap although it was morally responsible.<sup>60</sup> The gravity of the situation meant direct involvement of the World Bank's Controller and the Africa Region's vice president, who until the gap disappeared were required to attest quarterly to the low risk associated with the deficit. The MDRP Secretariat closely monitored the financial situation of the trust fund and knew that due to low anticipated disbursements (in Angola, Burundi and RoC), the Bank was not at risk<sup>61</sup> — indeed, the MDTF closed in June 2009 with a surplus of almost US\$ 10 million. However a major crisis was prompted in the Bank that led to significant reforms in trust fund policies.

<sup>57</sup> The contribution was €108 million; the exchange rate in 2002 was 0.9927.

<sup>58</sup> As of October 22, 2002 when the Initiating Brief for the Trust Fund (IBTF) was drafted.

<sup>59</sup> The contribution was £25 million; the exchange rate in 2002 was 1.432

<sup>60</sup> The opinion was: (1) that the Bank, acting in its capacity as administrator, "is under no legal obligation to finance from its own resources the funding shortfall faced by the MDRP trust fund"; and (2) "the Bank as administrator is under a moral obligation to honor satisfactory withdrawal applications under active grants implementing satisfactorily, and not doing so would expose it [Bank] to serious reputational risks."

<sup>61</sup> MDRP donors had always collectively promised to fulfill their commitments. However, the most active donors followed the MDRP closely and were also aware of the projected lower disbursements in countries such as Angola and Burundi; as a result, they were hesitant to allocate further resources to the MDTF.

## 6. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON DDR

**Addressing DDR as Two Distinct Processes.** The experience of the MDRP suggests that in some cases, separating DDR into two concurrent and complementary implementation processes may work better than relying on a single process. The first axis would focus on disarmament and demobilization as well as reinsertion (i.e., DDr, with the small “r” representing reinsertion support), while the second would deal with broad-based reintegration (i.e., capital R). In such circumstances, DDR would become DDr + R. This lesson is consistent with findings from the UN’s Inter Agency Working Group on DDR.

This multi-pronged approach is justified for a number of reasons. First, there is broad consensus among practitioners and policy makers that DDR interventions represent a transition process rather than a combination of specific sequential milestones. That is, DDR is a transition from politically driven security agendas to developmentally driven human development ones. It also represents a transition from (i) accommodating the outcomes and commitments agreed to in peace agreements to (ii) recovery- and vulnerability-driven social protection schemes. Second, from an implementation perspective, DD is fundamentally a security and logistics operation, often managed by the military, whereas broad-based R is a developmental activity that lends itself to being implemented by mainstream institutions dealing with development programming. Such mainstream institutions are also likely to be better able to link the targeted reintegration of ex-combatants with longer-term community development and broader recovery efforts.

There would be advantages and disadvantages to the proposed separation. On the one hand, reintegration would likely receive dedicated attention much earlier in the process and

likely be more effective as a result, increasing ownership and sustainability. On the other hand, the coordination of two implementation processes would probably be more challenging and require more resources.

**Increasing the Impact of Reintegration Assistance in Fragile and Post-Conflict Settings.** One of the greatest challenges of DDR programs is to create opportunities for ex-combatants that will ultimately lead to generation of income and sustainable livelihoods. This challenge is made more difficult by the fact that these programs are being implemented in post-conflict environments with collapsed or frail economies. Donors preferred the Bank to manage the MDRP in part because of its investments in reconstruction and development and the linkages that could be made with these operations. The Bank was also expected to formulate exit strategies that would forge relationships with these projects in a post-DDR phase. In practice, the fusion of DDR activities with other Bank-financed development projects turned out to be more difficult than anticipated. MDRP Secretariat staff tried to work with Bank task team leaders of other projects (e.g., infrastructure, social funds in the DRC) but these projects had narrowly defined objectives or were already in place and difficult to retrofit to accommodate the needs of ex-combatants.

**Addressing the Needs of Special Groups.** The MDRP took two distinct approaches to dealing with the needs of special groups. It established special projects to provide services to child soldiers, which were implemented by UNICEF and various NGOs (e.g., in DRC and Burundi, where the number of child soldiers was particularly high). By contrast, in dealing with female, disabled, and chronically ill adult ex-combatants (as well as child soldiers in other MDRP countries), MDRP applied a mainstreaming approach. Earmarking resources for child soldiers proved reasonably effective.

However, results on gender, the disabled, and the ill were more elusive, even in the higher-capacity countries.

This is not a surprise. With regard to gender, experience has demonstrated that the exclusion of women in DDR programs is often inevitable because of the way lists of combatants are drawn up, the stigma associated with being part of armed groups for women in particular, and the narrow definition of ex-combatant that is related to possessing arms. To address the last constraint, the international community, including the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, has broadened the concept of female ex-combatants to encompass women in their different roles related to armed groups (referred to as females associated with armed groups).

Similarly with regard to the disabled/injured, many DDR programs have struggled to deal effectively with the issue of injured and handicapped ex-combatants. Invariably, the bottom line has been a lack of a suitable package to attract eligible ex-combatants. The problem is that a DDR program can rarely afford to either establish the requisite services (which can go as far as building special facilities) or provide the life-long financial support. As a result, the disabled/injured individual ends up calculating that he or she is better off staying in the army in the long term. Obviously, part of the problem is that the army allows this to happen easily; nonetheless, new thinking is required on how to address the needs of the disabled and chronically ill. Another obstacle is that legal provisions for access to retirement pension schemes and state disability pensions are rarely in place.

For both the disabled/injured and women, future programs would do well to consider a window that provides dedicated support for their needs, not just for the needs of children, or to encourage bilateral partners to assist

these groups, as was the case with JICA, GTZ, and the German Development Bank (KfW) in Rwanda. Programs should also consider regional technical support, such as LEAP, which although coming late in the program has been at the forefront of new approaches to assist women ex-combatants and is showing positive results.

**Improving the Quality of M&E.** Effective M&E starts at the design stage of any project. The nature of the emergency response embedded in all MDRP-supported projects and the characteristics of the Bank's instruments used at the time (Emergency Recovery Lending), diverted attention from early M&E design and results-based programming. Much better information and lessons are available today on M&E systems for DDR operations, and together with modern and more cost-effective technological solutions they have led to a better focus on results-oriented project design and early implementation of M&E approaches. In fact, most DDR operations evolving from the legacy of the MDRP (e.g., in Rwanda and Burundi) now have robust results frameworks and monitoring plans embedded in their designs and should provide for better decision-making information.

This said, the inherent weaknesses of post-conflict states and institutions and the emergency nature of post-conflict DDR operations mean that implementing the kind of robust results-based frameworks that donors expect will never be easy, particularly under the national ownership model in which national governments have overall responsibility for project-level M&E. Thus, programs like the MDRP need to compensate to the extent possible and provide their own technical and financial resources to augment the M&E work done by national governments and implementing agencies. The MDRP did increase its attention to M&E as the program evolved, but the capacity constraints of country counterparts should

have been recognized from the outset and appropriate levels of technical support put in place. The MDRP's successor program, the TDRP, has established a quality enhancement facility to this end.

The question of standardizing M&E systems, registration procedures, and common databases across all MDRP participating countries was highlighted in the original Regional Strategy and discussed at different stages of the program. While originally conceptualized as a very desirable outcome of MDRP's regional nature, this initiative proved impractical and unfeasible. Several countries within the MDRP sphere had gone through previous DDR exercises. A wealth of legacy data and registration systems were in existence at the time of MDRP engagement; these required adaptation but had to be preserved to accommodate the requirements of specific processes (e.g., in Rwanda, which had already implemented one DDR phase, and in Angola, which had executed two peace processes prior to the MDRP). And not all "entry points" into the registration systems were managed by MDRP-sponsored activities; therefore, the program had little control over how ex-combatants were initially registered and what data were collected.

Moreover, some of these systems were only designed for identification and registration purposes and did not provide options to support reinsertion and reintegration work, and were thus inappropriate for DDR. Finally, for data to be compatible across countries in the region and for the potential movement of combatants across borders to be tracked, a robust and consistent biometric registration system would have been required. These technologies were not available at the scale and costs needed to be field-deployable when the MDRP started. Today, technological progress and the knowledge generated, largely due to the MDRP experience, would allow for the deployment of

better, more cost-effective regional registration and control systems. Operations designed in future years will be well served by the experience and knowledge generated by the MDRP.

## **7. LOOKING FORWARD: THE WORLD BANK'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ON DDR**

The MDRP as a framework for DDR worked under the stewardship of the Bank. The ability to leverage almost US\$ 250 million in IDA resources during the life of the MDRP plus an additional US\$ 68 million in IDA to complete DDR operations in the region would have been highly unlikely without Bank leadership and coordination. Under the direction of the Bank, the MDRP championed development principles such as national ownership, partnership, and regionality, which were new in DDR programming when the MDRP began but subsequently have become embraced by DDR policy makers and the international development community more broadly. Based on this record, a future conflict similar to that which engulfed the GLR of Africa would again make the Bank a likely candidate to take the lead in a regional post-conflict program.

The implementation of the MDRP, however, revealed the need for a comprehensive review of the Bank's capacity to carry out this type of work in the future. The following areas, in particular, require attention.

- The Bank needs clear corporate policies and procedures related to DDR, as well as a better corporate understanding of the implications of being involved in complex regional DDR programs and the willingness to address them.
- The Bank needs to develop the staffing, organizational agility, and decision-making systems that lend themselves to



implementing a fast-moving, high-risk endeavor such as the MDRP.

- Better support systems need to be put in place by the Bank. For example, the relationship of DDR programs to a sector board or a Bank-wide department with institutional responsibility over DDR is still lacking. In the case of the MDRP, the Secretariat could not rely on a sector board to provide it with the strategic, policy, or human resources support that sector boards typically provide in the Bank.
- The Bank's program management of a large regional DDR program, including the location, size, composition, and management of the Secretariat, needs to be well thought through.

The Bank is poised to address the key organizational and institutional issues uncovered during the implementation of the MDRP with the upcoming release of the World Development Report on conflict and fragility, which will offer suggestions and approaches to addressing policy and operational issues such as those confronted by the MDRP. The Bank also plans to review its Operational Policy 2.30 on "Development Cooperation and Conflict," which among other things deals with the principles of Bank involvement in conflict settings, part-

nerships, Bank support to countries in transition, and Bank engagement in areas affected by conflict. A rethinking of the Bank's role in the security sector will be part of this endeavor, and as expected, the experiences of the MDRP will inform the analysis.

The overall commitment of the Bank to working on fragile and conflict situations is clear, as revealed in a statement to the UN Security Council Debate on Post-conflict Peacebuilding made by Ms. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, managing director of the World Bank, on April 16, 2010. She ended her delivery with these words:

*"Let us make no mistake: if we are to deliver real results for the people living in fragile and conflict-affected situations, these areas deserve our full attention. We know that the costs of failure are great, but let us also bear in mind that the benefits that flow from success can be even greater. Beginning with our deliberations here today, let us take every opportunity to ensure that success."<sup>62</sup>*

Consistent with that message, the Bank should take the opportunity to learn from the rich experiences generated by the MDRP and continue to upgrade its capabilities to play the role that partner countries and other international agencies expect.

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<sup>62</sup> UN Security Council 6299th Meeting. See full report at: <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PBC%20SPV%206299.pdf>





# Annexes



# Annex 1: Cost and Financing Tables

Source	Amounts Committed in Currency		Amounts Received in Currency		Amounts Received in \$US
Donor Contributions					253,036,255
Belgium	€	10,007,938	€	10,007,938	10,992,483
Canada	Can\$	24,500,000	Can\$	24,499,910	19,475,901
Denmark	DKr	26,872,000	DKr	26,872,000	4,033,720
EC	€	20,000,000	€	20,000,000	22,764,000
Finland	€	1,000,000	€	1,000,000	1,356,450
France	€	2,000,000	€	2,000,000	2,078,600
Germany	€	10,685,000	€	10,684,966	13,994,288
Ireland	€	500,000	€	500,000	659,550
Italy	€	1,500,000	€	1,500,000	1,714,050
Netherlands	€	103,000,000	€	103,000,000	125,831,219
Norway	NKr	45,000,000	NKr	45,000,000	6,875,376
Sweden	SKr	60,000,000	SKr	60,000,000	8,260,619
UK	\$	35,000,000	US\$	35,000,000	35,000,000
Investment Income	\$	0	US\$	7,214,774	7,214,774
<b>Total Income</b>					<b>260,251,029</b>

Activity Type	Amounts in US\$
National Programs	167,333,774
Special Projects	54,893,443
LEAP	1,206,421
Other Regional Activities	1,156,160
Program Management	24,853,240
Non-Project Costs*	1,636,257
<b>Total</b>	<b>251,079,294</b>

\* *Non-Project Costs* refer to the Bank's administration fees for managing the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, based on contributions received from donors.

**Table A1.3: MDTF Expenditures, by Country (in US\$)**

Country	National Programs	Special Projects	Bank Expenditures*	Total
Angola	20,711,832	4,245,592	756,066	25,713,489
Burundi	29,171,408	3,474,016	2,839,665	35,485,089
CAR	0	9,727,000	736,800	10,463,800
Congo	13,298,226	0	325,916	13,624,143
DRC	90,550,444	33,303,769	5,727,012	129,581,224
Rwanda	13,601,864	0	940,976	14,542,840
Uganda	0	4,143,066	1,043,206	5,186,272
Regional	0	0	14,846,179	14,846,179
<b>Total</b>	<b>167,333,774</b>	<b>54,893,443</b>	<b>27,215,821</b>	<b>249,443,037</b>

\*Includes regional activities, LEAP, and program management, and excludes non-project costs

**Table A1.4: Overview of Income Sources, MDRP and IDA, Disbursed and Cancelled (in US\$)**

Use/Source	MDTF	IDA	Total	%MDTF
Signed Amount	260,251,029	240,446,116	500,697,145	52%
Disbursed	251,079,294	188,366,651	439,445,945	57%
Surplus/Cancelled	9,171,735	52,079,465	61,251,200	15%
Percent Disbursed	96%	78%	88%	

## Annex 2: Statistical Annex

**Table A2.1: Estimated MDRP Target Groups, 2002**

Country	Estimated Number of Ex-combatants
Angola	75,000
Burundi	60,000
CAR	2,000
Democratic Republic of Congo	80,000
Namibia	3,000
Republic of Congo	8,000
Rwanda	65,000
Uganda	25,000
Zimbabwe	10,000
Total National programs	328,000
Special cases	25,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>353,000</b>

*Source: MDRP Regional Strategy*

**Table A2.2: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the GLR, 2002-2009**

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Angola	4,100,000	1,400,000	450,000	91,000 <sup>a</sup>	No IDPs	No IDPs	No IDPs	No IDPs
Burundi	475,500	281,628	281,600	117,000	117,000	100,000	100,000	100,000
CAR	No data	200,000	200,000	No IDPs	50,000	150,000	108,000	162,284
DRC	2,500,000	3,400,000	2,300,000	2,300,000	1,480,000	1,400,000	1,373,169	1,900,000
RoC	225,000	84,000	No data	No data	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800
Rwanda <sup>b</sup>	No IDPs	No IDPs	No IDPs	No IDPs	No IDPs	No IDPs	No IDPs	No IDPs
Uganda	550,000	830,000	1,600,000	1,900,000	1,850,000	1,700,000	869,000	437,000
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7,850,500</b>	<b>6,195,628</b>	<b>4,831,600</b>	<b>4,408,000</b>	<b>3,504,800</b>	<b>3,357,800</b>	<b>2,457,969</b>	<b>2,607,084</b>

*Source: <http://www.internal-displacement.org>*

<sup>a</sup> According to the government, all IDPs have since then returned, resettled or reintegrated, but since the end of 2005 there has been no monitoring of population movements, and the level of reintegration of the former internally displaced population has not been assessed.

<sup>b</sup> After the “villagization” process in 1998-1999, the UN and the Rwandan government consider that there are no more internally displaced in Rwanda.

**Table A2.3: Refugees in the GLR, by Country of Origin, 2002-2008**

Country of Origin	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Angola	435,421	329,583	228,858	215,827	206,501	186,155	171,393
Burundi	574,555	531,637	485,454	438,706	396,542	375,727	281,592
CAR	25,376	35,400	31,069	42,890	71,685	98,104	120,106
DRC	421,350	453,465	461,042	430,929	401,913	370,374	367,995
RoC	28,000	29,000	28,200	24,400	20,600	19,700	-
Rwanda	75,251	75,263	63,308	100,264	92,966	80,955	72,530
Uganda	40,409	35,247	31,960	34,225	21,751	21,341	7,548
TOTAL	1,600,362	1,489,595	1,329,891	1,287,241	1,211,958	1,152,356	1,021,164

Source: UNHCR database ([www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase](http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase))

**Table A2.4: Gross Domestic Product in the GLR, by Country, 2002-2008 (in constant 2000 US\$ billions)**

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Angola	10.78	11.14	12.38	14.93	17.71	21.3	24.1
Burundi	0.76	0.75	0.78	0.79	0.83	0.86	0.9
CAR	0.96	0.88	0.89	0.91	0.95	0.98	1.01
DRC	4.36	4.61	4.92	5.24	5.5	5.85	6.21
RoC	3.5	3.52	3.65	3.93	4.17	4.11	4.34
Rwanda	2.09	2.1	2.21	2.36	2.54	2.74	3.04
Uganda	6.92	7.36	7.86	8.36	9.26	10.06	11.02

Source: World Bank Development Indicators

**Table A2.5: GDP Growth in the GLR, by Country, 2002-2008 (annual %)**

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Angola	14.5	3.3	11.2	20.6	18.6	20.3	13.2
Burundi	4.5	-1.2	4.8	0.9	5.1	3.6	4.5
CAR	-0.6	-7.6	1	2.4	3.8	3.7	2.2
DRC	3.5	5.8	6.6	6.5	5.1	6.3	6.2
RoC	4.6	0.8	3.5	7.7	6.2	-1.6	5.6
Rwanda	11	0.3	5.3	7.1	7.3	7.9	11.2
Uganda	6.4	6.5	6.8	6.3	10.8	8.6	9.5

Source: World Bank Development Indicators



**Table A2.6: Exports of Goods in the GLR, by Country, 2002-2008 (in US\$ millions)**

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Angola	8,327	9,508	13,475	24,109	31,344	43,154	-
Burundi	31	47	48	57	59	53	79
CAR	145.3	117	126.3	127.8	158	178	185
DRC	1076	1340	1,813	2,071	2,350	2,515	2,500
RoC	2,289	1,461	3,433	4,745	6,066	5,808	10,847
Rwanda	67	63	98	128	145	184	210
Uganda	481	563	709	864	1,004	1,459	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12,416</b>	<b>13,099</b>	<b>19,702</b>	<b>32,102</b>	<b>41,125</b>	<b>53,351</b>	

Source: EIU ([www.countryanalysis.eiu.com](http://www.countryanalysis.eiu.com))

**Table A2.7: Life Expectancy at Birth in the GLR, by Country, 2002-2008 (years)**

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Angola	44	45	45	46	46	47	47
Burundi	48	48	49	49	50	50	50
CAR	46	46	46	46	46	47	47
DRC	47	47	48	48	48	48	48
RoC	53	53	53	53	53	53	54
Rwanda	46	47	48	48	49	50	50
Uganda	48	48	49	50	51	52	53

Source: World Bank Development Indicators

**Table A2.8: Number of Disabled Ex-Combatants who Received Support from the MDRP, by Country and Gender, 2008**

	Females	Males	Total
Angola	22	749	771
Burundi	16	1,739	1,755
CAR	0	4	4
DRC	1	241	242
RoC	-	-	-
Rwanda	6	9,127	9,135
Uganda	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>11,860</b>	<b>11,907</b>

Source: MDRP Monthly Statistical Progress Report October 2008, Table 4 ([www.mdrp.org](http://www.mdrp.org))

## Annex 3: MDRP Partners

<p><b>Countries</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Angola</li><li>2. Burundi</li><li>3. Central African Republic (CAR)</li><li>4. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)</li><li>5. Republic of Congo (RoC)</li><li>6. Rwanda</li><li>7. Uganda</li></ol>	<p><b>Other Partners</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. African Development Bank (AfDB)</li><li>2. African Union (AU)</li><li>3. Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEEAC)</li><li>4. European Union (EU)</li><li>5. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)</li><li>6. Global Coalition for Africa (GCA)</li><li>7. International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)</li><li>8. International Labour Organization (ILO)</li><li>9. International Monetary Fund (IMF)</li><li>10. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)</li><li>11. UN - Department of Political Affairs (DPA)</li><li>12. United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO)</li><li>13. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)</li><li>14. United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)</li><li>15. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)</li><li>16. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)</li><li>17. UN - Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)</li><li>18. UN Mission in DRC (MONUC)</li><li>19. UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)</li><li>20. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)</li><li>21. World Food Programme (WFP)</li></ol>
<p><b>Contributing Donors</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Belgium</li><li>2. Canada</li><li>3. Denmark</li><li>4. European Commission (EC)</li><li>5. Finland</li><li>6. France</li><li>7. Germany</li><li>8. Ireland</li><li>9. Italy</li><li>10. Netherlands</li><li>11. Norway</li><li>12. Sweden</li><li>13. United Kingdom (UK)</li><li>14. World Bank</li></ol>	

# Annex 4: Synthesis of National Programs and Special Projects

## I. MDRP National Programs

### GUIDING PRINCIPLES

National programs implemented by the MDRP were guided by the following principles:

- a. Support to national ownership of programs. Since most successful DDR programs have been based on strong national political will and ownership, the MDRP supported national programs tailored to the requirements of a given country.
- b. Support to comprehensive programs. Within each country, the MDRP supported the establishment of a single national program to discourage fragmentation and duplication of efforts.
- c. Beneficiary involvement. Beneficiaries from all sides were included in program design and implementation from the outset.
- d. Participation. Since the successful economic and social reintegration of former combatants requires the involvement of local authorities and communities, the MDRP encouraged their participation and strengthened their capacities.
- e. Coordination and partnerships. The roles and responsibilities of international actors were determined on a case-by-case basis for each national program. Partnerships with political and security actors, especially those involved in the crafting and implementation of peace agreements, was critical.
- f. Links to economic reconstruction efforts. DRPs were implemented in the context of broader reconstruction efforts. They were encouraged to coordinate and link closely with such efforts in order to benefit from associated employment opportunities and to actively contribute to local reconciliation and recovery efforts.

## ANGOLA

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**Project Name:** Angola Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project

**Implementing Agency:** Institute for Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-combatants (IRSEM)

**Financing:** US\$ 233.65 million (World Bank IDA grant: US\$ 33 million | MDTF: US\$ 30.25 million | European Commission grant: US\$ 13.4 million | Government of Angola: US\$ 157 million)

**Status:** Closed December 31, 2008

**Objective:** The objectives of the project were to:

- Demobilize up to an estimated 138,000 ex-combatants;
- Support their reintegration into civilian life; and
- Contribute to facilitating the reallocation of government expenditure from the military sector to social and economic sectors.

The overall outcome rating for this project was *moderately satisfactory* based on the highly substantial relevance of the project. The project received a moderately satisfactory rating for results in terms of meeting its project development objectives and a satisfactory rating for efficiency.

## BURUNDI

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**Project Name:** Burundi Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project

**Implementing Agency:** Executive Secretariat of the *Commission Nationale de Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Réintégration (CNDRR)*

**Financing:** US\$ 74.8 million (World Bank IDA grant: US\$ 33 million | MDTF: US\$41.8 million)

**Status:** Closed December 31, 2008

**Objective:** The project objectives were to:

- Demobilize an estimated 55,000 combatants of the Burundian Armed Forces, Armed Political Parties and Movements (APPMs), and the National Defense Force, and support their reintegration into civilian life;
- Support the reinsertion of an estimated 20,000 *Gardiens de la Paix (GdP)* and 10,000 *militants combattants (MCs)*; and
- Facilitate the reallocation of national budget resources from the defense sector to social and economic sectors over five years.

The overall outcome rating for this project was *moderately satisfactory* based on its highly substantial relevance. The project received a moderately satisfactory rating for its project development objective and a moderately unsatisfactory rating for efficiency.

## DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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**Project Name:** Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project

**Implementing Agency:** *Unité d'exécution du Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (UEPNDDR)*

**Financing:** US\$ 272 million (World Bank IDA grant: US\$ 150 million | MDTF: US\$ 100 million, AfDB grant US\$ 22 million)

**Status:** Ongoing (MDRP financing is closed)

**Objective:** The objectives of the project were to:

- Demobilize up to an estimated 150,000 ex-combatants and help support their return to civilian life; and
- Promote the reallocation of government expenditure from the military sector to social and economic sectors.

The overall outcome rating for this project (MDRP Trust Fund only, since the IDA-funded portion of the project is ongoing) was *moderately satisfactory*, since the principal quantitative objective was 86 percent achieved and most of the activity-related performance target indicators were successfully achieved. Nonetheless, the project also suffered from cost overruns, which were significant and had a detrimental effect on the ability of the project to fully achieve its stated objectives.

## REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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**Project Name:** Emergency Reintegration Project

**Implementing Agency:** *Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants*

**Financing:** US\$ 24.2 million (Multi-Donor Trust Fund: US\$17 million, European Union TF: US\$4.2 million, Counterpart Funding: US\$ 3 million)

**Status:** Closed February 28, 2009

**Objective:** The objectives of the project were to:

- Contribute to the improvement of security through the disarmament and demobilization of up to 11,000 combatants;
- Support social reintegration through rehabilitation of social infrastructure, conflict management, and reconciliation; and
- Support economic reintegration through income generating activities to ex-combatants.

The overall outcome rating for this project was *moderately unsatisfactory* since the project's demobilization objectives and some of its reintegration objectives were not achieved.

## RWANDA

**Project Name:** Rwanda Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project

**Implementing Agency:** Technical Secretariat of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (TS/RDRC)

**Financing:** US\$ 65.5 million (Multi-donor Trust Fund: US\$ 14.4 million | IDA credit: US\$ 19.12 million | IDA grant: US\$ 11.48 | DFID: US\$ 8.8 million | Germany: US\$ 8.6 million | Government of Rwanda: US\$ 2.7 million | African Union: US\$ 342,000)

**Status:** Closed December 31, 2008

**Objective:** The objectives of the project were to:

- Demobilize an estimated 36,000 ex-combatants from the RDF and members of armed groups, and support their transition to civilian life;
- In the spirit of the Arusha Agreement, support the reinsertion of ex-Rwandan Armed Forces;
- Support the social and economic reintegration of all ex-combatants to be demobilized in stage II and all stage I ex-combatants who remain socioeconomically vulnerable; and
- Facilitate the reallocation of government expenditure from the defense sector to social and economic sectors.

The overall outcome of the project was rated *satisfactory* based on its substantial relevance. The project also received a satisfactory rating for achieving its project development objectives and project efficiency.

## II. MDRP Special Projects

During this first phase of the MDRP (2002-2004), while grant agreements were being negotiated and new government structures created, the MDRP financed a number of Special Projects that were intended to support national demobilization and reintegration (D&R) processes where, for political reasons (Uganda) or capacity reasons (CAR), the government was not prepared to have a national program. These Special Projects financed early D&R activities, for example with a focus on children, in advance of the national programs. In total, the MDRP financed 10 special projects in Angola, Burundi, the CAR, the DRC, and Uganda, totaling just over \$60 million.

### Number of Ex-Combatants That Received Assistance Through the MDRP Special Projects

Angola	
Agricultural reintegration	44,816
Economic reintegration	4,891
IRSEM institutional capacity	96

Burundi (Child Soldiers)	
Number of former child soldiers demobilized	3,028
Number of former child soldiers reintegrated	3,013 <sup>63</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Of the 3,028 children demobilized, seven have since died and another eight are missing.

Central African Republic	
Number of ex-combatants demobilized	7,556 <sup>64</sup>
Number of ex-combatants having received reinsertion assistance	7,533
Number of ex-combatants having received reintegration assistance	7,556

Uganda	
Number of ex-combatants demobilized	16,256
Number of ex-combatants having received reinsertion assistance	14,816
Number of ex-combatants having received reintegration assistance	N/A

Democratic Republic of Congo				
Category <sup>65</sup>	Organization	Number of children beneficiaries of demobilization/ demobilized or released	Number of ex-combatants having received reinsertion <sup>66</sup> assistance	Number of ex-combatants having received reintegration assistance
Former Child Soldiers	Belgian Red Cross	553	N/A	750/ 101
Former Child Soldiers	CARE International (Maniema Province)	905 <sup>67</sup>	N/A	2,682 <sup>68</sup>
	International Rescue Committee (IRC) (Oriental Province)	2,209	N/A	1,449
	International Foundation for Education and Self Help (IFESH) (Northern Katanga Province)	1,885	N/A	1,540
Community Rehabilitation & Reintegration of Former Combatants <sup>69</sup>	United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	N/A	N/A	929 <sup>70</sup>
Rapid Reaction Mechanism	United Nations Development Program (UNDP)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Former Child Soldiers	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	4,325	N/A	4,325
Former Child Soldiers	Save the Children Fund UK	5,902	N/A	5,931 <sup>71</sup> / 3,092

<sup>64</sup> Among the 7,556 demobilized ex-combatants, only 190 were disarmed. The concept of weapons in exchange for development was thus only partially implemented, with many ex-combatants receiving their reinsertion kits and incentives in cash, as opposed to the initially envisaged in-kind reinsertion kits. This was also the case in the DRC, where very few weapons were recovered (less than 30 percent of the demobilized).

<sup>65</sup> The objectives of this project did not include the demobilization of former child soldiers.

<sup>66</sup> Former child soldiers did not receive reinsertion packages.

<sup>67</sup> An estimated 2,221 children were released from the armed forces: 905 were processed through the official demobilization process; the remaining 1,316 self-demobilized or returned straight to their families.

<sup>68</sup> 752 were enrolled in formal schooling; 1,422 joined formal vocational training; and 508 informal vocational training. These numbers reflect the enrollment rate and not the completion rate; certain children are thus included in multiple categories.

<sup>69</sup> The objectives of this project did not include the demobilization and reinsertion of former combatants.

<sup>70</sup> While only 929 ex-combatants were reported to have benefited from sustainable long-term income generating activities and professional training at the close of the project on December 31, 2005, the project also supported short-term employment creation for approximately 3,800 ex-combatants and short-term transitional income-generating opportunities for 1,700 ex-combatants.

<sup>71</sup> These numbers include both ex-CAFF and other vulnerable children (Education – 2,696; Professional training – 2,385; and Agriculture – 850).

## ANGOLA

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**Project Name:** Support the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Framework of the Peace Process in Angola

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

**Financing:** US\$ 4.3 million

**Status:** Completed (June 2005)

**Objectives:** The project consisted of two main components:

- Basic agriculture assistance to ex-combatants and their families. Implemented by FAO, this component aimed to assist an estimated 50,000 ex-combatants to produce basic foods for themselves and their families for one year through the provision of agriculture kits and technical support.
- Economic reintegration support. Implemented by UNDP, this component consisted of a number of pilot activities designed to test the underlying assumptions and approaches regarding economic reintegration, including vocational training opportunities, business training and business advisory services, job placement, micro-credit support, and employment generation.

The project also provided support to develop the procedures for reintegration project review and approval, to design the project management information system, and to train provincial and central office staff of IRSEM.

The overall outcome rating for this project was *satisfactory*; it filled a key gap at a critical point in the Angola peace process and served as a model for others in the MDRP portfolio, both from a technical standpoint and in terms of the institutional arrangements between the Bank and the UN partner. Despite the challenging implementation environment, the project fully realized most of its intended objectives.

## BURUNDI

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**Project Name:** Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in Burundi

**Implementing Agency:** The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

**Financing:** US\$ 3.5 million

**Status:** Completed (June 2006)

**Objectives:** The project aimed to reintegrate demobilized child soldiers into their communities through:

- Community preparation;
- Support to vulnerable biological families;
- Support to community-based care arrangements;



- Enrollment in appropriate education and learning pursuits;
- Support to demobilized child soldiers in need of special care;
- Provision of community-based psychosocial support to address the mental health problems of demobilized children and their families; and
- Support to quick, high-impact projects for youth participation (community service initiatives, apprenticeships, small business, sports, cultural activities), etc.

The overall outcome rating for the project was *satisfactory*. Over 3,000 children (more than 10 percent above the project's target number of beneficiaries) were demobilized and reunited with their families without significant social problems. While there were some shortcomings and inefficiencies in the planning and delivery of the reintegration assistance component, the targeted assistance provided to former child soldiers by the project was successful in reducing their vulnerability.

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

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**Project Name:** Ex-combatants Reintegration and Community Support in Central Africa

**Implementing Agency:** Government of the CAR and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

**Financing:** US\$ 9.7 million from MDRP Trust Fund and US\$ 3.3 million from UNDP

**Status:** Completed (February 2007)

**Objectives:** The project aimed to:

- Support the D&R of ex-combatants by financing micro-enterprise activities in agriculture, mining, reconstruction, etc.; and
- Assist in the rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure and the creation of income-generating activities, as well as reconciliation and dialogue activities.

The overall outcome rating for this project was *unsatisfactory*. The project failed to deliver on a number of its objectives. In particular, disarmament (which was financed through a complementary activity) was very low, with only 190 arms collected from the 7,556 demobilized ex-combatants.

## DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

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**Project Name:** Family and Community Reintegration of Demobilized Child Soldiers

**Implementing Agency:** Belgian Red Cross

**Financing:** US\$ 1.1 million

**Status:** Completed (March 2006)

**Objectives:** The project consisted of three components to be implemented in Kinshasa and in the southern part of the Equateur region around Mbandaka:

- Training of personnel. Carrying out of training, for the Recipient's staff, in working with demobilized child ex-combatants, mediating with their families, and conducting sensitization activities at the community level.
- Sensitization and prevention. Carrying out of sensitization activities aimed at groups including government officials, local authorities, communities, families, teachers, students and volunteers, to increase understanding of the need to better protect children, the legal framework of child protection, and the situation of child ex-combatants and their reintegration into their families and communities through provision of technical advisory services and training.
- Reintegration of child ex-combatants. Reintegration of demobilized child ex-combatants into their families and communities through: (i) establishment and operation of transit centers to receive and prepare child ex-combatants; (ii) provision of services and training to child ex-combatants including counseling, health care, and limited education; and (iii) actual reintegration of child ex-combatants into their families and communities.

The overall outcome rating for this project was *moderately satisfactory*. While child beneficiary numbers for the project were very low, and the project did not achieve all of its initial objectives, it was able to rapidly adapt to changing circumstances and provide effective transit and tracing services to child ex-combatants hoping to be reunified with their families and communities.

**Project Name:** Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Orientale, Northern Katananga and Maniema Provinces

**Implementing Agency:** CARE International, International Rescue Committee (IRC), International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH)

**Financing:** US\$ 9.16 million

**Status:** Completed (April 2007)

**Objectives:** This project consisted of four components to be implemented in three provinces of eastern DRC:

- Development of a profile of the situation of child soldiers in Orientale province and evaluation of the good faith of accessible armed groups to provide access to and develop D&R activities for these children;
- Assessment of the capacity of families and communities-of-return to facilitate the reintegration of children returning from armed groups and identification and development of potential partners and resources needed for successful reintegration and recruitment prevention, to include pilot activities;
- Design of a comprehensive demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) for child soldiers, [in collaboration with CARE, IRC and IFESH] in selected provinces within the framework of the national DRP as it evolves; and
- Implementation, for a trial period of six months, of the DRP for child soldiers [in Maniema,

Oriental, and Northern Katanga provinces] in close collaboration with the national DRP, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and other key actors.

The overall outcome rating for the project administered by CARE in Maniema Province was *moderately satisfactory*. The project assisted over 2,220 CAFF and 918 additional vulnerable children. It created strong local support networks to ensure long-term reintegration, thus strengthening the overall capacity of the community to cope with conflict. Nonetheless, the quality and impact of the project partially suffered from a lack of forward planning, an overly ambitious design, and weak monitoring.

The overall outcome rating for the project administered by the IRC in Oriental Province was *moderately satisfactory*. The project assisted over 2,000 CAFF, was actively involved in the verification and tracing component, and paid great attention to the well being of the beneficiaries during the transition period. However, it also struggled to provide sufficient or quality reintegration support to the children once back in their communities, partly for reasons beyond their control, but also partly due to a lack of experienced staff in the field and of creative problem solving.

The overall outcome rating for the project administered by IFESH in Northern Katanga Province was *moderately satisfactory*. The project assisted over 1,500 former child soldiers. However, like the IRC, IFESH struggled to provide sufficient or quality reintegration support to the children once back in their communities.

**Project Name:** Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization & Reintegration of Children Associated with the Armed Forces

**Implementing Agency:** The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

**Financing:** US\$ 4.9 million

**Status:** Completed (April 2007)

**Objectives:** The project aimed to:

- Support the development and coordination of a national program for the DDR of children associated with fighting forces (CAFF) in the DRC; and
- Support the D&R of CAFF as well as activities aimed at preventing their re-recruitment.

The overall project rating was *satisfactory*. While the project directly assisted “only” approximately 4,000 children, its overall contribution to the national program facilitated the release of almost 30,000 children across the country. Furthermore, UNICEF’s contribution to the overall program for CAFF in the DRC was essential. By developing the tools to coordinate and guide such a large scale operation, UNICEF was able to set in motion two of the most essential elements of the program: harmonization and coordination.

**Project Name:** Support for the Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo

**Implementing Agency:** Save the Children Fund UK

**Financing:** US\$ 5.37 million

**Status:** Completed (December 2006)

**Objectives:** The project had three main objectives:

- Improve understanding of the needs of children associated with fighting forces -- including girls -- and promote their rights during transition from military to civilian life (North and South Kivu);
- Prepare and strengthen institutional capacity of government and NGO partners to ensure protection of child soldiers in the framework of the national D&R program; and
- Ensure the sustainable socioeconomic reintegration of former child soldiers into their communities through support to their interim care, family reunification, and strengthening of community capacity (North and South Kivu, Bunia).

The overall outcome rating for the project was *satisfactory*. While the project suffered significant delays and shortcomings in terms of monitoring, it was nevertheless able to support the D&R of over 5,700 children associated with fighting forces and over 2,800 other vulnerable children, exceeding the original target number of 8,000 total beneficiaries. It was also instrumental in providing training and support to the national government structure and other, less experienced, implementing agencies.

**Project Name:** Community Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the DRC

**Implementing Agency:** Government of the DRC and United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

**Financing:** US\$ 5 million

**Status:** Completed (March 2005)

**Objectives:** The project, implemented in five provinces (North and South Kivu, Orientale, Katanga, and Maniema), aimed to:

- Sensitize and mobilize receiving communities around socioeconomic reintegration of war-affected populations and the peaceful co-existence between the fighting groups;
- Improve access and quality of basic social services through the reconstruction of social infrastructure in the receiving communities;
- Create economic opportunities for returnees (displaced populations returning to their communities of origin) through the promotion of income generating activities; and
- Facilitate the economic reintegration of ex-combatants and their dependants in receiving communities.

The overall outcome rating for this project was *moderately unsatisfactory*. While activities to sensitize and mobilize communities and to improve access to basic social services were well received, they were not consistently available throughout the project areas. The project was also less successful in creating economic opportunities for communities and was unable to

achieve the core objectives of the project, namely facilitating the economic reintegration of ex-combatants. However, the project did contribute to building a foundation for peace-building and community recovery in the conflict-affected Eastern DRC.

**Project:** Rapid Reaction Mechanism in support of the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants

**Implementing Agency:** United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

**Financing:** US\$ 12.6 million

**Status:** Completed (December 2006)

**Objectives:** The project aimed to:

- Respond to urgent situations relating to the process of D&R of ex-combatants in the DRC by supporting the rapid deployment of technical and human resources and equipment as well as the establishment of demobilization sites and the provision of reintegration services in areas of interventions; and
- Facilitate the preparation of a National Program on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration through exploratory activities, evaluation missions, surveys of target groups, analysis of conditions for the implementation of DDR, sensitization activities, and information exchanges and consultation.

The overall outcome rating for this project was *moderately satisfactory* since most of the project's main objectives were met. Nonetheless, one of the key objectives, to facilitate the preparation of the national program, was not fully accomplished.

## UGANDA

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**Project Name:** Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration of Reporters

**Implementing Agency:** Uganda Amnesty Commission

**Financing:** US\$ 4.2 million

**Status:** Completed (June 2007)

**Objectives:** The project aimed to:

- Assist approximately 15,310 ex-combatants in their reintegration into civilian life, within the context of Uganda's Amnesty Act of 2000; and
- Strengthen the capacity of the Amnesty Commission to implement its functions.

The overall outcome rating for this project was *moderately satisfactory*. The project contributed to an improved environment for peace and development in Uganda. Furthermore, the sensitizing of communities and potential reporters by the Amnesty Commission played an important role in the government's Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan for Northern Uganda, which engaged many government and non-government stakeholders, facilitated the peace talks with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and led to increased confidence among the people in Northern Uganda to return home. Finally, the MDRP framework within which the grant was provided facilitated partnerships with other donors and UN agencies.

# Annex 5: MDRP Partner Meetings<sup>72</sup>

## ADVISORY COMMITTEE (AC) AND TRUST FUND COMMITTEE (TFC) MEETINGS

**April 2002, Paris:** The meeting discussed the updated MDRP Strategy. It also addressed a range of issues such as including Sudan in the MDRP; targeting unemployed youth through the MDRP; and the importance of MDRP beneficiaries not being responsible for war crimes. Partners stressed the importance of: (i) ensuring that the MDRP Secretariat has adequate staffing capacity to fulfill its responsibilities, including social impact monitoring; (ii) supporting longer-term social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants; and (iii) community-based approaches to reintegration.

**November 2002, The Hague:** The meeting discussed the first Joint Supervision Mission (JSM) which affirmed the principles underlying the MDRP: conditions for country program aid, need for national ownership, and MDRP as the only trust fund for DDR. Concerns about slow progress in putting in place special projects in the DRC were raised as well as the need for permanent MDRP presence in Kinshasa.

**April 2003, Paris:** The AC noted the approval of the first Special Project in the DRC, but of greater importance was that procedures had been cleared so that future projects could be processed faster. More active involvement of the MDRP on the ground in Burundi had resulted in better quality analysis. The previous recommendation of a permanent presence in DRC should be generalized across all MDRP countries and links with political processes stressed: *“more in-depth political analysis... in collaboration with local partner representatives, would further enhance the quality of national programs and other MDRP activities... also requested that the Secretariat prepare a discussion paper on the linkages between DDR and SSR ... [and] prepare an options paper on how the MDRP might help in addressing the needs of [non-combatant women, children and disabled]... through linkages with humanitarian, reconstruction and other recovery efforts”* (AC April 2003 Minutes, para. 10).

**November 2003, Kinshasa:** The meeting reviewed national policies and DDR programs; progress of implementation and findings of the JSM; papers on links between DDR and SSR; and targeting of MDRP support: *“...need to seek and advocate linkages with efforts in support of war-affected groups not covered under the MDRP financing ... and the recommendation to apply community- and area-based reintegration strategies where feasible was reaffirmed”* (AC November 2003 Minutes, para. 11).

**May 2004, Brussels:** Partners wanted a focus on regional activities and support to cross-border

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<sup>72</sup> Synthesis of Partner Meetings from Scanteam, “Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program,” End of Program Evaluation.

sensitization and repatriation activities. The UN briefed on the preparations for a GLR conference on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development, highlighting “*the importance of national ownership of the process, the role of civil society representatives*” (AC May 2004 Minutes, paras. 11, 14).

**February 2005, Paris:** The main item was the MTR (see main text). The destabilizing factor of 41,000 COFS, especially in eastern DRC, was raised, and the need for partnership with the UN in addressing this. The UN noted the option of forcible disarmament was not feasible due to lack of mandate and force size. Some parties cautioned the MDRP on issues where diplomatic efforts were ongoing. DDR in Africa and how MDRP could share its lessons with the development community were addressed.

**November 2005, London:** The diverse nature of country circumstances and the practical problems of implementing DDR activities in fragile states as well as the continued slow progress on the COFS issue were noted. A special session on MDRP in the wider context of peace and security was held.

**November 2006, Paris:** The meeting returned to the DDR-SSR links, noting the Bank’s limited ability to engage in SSR, while also discussing the necessary links between DDR and transitional justice.

**December 2007, Paris:** Focus was on three MDRP tasks: (i) accelerate implementation; (ii) plan the exit; (iii) consolidate learning from MDRP. The main political theme was a presentation by the EU Special Representative for the GLR discussing the conflict in the DRC and its massive civilian displacement and sexual violence. He stressed the need for a solution to peace that incorporates diplomatic, political and developmental tools, and the importance of the MDRP over the next two years. The need for comprehensive approaches that align political, security, humanitarian and development elements early on was raised, but partners noted the difficulty of executing such longer term complementary activities in early post-conflict environments.

**March 2009, Washington:** The final AC meeting was preceded by a “reflection workshop” with many of those who set up the MDRP, followed by a DDR Forum to assess the state of knowledge on DDR. The AC was followed by a half-day TFC (for the donors) and TCG (for the African partners). Focus of the AC meeting was the final reports from partners on achievements on the ground, a historical overview of the conflict in the region, as well as the Secretariat’s assessment of MDRP achievements.

## OTHER TRUST FUND COMMITTEE MEETINGS

September 2005, Kinshasa

February 2006, Kinshasa

May 2006, Kinshasa

October 2006, Paris

May 2007, Paris

May 2008, Paris

June 2009, Paris

## TECHNICAL COORDINATION GROUP MEETINGS

**July-August 2002, Luanda:** A first four-day TCG meeting included 13 staff from all seven countries. DDR experts from Chad, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone presented experiences from their countries as background to discussions on how to organize D&R programs in the GLR.

**August 2003, Kibuye:** A workshop was held to discuss M&E and the setting up of MIS to register and analyze M&E data.

**February 2004:** A study tour to Sierra Leone included staff from all the MDRP partner countries except the DRC, with a view to better understanding the Sierra Leone experience in demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants.

**September 2004, Kigali:** The RDRRC hosted a meeting with delegations from Burundi and Uganda to share experiences.

**October-November 2005, Kigali:** The workshop, jointly hosted by UNIFEM and the MDRP, discussed gender and D&R, with countries presenting experiences, lessons, and constraints to addressing gender and a reflection held on issues affecting the regional program as a whole.

**June 2006, Luanda:** Five countries sent staff to look at Angola's results on reintegration.

The MDRP Secretariat then organized a meeting for technical delegations from Rwanda and DRC in Nairobi, September 16-20, 2002, with UNDP and MONUC present, in order to develop comprehensive implementation of the DD and repatriating of Rwandese armed groups from DRC. Rwanda invited a delegation from the DRC to visit their program.

**November 2006, Paris:** The TCG discussed experiences and ideas on the following cross-regional issues:

- *Children Associated with Fighting Forces:* Focus was on updating and strengthening the Cape Town Principles, the role of the new principles in MDRP-supported programs, and “best practices” developed within MDRP-supported programs for working with children.
- *Strengthening Gender Dimensions of DDR:* The key themes were the need to develop a conceptual framework on gender and DDR, and to establish a forum through which to collate, discuss and disseminate experiences with gender and DDR within MDRP.
- *Re-thinking DDR:* Seeing DDR from both conflict management and development perspectives had participants reflect on DDR, security and peace-building within a wider frame-



work of governance, justice and economic and social well-being/development.

- *DDR and National Ownership*: Three case studies addressed the concept of national ownership: Angola's experience with engaging formerly opposing groups; the ROC's experience with engaging parliamentarians; and Uganda's experience of working with civil society organizations

**June 2007, Kigali:** The challenge of psycho-social trauma among ex-combatants and how to address this at individual and community levels was the main topic.

**November 2007, Paris:** The session (i) discussed and shared experiences on working with the World Bank, the Bank's policies and procedures, mandate and priorities within the Africa Region; and (ii) presented creative leadership concepts in the context of DDR programs. Following this, the MDRP held its first one-day Learning Seminar.

**March 2009, Washington:** An expanded *DDR Policy Forum* with TCG, full AC and external resources persons discussed the status of knowledge on key DDR issues: global policy on conflict, security, fragile states and future DDR programming; the early recovery challenge of balancing needs of ex-combatants vs. victims of violence vs. constructing the foundations for peace; the debate on alternative approaches to reintegration; and regional modalities to address fragile states and regional conflicts.

## Annex 6: Analytical Work

Year	Study
2003	1. Linkages between Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants and Security Sector Reform
2004	2. Targeting MDRP Assistance: Ex-combatants and Other War-affected Populations
2005	3. Taking a Gender Perspective to Strengthen the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program in the Greater Great Lakes Region 4. MDRP Gender Desk Study (Emily Schroeder)
2006	5. Reintegration Assistance for Ex-combatants: Good Practices and Lessons for the MDRP (Sarah Michael)
2007	6. Ex-combatants in Burundi: Why They Joined, Why They Left, How They Fared (Peter Uvin) 7. Beyond Demobilization: Challenges and Opportunities for Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic (Boubacar N'diaye) 8. Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Hans Romkema) 9. The Social and Economic Status of Beneficiaries of the Burundi Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention Special Project (Sarah Michael)
2008	10. The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program: Lessons From the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (Sarah Michael) 11. CAR: Lessons From a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program 12. Psychosocial Issues in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants 13. The Status of LRA Reporters (Sarah Michael) 14. Contemporary Security and Development Trends in the GLR (Gilbert Khadiagala)
2009	15. Voices of Youth in Post-conflict Burundi: Perspectives on Exclusion, Gender and Conflict (Pia Peeters, Emilie Smith, Maria Correia) 16. Voices and Views: Youth in Post-conflict Rwanda from a Poverty and Gender Perspective (Pia Peeters, Emilie Smith, Maria Correia) 17. Guidelines for Incorporating HIV/AIDS Activities in Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Programs for Ex-combatants (Carla Boussem) 18. Out of Work, Out of Manhood: Unemployment, Young Men, Masculinities and Conflict in Angola (Marianna Olinger, Marcio Segundo, Marcos Nascimento and Gary Barker) 19. Study on Local Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Constraints and Opportunities for a Return to Peace in Eastern DRC (Mass Walimba Katangira)

## Annex 7: List of Child Trust Funds

TF Number	Task Name	Closing Date	Type of Completion Report
TF051234	MDRP Regional Activities/TA	June 30, 2009	--
TF051235	MDRP Program Management, Administration, TF Coordination	June 30, 2009	--
TF090854	Learning for Equality Access and Peace (LEAP)	February 28, 2009	
TF052486	ANGOLA. Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project	December 31, 2008	ICR
TF052486	ANGOLA. Support the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Framework of the Peace Process in Angola (Special) Project	June 30, 2005	ICM
TF053794	BURUNDI. Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project	December 31, 2008	ICR
TF053856	BURUNDI. Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in Burundi (Special) Project	June 30, 2006	ICM
TF053548	CAR. Ex-combatants Reintegration and Community Support in Central Africa (Special) Project	February 28, 2007	ICM
TF054242	DRC. Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project	March 31, 2008	ICM <sup>73</sup>
TF052896	DRC. Community Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the DRC (Special) Project (Implemented by UNDP)	March 31, 2005	ICM
TF053310	DRC. Family and Community Reintegration of Demobilized Child Soldiers (Special) Project (Implemented by Belgian Red Cross)	March 1, 2006	ICM
TF054284	DRC. Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization & Reintegration of Children Associated with the Armed Forces (Special) Project (Implemented by UNICEF)	April 30, 2007	ICM

<sup>73</sup> ICR forthcoming when IDA portion of funding is closed.

TF052749	DRC. Demobilization and Community-Based Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers in Maniema Province (Special) Project (Implemented by CARE International)	December 31, 2006	ICM
TF052748	DRC. Demobilization and Community-Based Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers in Northern Katanga Province (Special) Project (Implemented by IFESH)	April 30, 2007	ICM
TF052747	DRC. Demobilization and Community-Based Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers in Oriental Province (Special) Project (Implemented by International Rescue Committee)	December 31, 2006	ICM
TF052897	DRC. Rapid Reaction Mechanism in Support of the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants (Special) Project (Implemented by UNDP)	December 31, 2006	ICM
TF052337	DRC. Support for the Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Special) Project (Implemented by Save the Children UK)	December 31, 2006	ICM
TF056057	ROC. Emergency Reintegration Program	February 28, 2009	ICM
TF052159	RWANDA. Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project	December 31, 2008	ICR
TF053729	UGANDA. Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration of Reporters (Special) Project	June 30, 2007	ICM

# Annex 8: List of Supporting Documents and References

## WORLD BANK IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION MEMORANDA (ICMs) AND IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORTS (ICRs)

- Angola ICR:** “Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project.” Implementation Completion and Results Report. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.
- Angola ICM:** “Support the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Framework of the Peace Process in Angola (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum for project implemented by UNDP. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005.
- Burundi ICR:** “Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project.” Implementation Completion and Results Report. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.
- Burundi ICM:** “Child Soldier Demobilization, Social Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in Burundi (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum for project implemented by UNICEF. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008.
- CAR ICM:** “Ex-combatants Reintegration and Community Support in Central Africa (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum for project implemented by UNDP. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005.
- DRC ICMs:**
- (a) “Community Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the DRC (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum for project implemented by UNDP. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006.
  - (b) “Demobilization and Community-Based Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers in Maniema Province (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum for project implemented by CARE International. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.
  - (c) “Demobilization and Community-Based Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers in Northern Katanga Province (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum for project implemented by IFESH. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.

(d) “Demobilization and Community-Based Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers in Oriental Province (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum for project implemented by International Rescue Committee. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.

(e) “Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.

(f) “Family and Community Reintegration of Demobilized Child Soldiers (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum for project implemented by Belgian Red Cross. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006.

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(h) “Rapid Reaction Mechanism in support of the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum for project implemented by UNDP. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.

(i) “Support for the Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum for project implemented by Save the Children UK. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.

**RoC ICM:** “Emergency Reintegration Program.” Implementation Completion Memorandum. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.

**Rwanda ICR:** “Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project.” Implementation Completion and Results Report. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.

**Uganda ICM:** “Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration of Reporters (Special) Project.” Implementation Completion Memorandum. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.

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